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1. General Introduction
Why do achievements differ so widely from aspirations? [...] Social life is not
only a trial of strength between opposing groups: it is action within a more or
less resilient or brittle framework of institutions and traditions, and it creates
– apart from any conscious counter-action – many unforeseen reactions in
this framework, some of them perhaps even unforeseeable. To try to analyse
these reactions and to foresee them as far as possible is, I believe, the main
task of the social sciences. - Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies.
In the course of the research for my dissertation, I had the luck to encounter
three fascinating examples for which the introductory quote might as well have
been specifically tailored. Social and economic behavior takes place within
institutions and is strongly affected by social norms and past choices. The
resulting complexity of issues often appears daunting. Take for example the
currently existing US patent-regime. Since its inception, the United States
Constitution provides that Patent Law was created in order to “promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”.
Two centuries have passed, and while the Founding Fathers most certainly had
tangible matters like new tools or practical methods to be used in the nascent
state in mind, in the meantime the same law must govern the treatment of
genome sampling or the source code for computer programs while competing
with the patent systems of Europe, Japan, China and many others. This
adaptation would not have been possible – and some state forcefully that it
has failed miserably – without constant tweaks to the system and continuous
marginal reform processes. It is the role of economists to accompany such
1
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processes of change and to use the tools at our disposal to better understand
the underlying forces and to foresee their effects as far as possible – such as,
for example, the current role of patent examiners and judges for the innovation
behavior and creative efforts inside a country.
This dissertation is concerned with three different topics, each of which is
treated in a separate, self-contained article. Their underlying connection is
contained in the quote above, as they apply the methods of social science – mi-
croeconomic theory and micro-econometrics – to questions related to “grown”,
or in one case “growing” institutions. In Chapter 2, I address troubles that
patent systems are facing to a large and increasing degree, such as the deval-
uation of patents due to badly specified claims and property rights and the
ensuing central role that courts play in the patent system in the context of a
game-theoretic model. While the patent system can be considered a venerable
institution, in Chapter 3 I turn my attention to a young and budding one:
Online social networks. Making use of a unique data set, in collaboration with
Steffen Reik I try to explore whether the existing economic theory on social
networks can assist us in understanding the forces that shape user behavior
within. One of the central findings is the importance of social norms in this en-
vironment. In Chapter 4, which was developed working together with Leonardo
Felli and Konrad Stahl, the aim is to show how a specific social norm, trust,
shapes the interaction between upstream suppliers and downstream manufac-
turers in the automotive industry. I present a game-theoretic model and test
its predictions using data from an extensive industry survey we conducted.
In the following, I briefly introduce the three respective articles which com-
pose the remainder of this dissertation. The Appendix includes most of the
tables referred to in the text as well as the complete bibliography.
2
1.1. Private Profits and Public Benefits - How not to Reform the Patent System
1.1. Private Profits and Public Benefits - How
not to Reform the Patent System
The need for a reform of the US patent system has been widely expressed,
both by scientists and practitioners. There are widespread complaints about
the quality of granted patents, especially the lack of “clearly drawn property
lines”, to the extent that some refer to the patent system as “failed”. At the
same time, due to the investments made into existing patents and the resulting
rights of patentees, a fundamental reform of the patent system is not feasible
in the short- or medium term. For the foreseeable future, therefore, the system
will have to plod on with relatively minor tweaks; but due to its complexity,
even apparently minor tweaks can have quite serious consequences.
In order to better understand the tradeoffs involved in the contemplated
“improvements”, I present a model that includes the three pillars of current
patent systems: legislation, patent and trademark offices (PTOs) and courts.
Legislators decide the objective criteria concerning the matter that can be
patented, such as novelty or utility. The PTO inspects patent applications in
compliance with these regulations. The courts, whose importance has increased
substantially in the past two decades in the area of patenting, then decide
whether claims granted in existing patents are truly enforceable, or whether
the patent should perhaps have not been granted initially.
In contrast to the existing literature on patent litigation starting with Meurer
(1989), I introduce two different types of lawsuits: Both claims for damages by
the patentee against the alleged infringer as well as challenges to the validity of a
patent by competitors. I show that it depends on the competitive setting as well
as the expected quality of a patent whether litigation can have a complementary
function to the examination efforts of the PTO. Against this background, I then
show that some of the contemplated (or demanded) reform steps, especially
increasing the fees for patenting, may actually decrease the average quality of
patent applications in relevant cases.
3
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1.2. Individual (Ir)rationality? Behavior in an
Emerging Online Social Network
The last decade has seen important advances in the theoretical literature on
the economics of social networks, spearheaded by the work of Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996). This article, and its successors, depict social networks using
a graph-theoretic environment in which individuals are depicted as nodes and
their links – for example business partnerships or friendships – are resembled by
the arcs of the graph. The existing theory comes to very precise and relatively
homogenous predictions concerning structures of networks that are stable, in
the sense that they are the results of equilibrium behavior. But more recently,
experimental economists have started to examine the quality of predictions
derived from the theory in highly controlled surroundings and the results have
been mixed at best, so that doubts have been raised whether individuals truly
behave in a rational manner in social-network settings.
In this chapter, I take an empirical look at individual behavior within an actu-
ally existing social online-network with additional utility generating functions.
To be specific, users are able to upload music to online-libraries, from which
both they and their first-degree “friends” can access the music whenever they
are online. Standard economic theory proves to be very helpful in predicting
with whom individual users are going to form new friendships, as this behavior
is compatible with utility maximization. But we also find behavior that points
in the direction of social norms that are mutually enforced: Users decline to
enter into or sever purely beneficial links when there is indication of free riding,
for example. Further, we show that in the face of public-good like provision
and organization of music, users do slightly undersupply these forms of effort
for higher levels of other users’ efforts, as standard public-good or club-good
theory would predict. But users immediately react to other users’ additional
provision of public goods in a positively reciprocal manner to a degree that
more than compensates for the first effect.
4
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1.3. Trust and Investment - A Theoretical and
Empirical Assessment
In the fourth chapter, I present a simple model of contractual structures in-
volving upstream suppliers and downstream producers. The upstream sup-
pliers exert effort to determine the joint surplus from cooperating with the
downstream firm. Since the latter has the entire bargaining power, this is a
classical holdup situation. Defining trust as the expectation of the supplier
that the downstream firm will honor his property rights, it is straightforward
to show that higher levels of trust will alleviate the typical underinvestment
problem. What is more surprising is the relationship between trust and com-
petition among suppliers, which the downstream firm is able to induce. As
opposed to the literature on relational contracting, which generally finds that
arms-length (market) interactions and functioning informal relationships are to
a great extent mutually exclusive, in this setting more intense competition can
be associated with higher levels of trust. The intuition behind this result is that
competition is one mechanism to extract a part of the supplier’s surplus that
is utilized instead of exploiting the hold-up situation.
We then take these predictions to the data, a unique dataset collected during
a two year survey of the German automotive industry. Each of our observa-
tions is a relationship between a supplier and a car manufacturer with regard
to one part that is procured. This allows us to focus on the relationship specific
nature of trust, while existing empirical and experimental studies mostly treat
trust as a characteristic of individuals. We are able to study the effects and
determinants of trust in these relationships and show that the suppliers’ trust,
captured by different measures with individual connotations, can be damaged
by rent-extracting behavior of the downstream firm. On the other hand, as pre-
dicted by our theoretical model, trust is not negatively associated with stronger
competition between suppliers induced by the car manufacturer. Emphasizing
the importance of trust in vertical relationships, we then demonstrate that trust
can mitigate the underinvestment issue resulting from the hold-up situation:
5
1. General Introduction
In particular, lower levels of trust of the supplier in the car manufacturer are
associated with higher failure rates of the procured part, which we use as a
proxy for investment.
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How not to Reform the Patent
System
2.1. Introduction
2.1.1. Motivation
A patent is not a property right. Patentees cannot directly exclude others from
markets that are covered by the claims of their patent(s). Instead, a patent
only conveys to the holder the right to go to court against alleged infringers. In
recent years, the number of court cases involving patents has grown extremely
rapidly to impressive levels.1 In a thought-provoking study, Bessen and Meurer
(2008b) estimate that litigation costs related to patents have exceeded private
profits from patents ever since the late 1990s. According to their estimates,
global profits directly connected to US patents in 1999 accrued to 9.3 billion
USD, while their estimate for the domestic litigation costs to companies is
roughly 16 billion USD. These figures are alarming.
The need for a reform of the US patent system has been widely expressed,
both by scientists and practitioners. There are widespread complaints about the
quality of granted patents, especially the lack of “clearly drawn property lines”,
to the extent that some refer to the patent system as “failed”. Currently, there
are efforts underway in both Europe and the US to improve the way patents
are granted and enforced.2 Researchers’ more audacious recommendations for
1See Cook (2007) for an analysis of this phenomenon, with a focus of the role of specialized courts.
2Recent efforts in Europe include the development towards a unified “European Patent” agreed upon in
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this have ranged from advising fundamental, game-changing reform such as
Bessen and Meurer (2008a), to demanding the patent system as a whole being
scrapped such as Boldrin and Levine (2002, 2008).
Compared to these demands, the actual reforms that have been attempted
are extremely tame, focussing on (seemingly) minor procedural measures. And
also the bulk of theoretical research has focused on more marginal shifts. The
reason for this is fairly obvious - despite the many shortcomings of the current
systems, the existing patents held by individuals and corporations are tremen-
dously valuable. The investments that lead to the protected innovations were
(arguably) sunk with the goal of patenting in mind, which means that any
legislature tampering with the system will face never before seen claims for
damages. As the youngest current patents have another 20 years on the clock,
any fundamental reform steps are all but certain to be postponed until then,
at least.3
So for the foreseeable future, any revolution to the patent system by needs
will be extremely marginal, infused with apparently harmless tweaks to the
patent application fee or the responsible jurisdiction for patent claims; but in
fact, due to the immense complexity of the current patent-machinery, pitfalls
loom even for tweaks that appear to be harmless. The goal of this article is
to provide a theoretical framework that is as simple as possible, while it still
spans all three pillars of current patent systems. Our aim is to demonstrate
a number of perhaps unexpected tradeoffs involved in tampering with them.
What we consider the three pillars are:
(1) Patent legislation, which defines the prerequisites for a patent to be
granted as well as the right of patent holders.
the Council of Ministers of the European Union on December 4, 2009, as well as the introduction of
a specialized European Patent Court as a part of the (currently stalled) European Patent Litigation
Agreement. In the US, introducing new patent legislation has become a bi-annual tradition, of which
the Patent Reform Acts of 2009, 2007, 2005 and 2003 bear witness. The main goal of the latest was to
reduce the burden of the Patent and Trademark Office in the inspection process.
3With this point in time moving along until any first steps are at serious reform are taken. And the 20-year
timeframe is actually rather optimistic, because research programs that are currently underway with
patents potentially looming years from now may already have generated claims based on the investors’
trust in the current system.
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(2) Patent and trademark offices (PTOs), which apply the existing rules and
regulations in examining patent applications.
(3) Courts, which uphold the rights of patentees against alleged infringers
and, by giving third parties the chance to challenge existing patents,
have the ability to invalidate patents that should not have been granted.
The basic dilemma in patenting is that the patentability of an idea from the
perspective of legal requirements or social welfare does not necessarily coincide
with the private benefits an inventor obtains from being granted patent claims.
In our model, we distinguish between the profit an individual or firm may
derive from an idea if patented and the patentability of an idea from the legal
perspective. Unlike the existing literature, which mostly focuses on binary good
vs. bad distinctions, we allow for a continuum along both dimensions - ideas
may range from patentable over “almost” patentable to “clearly not” patentable,
as is arguably the case in reality. It is the role of the PTO to make this
distinction, with its decision necessarily being imperfect - as PTOs face time,
budget and staffing constraints. We represent this in a highly reduced form in
the model. Finally, there is the possibility of patent holders and competitors
becoming entangled in court proceedings, where we can distinguish between
damage suits against alleged infringers on the one hand and challenges of the
validity of granted patents on the other. We attempt to represent both kinds
of proceedings in our model.
The occurrence, type and outcome of court interactions depend on various
factors: The most important are the average quality of patents, as there is
asymmetric information about the validity of individual patents, and the com-
petitive setting between patentees and potential infringers. We show that one
of the most frequently contemplated (or demanded) reform steps, increasing
fees for patent applications at the PTO, may actually decrease the average
quality of patent applications. Further, we point out some unintended and
potentially costly consequences of increasing the level of scrutiny exerted by
the PTOs. Further, we find that a reduction of litigation costs for patent costs
9
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has multiple desirable effects - which is especially relevant in the face of spe-
cialized courts of appeals being introduced in the US and the European Patent
Legislation Agreement.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows: After a brief review of the
related literature, section 2 sketches legal and empirical differences between
the European and the US patent system in order to derive stylized facts and
motivate the relevant determinants of our model. Section 3 develops the model
of patent legislation, examination and litigation. In section 4 we derive the
equilibria of the model and perform comparative statics exercises to determine
the effects of various approaches to patent system reform. Section 5 empha-
sizes empirically relevant predictions, proposes venues for further research and
concludes.
2.1.2. Related Literature and Contribution
The first strain of the literature that our article is related to studies the effects
of patent litigation. The issue of potentially invalid patents and resulting liti-
gation has garnered recurring interest in the past two decades. Meurer (1989)
proposes the first model that explicitly takes the possibility of patent invalid-
ity and resulting litigation into account. Patentees face a single competitor,
with both parties aware of the fact that courts may overturn the patent. The
competitor can either accept the patentees non-cooperative bargaining offer, do
nothing or challenge the patent through the courts. The study carefully shows
how settlement and litigation probabilities depend, among other things, on the
strength of the patent both under symmetric and asymmetric information. We
adapt the model for one of our litigation subgames.
Crampes and Langinier (2002) study the opposite competitive setting: Here,
the competitor does not challenge the patent, but simply enters the market,
thereby (potentially) infringing the patentee’s rights. The patentee does not
necessarily notice this, instead he must invest in a costly monitoring technology,
which determines the probability with which infringement is observed. If ob-
10
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served, the patentee must make the decision whether to accommodate, litigate
or settle with the infringer, where the settlement results from cooperative Nash
Bargaining. The otherwise efficient bargaining potentially breaks down as the
authors impose costly frictions in the bargaining process. Monitoring is shown
to be an effective way to preclude entry. Bessen and Meurer (2006)’s approach
is very is similar to Crampes and Langinier (2002) - they give the potential
infringer the strategic opportunity to invest into research, which affects the
probability of being fined by courts in two possible ways: This activity could
be general R&D (e.g. adding additional features to the product), which would
potentially increase the risk of being found infringing. Or the company could
exert effort to specifically invent around existing patents, which would reduce
the probability of infringing. Instead of monitoring activity as in Crampes
and Langinier (2002), the patent holder can invest in strengthening his patent;
the probability that the court will find the infringer guilty if a trial arises in-
creases in this investment (this can be interpreted as applying for additional
patents to create a thicket or employing better and more expensive lawyers to
phrase the patent application and claims optimally). In the empirical part of
their project, the authors find that competitors’ investment is overwhelmingly
focused on research.
More specific issues within the area of patent litigation have also been dis-
cussed: A number of papers investigate the role of different liability rules and
how these affect the level of protection granted by intellectual property rights,
see e.g. Schankerman and Scotchmer (2001) and Choi (2006) for comparisons of
lost profit and unjust enrichment rules in different competitive settings. Anton
and Yao (2007) study the infringement decision in the case of process innova-
tions for lost profits damages. Antitrust issues and anticompetitive effects of
the settlement of patent litigation are taken into account in Shapiro (2003) and
Lemley and Shapiro (2005).
A second group of articles is concerned with the organization of and incen-
tives within patent offices and their effects on the patent system. Caillaud and
Duchene (2006) scrutinize the capacity of the patent office to deal with appli-
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cations and the so called overload problem. In their model, if the PTO were
to employ a strict examination standard, a hypothetical equilibrium exists in
which bad applications are deterred. A problem arises, though, if the PTO is
overloaded with applications - as it can no longer enforce the strict standard, de-
terrence becomes less effective and the separating equilibrium can no longer be
upheld. In Prady (2008), low quality inventors can induce shirking of the patent
examiner by sending signals that require more effort to disentangle. Schuett
(2009) models the examination process as a combined moral-hazard/adverse-
selection problem and tries to explain and argue for different incentive schemes
for examiners.
Two recent studies are closely related to ours. Both Farrell and Shapiro
(2008) and Chiou (2008) present models which allow for patent examination
and potential litigation. In Farrell and Shapiro (2008), an upstream innovator
owns a patent that may be “weak” in the sense that a court will only uphold
it if challenged with a certain probability. The upstream innovator faces a
set of downstream firms which can apply his innovation. Depending on the
competitive setting, they show that even very weak patents can have a strong
price-shifting effect – when the downstream market is very competitive, then
there is next to no private incentive to challenge the patent, which gives even
weak patents great power. In such a setting, more stringent PTO reviews
are welfare enhancing. Our study is in many ways complementary to this
approach: While in Farrell and Shapiro (2008) there is no room for litigation
in equilibrium, despite zero litigation costs, our main focus is to determine
under which conditions which kind of litigation will appear, and how this is
affected by contemplated reforms. Their main analysis focuses on the role of
the intensity of downstream competition in a specific setup - we treat this factor
in a reduced form, which to a certain degree encompasses their analysis. Finally,
they treat the quality of granted patents as uncertain even for the holders. We
demonstrate that similar effects can be generated with asymmetric information
and two kinds of patents –ironclad or void – and that the probabilistic nature
is no requirement.
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Motivated by Lemley (2001)’s provocative thesis that increases in the dili-
gence of the patent office are inefficient and one should let the competition sort
out bad patents through litigation, Chiou (2008) sets up a two stage model,
in which first the patent office exerts effort in order to find prior art that al-
lows to deny a latently invalid patent. If the patent office is unable to destroy
the patent, in the second stage a private competitor can exert effort in the
same way to have it repealed. While for relatively good patents (high priors
of patent quality) he finds a crowding out of private efforts through the patent
office along the lines of Lemley (2001), for low-quality patent population he
finds the opposite effect: Stricter enforcement by the patent office actually en-
courages the competitor to himself invest in research efforts to try to invalidate
the patent. The paper relies on a new way of modeling court interactions –
higher exertion of (costly) effort by the challenger (or by the PTO) leads to
the destruction of the patent with a higher probability and the “quality” of a
patent affects the marginal effect of effort. Again, our approach, using a more
classical way to model suits and countersuits applied to a population of patent
applications, can be seen as complementary.
This article contributes to both strands of the literature. Our model encom-
passes both the examination and the litigation phase of the patenting process.
Regarding litigation, we integrate the competitors’ choice between challenging
an existing patent or entering the market directly and potentially infringing.
Competitors’ beliefs concerning patent validity are determined by the policy
adopted by the patent office as well as settlement offers proposed by the patent
holders. Further, we allow for a delay between patent application and the final
decision of the patent office - a form of patent office overload related to the one
studied by Caillaud and Duchene (2006), which can be considered a “cost” of
demanding higher levels of diligence from patent examiners and which awaits
empirical exploration. Finally, we study a population of ideas which varies
continuously regarding private value to the inventor and objective patentabil-
ity, which allows us to shed light on tradeoffs due to the composition of the
population of patent applications, which have not been studied before.
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2.2. Comparison of the US and the European
Patent System - Stylized Facts
Before we describe the theoretical model, we first provide a glimpse of some of
the differences between two of the most important patent regimes today: the
US and the European patent system. The goal is not to exhaustively display
and analyze these issues, but to motivate the factors and variables we integrate
into our model.
2.2.1. Patent Legislation and Examination through
Patent Offices
Even though there are many calls for and initiatives in the direction of harmo-
nization, the US and the European patent legislations retain some very distinct
features. Generally speaking, there are stark differences between European and
US patent laws, while the differences among the core countries of the EU are
comparably negligible.
While the “first to file” system is prevalent in Europe, that is, the first to ap-
ply for a patent is awarded the right, traditionally the US award patent rights
to the first person to discover an innovation (“first to invent”). A further differ-
ence regarding the patenting requirements concerns what in the US is termed
“novelty” and, e.g., in Germany the “inventive step”. Both requirements state
that for an idea to be patentable it may not yet have been made public previ-
ously in any form. In Germany this holds absolutely. In the US, inventors are
granted a “grace period”, i.e. they generally only have to file their application
within a year of their idea’s publication.
The other general requirements for something to be patentable are similar in
both systems - patentable subject matter, non-obviousness, and applicability.
Still, there is quite a lot of evidence that these requirements are interpreted
differently by the US and European patent offices, which is close to the focus
of our study. For example, Straus and Klunker (2007) cite the following num-
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bers of the US and the European patent offices: In 2005, there were 409,532
applications for patents in the US. Out of these, 165,485 were granted, i.e. a
share of 40.4 per cent. On the other hand, in Europe, the number of appli-
cations in the same year was 197,391 with 53,256 patents being granted, i.e.
a significantly smaller share of 27,0 per cent. From these numbers alone, it
appears that that the German patent offices apply a stricter standard than the
American ones. This is corroborated by other observations: The average time
from filing a patent to it being granted was 45,3 months in Europe, while it
was only 24 months in the US, as Hall and Harhoff (2004) report. They also
look at the grant-rates of patents at the European Patent office for US patents
seeking European approval on the one and patents from other countries seeking
approval in Europe on the other hand. They find that the approval rate for
US patents was substantially lower, with a 16 per cent difference in 1995. The
trend points towards a deterioration of the US standards, as in 1979 there was
parity concerning these numbers.
Straus and Klunker (2007) further cite a study by the consulting firm Roland
Berger that found that in order to apply for and maintain a patent over its
entire lifetime, costs between 32,000 and 47,000 EUR accrue in Europe, while
the average figure is only 10,250 EUR in the US.4
From these observations, we derive the following stylized facts regarding the
patent application process in the US and in Germany:
(F1) Patent applications are scrutinized more strictly by European than by
US patent offices.
(F1’) As a result, a European patent is potentially a better indicator of the
strength of the patentee’s claims than a US patent.
(F2) It is significantly more expensive to obtain a patent in Europe than in
the US in terms of the fees required.
4For comparison: Regular period from filing to grant: 31,6 months in Japan, 45,3 months in Europe, 24
months in China and US. Patent costs are estimated to range from about 2,400 to 4,000 EUR in China.
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(F3) The duration of patent pending varies between patenting systems by a
considerable margin.
2.2.2. Courts and Patent Trials
After briefly discussing the differences concerning the laws in the two jurisdic-
tions, we will next consider how patent suits fare in the courts.
Cook (2007) notes that in the course of the last decade, the number of patent
cases filed in the US has roughly doubled, from about 1,250 in 1990 to about
2,500 in 2000. He shows that this is one the one hand a result of more patents
being filed in general (the ratio of cases per granted patent remains relatively
unchanged, as the latter number increases from about 90,000 to about 180,000
per year in the same period). On the other hand it results from courts being
more accommodating to plaintiffs. In his empirical model the decision to go to
court depends, among other factors, on the share of cases that were successful
in the respective district in previous periods. One impressive measure in this
regard is that the probability of receiving a patent reward of 1 million USD or
more in 2001 constant dollars increased from less than 10 percent in 1976 to
more than 30 percent in 2000.
Concerning the average costs of going to court over patent infringement in
the US, estimates range from 500,000 USD to 3,000,000 USD for each party.
Much larger sums are mentioned in the context of complex or high-stakes cases,
especially in the area of pharmaceuticals. For a European patent to be litigated,
court fees of 70,000 EUR arise according to European Patent Office (EPO)
reports. Their estimates of the lawyers’ fees bourn by the parties in addition
amounts to approximately the same figure, so that each party would have to
expect costs around 150.000 EUR ex ante.
We glean the following stylized fact from these brief observations:
(F4) There is a significant cost difference between bringing a case to court in
the US and Europe, i.e. the costs of litigation are vastly higher in the US
than in Europe.
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2.3. Model Setting
2.3.1. The rules of the patent system
Legislators (exogenously) define a minimum standard for utility, novelty, non-
obviousness, etc which makes an idea objectively patentable. For this model,
we assume that these various criteria can be reduced to one dimension, and the
minimum objective standard set by legislators is denoted µ.
Figure 2.1.: Timeline of the entire model
2.3.2. Strategic Players and “Ideas”
We consider a game with two risk-neutral strategic players, A and B. Player
A actively generates ideas. Ideas are “random events”, i.e. individual ideas
are imbued with certain randomly drawn characteristics (more on this below).
Generating n ideas in a given period, A incurs costs C(n). We assume that
∂C(n)
∂n > 0 and
∂2C(n)
∂n2 > 0.
5
Each individual idea that is generated is defined by the following character-
istics:
5This can be interpreted in the following way: A resembles the population of potential inventors and they
are sorted according to the marginal costs of their ideas.
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(1) The patentability of the idea from a legal standpoint, i.e. its utility,
novelty, non-obviousness etc. Again we assume that these can be reduced
to a single scalar, which we denote by ι, with ι[0, 1]. Note that if ι ≥ µ
an idea is objectively patentable from the legal standpoint.
(2) A measure of the additional value to the inventor derived from patenting
the idea, which we denote by υ. To be more specific, this measure is
defined as the value that the inventor can appropriate from exploiting
the idea optimally as a monopolist after obtaining the patent, i.e. given
no-one infringes upon the patent. As we are concerned with the incentive
effects of patents in the face of challenges with respect to enforcement,
we set the value from exploiting an idea without patent protection to
zero. Therefore in our model, from an ex ante perspective, an idea is
only valuable to its inventor in as far it can be patented. We normalize
once more such that υ ∈ [0, 1].
The inventor only learns the actual characteristics of a given idea after it
has been generated and he has incurred the associated costs. Specifically, the
parameters ι and υ are respectively drawn from commonly known and inde-
pendent6 distributions F (ι) and G(υ) and revealed to A. We further assume
that F and G are both continuous and strictly increasing.
2.3.3. Patent and Trademark Office
Patent Applications and the Patent Office
A decides for which of his ideas to submit patent applications. It costs A
the fixed amount τ1 to submit an idea to be examined by the patent office.
We assume that the PTO can only make a binary decision regarding a given
patent application: either approve or reject it. According to the legal rules
stated above, the PTO should approve patent applications if and only if ι ≥ µ.
6We only use this assumption (independence of distributions) to be able to derive a closed form solution
for an expression below. The majority of our results hold without it.
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We assume that the PTO cannot directly observe the actual ι of an individual
application. Conceptually therefore, it could commit two kinds of errors: Errors
of type one, i.e. granting a patent despite ι < µ, and errors of type two,
i.e. declining patents despite ι ≥ µ and both of these errors are associated
with social costs. For the sake of this model, we neglect errors of type two -
discussions both with scientists and practitioners have convinced us that they
are empirically close to irrelevant, since there is a relatively fast and cheap way
to appeal the decision in both jurisdictions in this case. Imagine that A can
incur the additional (small) costs τ2 in order to have the application reexamined
which leads to it being granted if ι ≥ µ. The only effect of this will be to shift
the expected profits from patenting of holders of patentable ideas downwards
by a fixed sum.
We model the patent office policy in the most simple possible reduced form.
The patent office simply implements an exogenously given examination policy
Φ which determines the likelihood φ(ι) of a given idea being patented, including
the probability of a first order mistake being made if ι < µ. For example, if the
PTO grants every patent application, then φ(ι) = 1 for any ι. The inspection
policy does not depend on υ – for one, patent examiners (as everyone else) have
a very hard time determining the expected value of a patent, and also, more
importantly, guidelines in general forbid different treatment of applications de-
pending on their suspected value. We assume that φ(ι) > 0 for all ι, i.e. even
the worst quality idea always has a positive chance to be awarded a patent.
Further we assume that ∂φ∂ι > 0 if ι < µ, i.e. the closer ι comes to the objective
patenting threshold, the more likely a patent is to be (falsely) granted. There-
fore the probability with which a given application will be granted is φ(ι) ≤ 1
if ι < µ, and φ(ι) = 1 if the idea is objectively patentable.
[Consider the following example for a possible micro-foundation as an illus-
tration of the idea: The patent office generates a number ζ of signals, where
ζ is part of the exogenous schedule Φ. ζ can for example be interpreted as
the time that a patent examiner spends researching prior art or perusing the
patent application. If individual signals are normally distributed with mean ι
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and standard deviation σ, the mean of the signals ι has the expected value ι
and the standard deviation ς = σζ0.5 . The examination schedule further includes
a cutoff level µ∗. If the mean of the generated signals is below this cutoff level,
the PTO rejects the application, and it grants the patent otherwise. ζ and µ∗
therefore implicitly determine the probability of type one and type two errors
that the PTO commits for any given ι. Denote the normal distribution with
mean ι and variance ς as Nι,ς . Then the probability for a type 1-error given
that ι ≥ µ is simply Nι,ς(µ∗), and equivalently the probability for a type 2-error
(which we do not consider) given ι < µ would be 1−Nι,ς(µ∗).]
Extension: Period of Patent Pending
As discussed above, the decision whether or not a patent application will be
granted is by no means made immediately. Instead, a substantial period of time
passes between application and decision, during which the ideas has the status
of “patent pending”. Little investigation has focused on the value of patents in
the course of the application process so far. But when Steve Jobs exclaimed
his now famous “And, boy, have we patented it!” during the speech introducing
Apple’s iPhone at the MacWorld Expo in January 2007, the greatest share
of the patents protecting the touch-screen technology involved had not been
granted, yet. In fact each of the 21 iPhone-patents considered “central” by
technology-afficionadoes was still pending at this point in time.7 Part of this
stance was surely justified by the knowledge that the patents would be granted,
later on, which turned out to be true. But to some extent, pending patent
applications itself are valuable, especially in fast-moving industries.
There are a number of reasons to suspect that inventors do benefit from
their ideas during the pending period. Many if not most license agreements
are negotiated prior to the actual patent being issued. Other firms may think
twice about entering the market if the product is designated with the “patent
pending” stamp, fearing future lawsuits. Finally, in one of the few empirical
7See http://www.mad4mobilephones.com/the-21-most-important-iphone-patents/562/ for an extremely
detailed description and links to the individual claims.
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studies related to the topic, Häussler et al. (2009) find that the chance to
receive venture capital rises with the number of patent applications in the
firms’ portfolios.
Again, we reduce this concept as far as possible. We simply denote the
patent-pending value of an idea (ι, υ) as δ(Φ)υ, where 0 ≤ δ < 1 and ∂δ∂φ < 0.
Therefore increasing the quality of patent office scrutiny (or lowering φ(ι) is
“expensive” in the sense that it increases the patent pending value of ideas, for
example by increasing the duration between application and examination on
average. We will not over-stretch this concept in the following, especially in
this overly simple linear specification, but it is useful to remember this factor
when discussing reforms aimed at more stringent inspection policies through
the PTO.
[Consider again the illustrative example above. Imagine that the patent pend-
ing duration of a given idea after application is t periods, where t = t(ζ, n) and
∂t
∂ζ > 0. During this time, the perspective patentee receives the benefits ∆(υ, ι)
per period.]
2.3.4. The Court System
We have described above how ideas are generated, how A decides whether or
not to apply for patents, and whether or not patents are granted by the PTO.
In the next and final stage of the model, B enters the picture. We consider B to
be the only strategically acting competitor of A in each of the markets covered
by a patent in the economy.8 B observes which patents were granted to A and
chooses one of the following reactions: He may either leave the corresponding
market uncontested (U), challenge the validity of the patent before court (C)
or enter the market and thereby infringe A’s patent (I).
Choices (C) and (I) respectively induce different litigation games: For (C),
8Analogously to above, B can be interpreted as the population of potential competitors to the population
of inventors A. More specifically, B is the most efficient or profitable competitor of A - this mitigates the
loss of generality from assuming only one competitor, as other less efficient firms’ incentives are aligned
with B’s, yet less strong.
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we adapt the approach introduced by Meurer (1989). For choice (I), we use
a setup related to Crampes and Langinier (2002), but with non-cooperative
bargaining.
Information
While the patent holder is perfectly informed about the quality (ι, υ) of any
given patent, B cannot observe ι. This parameter has the following significance
in the context of court proceedings: The probability that a court upholds a
given patent obviously depends on the legal patentability of the underlying
idea. For simplicity, we assume that courts make the “right” decision, that is,
they uphold the validity of the patent whenever ι ≥ µ. One might question
the assumption that courts can discover the true ι of an idea, while the PTO
cannot. But seeing that court cases take years while patent examiners have days
(if that!) to come to a decision regarding a given application, the assumption
may appear less severe.
Therefore, from A’s perspective, there is no uncertainty regarding the court’s
decision on the validity of a given patent: if ι ≥ µ the court will uphold its
claims, and it will repeal the patent otherwise. As B cannot observe ι, though,
the court proceedings take on a random character from his point of view and
he must form the subjective probability of a patent being upheld given the
information available to him. In our simple model, B only observes three
things: First, the fact that a patent was granted by the PTO. Second, the value
υ of the patent to the patent holder, which he may e.g. derive from observed
sales. Finally third, eventual settlement offers S proposed in the course of
the litigation game by A. From these observations, B forms the conditional
subjective expectation pB(ι ≥ µ|υ,Φ, S) of the validity of the patent. We
will abbreviate the probability unconditional on a settlement offer S as pB in
the following and denote updated equilibrium beliefs following an informative
signal S as p∗B.
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Structure of the Post-Patenting Litigation-Game
Combining the ingredients above, as the final step of the model, for each patent
that was granted to A, the following subgame is played:
B initially decides whether to leave the patent uncontested (U), challenge the
validity before a court of law (C) or enter the market and infringe A’s patent
(I).
(U) If B leaves the market uncontested, the game regarding the given patent
ends and the players get the payoffs piAU = υ and pi
B
U = 0.
(C) This case is treated analogously to, for example, Meurer (1989) and Chiou
(2008). If B announces her intention to challenge the patent, A and B
first have the opportunity to negotiate a settlement. The informed party,
i.e. A, who knows whether or not the patent will be held valid by the
court, can first propose a settlement offer SC . B observes the settlement
offer and in this process updates her subjective probability that the patent
is valid. Then she decides whether or not to go to court, with the following
outcomes: If ι ≥ µ the court upholds the patent despite the challenge and
the payoffs are υ − κ for A and −κ for B. If ι < µ the court rules that
the patent is invalid and therefore the market is no longer protected. By
definition, the payoff of A therefore is −κ and B obtains the payoff from
a competitive market with free entry net of court fees which we denote
as υCB − κ.9
(I) The following subgame ensues if B unilaterally enters the market with a
product that potentially infringes A’s patent. We assume that (C) and
(I) are mutually exclusive, i.e. it is impossible to, for example, challenge a
patent and enter the market.10 Again, we assume that it is the informed
9Note that any market payoff always depends on the overall profitability of the market, therefore for
example υCB is actually υ
C
B(υ). We continue to use the former as a shorthand.
10There are a number of sound economic reasons underlying this assumption. For one, challenging a patent
before introducing a product raises the specter of willful infringement and punitively higher compensation
in the case of being found infringing - we leave this consideration out of the model. Further, if the company
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party A who makes the settlement offer SI . If B rejects the offer, A
decides whether or not to litigate. As the patent is either valid (ι ≥ µ)
or not valid and A is perfectly informed about this, the case in which he
sues and the courts invalidate the patent does not arise (here, A would
receive a payoff of −κ and B receives the competitive payoff net of court
fees υCB − κ; therefore it is better for A to accommodate given patent
invalidity, which gives the duopoly payoff to both parties). If the patent
is valid and A sues, the courts grant him lost profits or compensatory
damages, therefore his payoffs from litigation are υ − κ.11 On the other
hand, the payoff of the infringer in this case is her duopoly profit plus the
difference between A’s duopoly profit and the forgone monopoly profit
minus court costs, i.e. υDB − (υ − υDA )− κ.
The Structure of Industry Payoffs
We make the following assumptions with regard to the industry profits. First,
we assume that υ > υDA + υ
D
B , the profit that A can optimally extract is larger
than the sum of the duopoly profits of A and B.12 Second, we assume that
υDB ≥ υCB > 0. B makes weakly higher profits in duopoly than under full
entry competition, but still makes strictly positive profits in the latter case
(though they may be arbitrarily close to 0). Third, we assume that υDA , υ
D
B and
υCB are all continuous and increasing in υ - loosely speaking, a more valuable
market in general leads to higher duopoly and competitive payoffs for market
participants. Each of these would hold for generic specifications of Cournot
competition with entry under integer constraints, for example. Fourth and
is not found to be infringing, it may itself benefit indirectly from the patent protection of the market, as
we will see below.
11We only focus on this form of damages, for an excellent discussion of the effects of different kinds of damage
awards see for example Schankerman and Scotchmer (2001) or Choi (2006). Further, we abstract from
the fact that an alleged infringement of a valid patent is not necessarily covered by the claims of the
patent. One could simply rescale the payoffs of the players by the ex ante probability that the product
will be found infringing, without significant changes to the results. To reduce the notational burden, we
abstain from this exercize.
12Implicitly, we thereby disregard such phenomena as “patent trolls”, companies which cannot exploit their
patents effectively without going to court (or threatening to do so) against producers who inadvertently
infringed upon their patent. See Reitzig et al. (2007) for a study focusing on this topic.
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finally, we assume that (υ − υCB) and (υ − υDA ) are nondecreasing in υ. As the
market as a whole becomes more valuable, the differences between monopoly-
and duopoly-, or monopoly- and competitive profits do not grow smaller.
2.4. Analysis
2.4.1. Equilibria
In the following, we first derive the Bayes-Nash Equilibria for the litigation
subgames, before embedding them in the larger model in order to learn more
about the incentives to generate ideas and patent them.
Litigation Subgames
We first focus on the case that has already been studied in the literature, i.e.
subgame (C) in which B threatens to challenge A’s patent before court.13
Clearly this threat is not credible unless the unconditional expected payoff
from going to court is non-negative, i.e. the following condition holds.
(2.1) (1− pB)υcB − κ ≥ 0
If (1) is violated, neither holders of valid nor of invalid patents make a settle-
ment offer to B, who in turn does not go to court over the issue. This resembles
a pooling equilibrium with the payoffs piA = υ and piB = 0.
The clearly more interesting case is the one in which (1) is satisfied. Note that
if ι ≥ µ, A cannot credibly signal to B that he is the owner of a valid patent
via his settlement offer and keep him from going to court completely, as signals
are costless and can be mimicked by holders of invalid patents. Intuitively, no
matter which sum holders of good patents offer to their competitor, they can
13As the derived results for this subgame have been established previously, we cover this case very briefly.
For a detailed discussion of the technical aspects of the equilibrium, we refer to Meurer (1989).
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Figure 2.2.: Game Tree for the Challenge Litigation Subgame
always be mimicked by the holders of bad patents and litigation will occur with
positive probability in equilibrium as a result. The following is an equilibrium:
Holders of good patents make the toughest settlement offer possible, i.e. SˆC =
0. Holders of bad patents mix between SˆC and offering a settlement worth
SC = υ
C
B − κ.
Lemma 1: [Proposition 1 - Meurer (1989)] Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of
subgame (C): (i) If (1) is violated, in equilibrium no settlement offer is made
and no patent is challenged. (ii) If (1) is satisfied, a semi-separating equilib-
rium arises in which holders of good patents never make a settlement offer,
holders of bad patents mix between making no settlement offer and offering
SC = υ
C
B − κ and B updates his beliefs to p∗B upon receiving or not receiving a
settlement offer and mixes between litigation and inaction.
We briefly sketch the existence proof in the following in order to clearly
demonstrate the mechanics and intuition of the equilibrium. With the refine-
ments of sequential equilibrium and D1, this equilibrium is also unique - for
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these proofs we refer the reader to Meurer (1989).
Proof. (i) As the expected payoff from litigation given pB is negative and
no signal is forthcoming, no updating takes place and B chooses inaction. (ii)
Denote the probability with which B goes to court given the signal SC = 0
as λ. Then the expected payoff of low quality patentees from mimicking the
behavior of high quality patentees is: (1−λ)υ+λ(−κ), while the certain payoff
given the settlement offer is υ − (υCB − κ). For low quality As to be willing to
mix between these two, they have to be identical. Consider next the payoff of
B if she observes the signal SC = 0. Let us call the probability with which
low-quality patentees mimic good quality patentees β. Upon perceiving the
signal SC = 0, Bayesian updating of the prior gives us the following condition:
1−p∗B = β(1−pB)pB+β(1−pB) . ForB to be willing to mix between litigation and accepting
the tough settlement offer, the following equality has to hold: p∗B(−κ) + (1 −
p∗B)(υ
C
B − κ) = 0. For the following values of λ and β, all of these conditions
are fulfilled simultaneously: λ∗ = υ
C
B−κ
υ+κ and β
∗ = pB1−pB
κ
υCB−κ . Finally, specify
off the equilibrium path beliefs pB(ι ≥ µ|υ,Φ, S > 0) = 0. Then it is easy to
show that no profitable deviation exists for either player.
Note that litigation arises here as a result of the competitor not being able to
distinguish between good and bad patents given that the offered settlement is
0, while she can identify those patent holders as bad who offer a more generous
settlement. For these, though, B needs not litigate, as she receives the same
expected payoff from the settlement as she would from litigation. Note that
the holders of bad patents are exactly indifferent between the tough settlement
offer of 0 and the generous offer due to the chance that the competitor will
take the case to court with a positive probability given the tough offer, which
results in them losing their patent protection entirely.
Let us next consider the subgame (I), in which B enters the market, thereby
infringing the potentially valid patent of A. From the payoff-structure above it
is clear that it is never profitable for holders of bad patents to go to court, as the
court is certain to deem their patent invalid and clearly υAD > −κ. Holders of
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Figure 2.3.: Game Tree for the Infringement Litigation Subgame
valid patents will prefer litigation to inaction only if the (certain) court outcome
of monopoly profits net of court costs is larger than the duopoly outcome they
would receive given inaction, i.e. the following condition holds:
(2.2) υ − υDA ≥ κ
If (2) is violated, even the patentee with a valid patent cannot credibly
threaten to go to court, therefore B will not be willing to pay any compensation
in settlement negotiations and SI = 0. The payoffs of the two parties are
piAI = υ
A
D and pi
B
I = υ
B
D. Again, the more interesting case is when (2) is
satisfied. Here, it is profitable for holders of good patents to sue for infringement
damages, while it is still not in the interest of holders of bad patents to do so.
But as opposed to subgame (C), now it is the informed party who decides
whether or not to go to court. Unlike in the previous case therefore there is
no positive probability of litigation to induce patentees of the bad type not
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to mimic the good type and even a semi-separating equilibrium cannot be
supported. Therefore in equilibrium, no informative settlement offer exists, in
the sense that it allows B to update her prior probability of patent validity.
Good patentees know that they will receive a gain of (υ− κ)− υDA from liti-
gation over inaction. The expected loss of B from failing to reach a settlement,
on the other hand, is equal to the expected damages payment plus court costs,
i.e. pB(υ − υDA + κ). From this we derive the following condition:
(2.3) pB(υ − υDA + κ) ≥ (υ − κ)− υDA
If this condition is violated, then holders of valid patents and the competitor
are unable to obtain a settlement and the patent holder sues for damages.
These considerations allow us to formulate the following lemma:
Lemma 2: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of subgame (I): (i) if (2) is vio-
lated, no settlement is reached and A remains inactive in equilibrium. (ii) If
(2) and (3) are satisfied , settlement is reached with certainty. (iii) If (2) is
satisfied and (3) is violated, no settlement is reached. Upon failure, holders of
valid patents sue and holders of invalid patents remain inactive.
Proof: (i) When (2) is violated, the threat of litigation is not credible for
either kind of patentee, therefore no non-negative settlement demand will be
met. (ii) Define a settlement offer S∗I [(υ − κ) − υDA , pB(υ − υDA + κ)]. Then
the following pair of strategies is a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium: Both types
of A offer S∗I . B accepts S
∗
I and declines any other settlement offer. If a
settlement offer has been declined, holders of valid patents sue and holders of
invalid patents remain inactive.14 (iii) Denote good quality A’s settlement offer
as S+I and bad quality A’s offer as S
−
I , with SI ≥ 0. We know that good
quality patentees will demand no less than their certain gains from litigation,
so that S+I ≥ (υ − κ) − υDA . Now assume that S+I > S−I and B accepts S+I
14Clearly, there is a continuum of equilibria. In the following, as A can make a take it or leave it offer, we
select the equilibrium most profitable to A whenever we consider payoffs from the subgames.
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with positive probability. Then bad quality patentees will want to mimic and
deviate to S+I . The same holds for the opposite case, therefore S
+
I = S
−
I in
equilibrium. As the minimal settlement offer of good inventors is larger than
the expected court outcome for B, i.e. SI = (υ − κ)− υDA > pB(υ − υDA + κ),
no feasible settlement offer exists that B is willing to accept.
It is convenient to summarize the results of Lemma 1 and 2 in the table
below.
Outcomes piA(ι ≥ µ) piA(ι < µ) piB
Case (C)
(1) violated no S, no L υ * 0
(1) satisfied all (mixed) υ − υCB−κ
υ+κ
κ υ − (υCB − κ) (1− pB)υCB − κ
Case (I)
(2) violated no S, no L υDA * υDB
(2) sat, (3) vio L if valid υ − κ υDA υDB − pB(υ − υDA + κ)
(2) & (3) sat S υDA + pB(υ − υDA + κ) * υDB − pB(υ − υDA + κ)
Table 2.1.: Equilibrium outcomes and expected profits of the litigation
subgames
(S indicates settlement, L litigation. When holders of invalid and valid patents receive the
same profits, these are abbreviated by an asterisk.)
In passing, note that we get the familiar result in the challenge subgame (C)
that weaker patents are more likely to result in the settlement outcome. More
interestingly, the infringement subgame (I) delivers the opposite result - here,
if the perception of patent quality is highest, settlement occurs (both for valid
and invalid patents), while intermediate patent quality lets litigation arise (only
for valid patents). An analysis focusing on only one type of potential litigation
will necessarily overlook this fact.
The combination of Lemma 1 and 2 allows us to derive our first proposition:
Proposition 1: In the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the litigation sub-
game, B will prefer challenging an existing patent to infringement and inaction
iff the following hold: (i) Condition (1) is satisfied, (ii) condition (2) is satisfied
and (iii) pB >
υDB−υCB+κ
υ−υDA−υCB+κ.
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The proof of the proposition follows directly from the preceding Lemma 1 and
2. Briefly note that if (1) is violated, B is indifferent between alternative (C)
and inaction, and when (2) is violated B always prefers infringement, as this
gives him the duopoly payoff. Condition (iii) of the proposition is perhaps the
most surprising: This shows that only for patent quality priors above a certain
threshold B prefers the challenge subgame over infringement. Intuitively, as
the patent quality increases, the higher likelihood of having to pay damages
makes infringement relatively less attractive.
This lower threshold increases (i.e. challenges become less likely) as the
costs of going to court κ increase - this favors infringement, where it is the
patent holder who must decide whether or not to initiate court proceedings.
It further increases in the difference between duopoly and competitive profits
for B, υDB − υCB . The higher the protection that B enjoys passively from A’s
patent, the less likely he is to challenge it, as this would threaten his own cozy
situation. On the other hand, if duopoly and free entry profits are relatively
similar, say in an industry with other entry barriers, the competitor is more
likely to challenge existing patents, unless strategic considerations outside of
our model are at play. The proposition also captures the central finding of
Farrell and Shapiro (2008): The more competitive the industry is, i.e. the
lower υCB , the less likely it is that a patent will be challenged by competitors
and the more pernicious the role that bad patents can play.
Condition (1) gives us a straightforward upper threshold for patent quality,
above which B prefers inaction to the challenging subgame, as his expected
profits from the latter become negative. This threshold is lowered as κ increases.
Thereby, the set of pB shrinks. For large court costs, the two bounds (1) and (iii)
bypass each other and the set of priors for which challenges to patent validity
arise becomes empty.15 The prior regarding patent quality can be interpreted
as a measure of patent quality. Therefore we find an alternative mechanism to
Chiou (2008) that leads to the result that competitors will contribute to the
control of patent quality privately only for intermediate patent quality. In our
15The set is given by υ
D
B−υCB+κ
υ−υDA−υCB+κ
< pB ≤ υ
C
B−κ
υCB
.
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model, if the patent quality is “too high”, there will be no challenges and if
the patent quality is “too low”. Our model therefore incorporates the central
results from Farrell and Shapiro (2008) and Chiou (2008). Let us next consider
the analogue to proposition 1 to discern the cases in which the infringement
subgame arises:
Proposition 2: In the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the litigation sub-
game, B will prefer infringing an existing patent to challenging it and inaction
iff one of the following holds:
(A) Condition (2) is violated.
(B) (a) Condition (2) is satisfied, (b) υDB − pB(υ − υDA + κ) > 0, and (c)
pB <
υDB−υCB+κ
υ−υDA−υCB+κ
Again, the proof follows directly from lemma 1 and 2. (B) is simply the op-
posite case from proposition 1, where (b) ensures positive expected profits and
(c) lets infringement be more attractive than challenging the existing patent.
The case (A) appears rather simple, but it signifies one of the possibilities of
the patent system “breaking down”. If condition (2) is violated, court costs are
so high in relation to the monopoly profits that the (certain) payoff of holders
of valid patents from going to court is lower than from accommodating the in-
fringer. As a result, the competitor can infringe with impunity. This problem
is clearly alleviated with the British system of assigning court fees, in which the
losing party has to cover the winner’s costs and this would be one important
reform suggestion to rejuvenate the American patenting system. But one has
to be careful about a too narrow interpretation of κ. For us, this term does not
only cover the fees of the courts and lawyers themselves, but in addition also
costs of the time for preparation and the hassle of proceedings. Streamlining
and simplifying proceedings, as is the goal of the EPLA, would therefore be a
method of reducing κ even in the European or British fee system.
These two propositions allow us to consider how the profits of the various
player types develop as the average quality of a patent decreases, given its value
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Figure 2.4.: Expected profits of patentees with valid patents (pi+A), invalid
patents (pi−A) and the competitor (piB), depending on the prior
probability of patent (in)validity.
υ and the corresponding structure of payoffs. Figure 2.4 illustrates the most
complex case, for the case that condition (2) is not violated.16 As the aver-
age quality of the patent decreases (or the share of invalid patents increases)
starting at 0, the equilibrium switches from the pure monopoly case to a chal-
lenging equilibrium (when condition (1) is satisfied), then to the infringement
with settlement (when condition (iii) from proposition 1 is satisfied), to the
separating infringement case (when condition (3) is satisfied). As discussed
above, the area between (1) and (iii) does not necessarily exist, as infringement
can dominate challenging from the view of the competitor.
The figure also allows us to analyze under which circumstances private efforts
by competitors may act as complements to the examination process of the
PTOs. This will be the case in a socially desirable way if the different forms
of litigation act as a deterrent to holders of not-patentable ideas specifically,
i.e. if the expected profit of the holder of an invalid patent is strictly lower
16If condition (2) is violated, all parties obtain expected profits of υDA,B .
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than the expected profit of the holder of a valid patent. Such a wedge between
the expected profits of holders of valid and invalid patents only occurs in the
sections to the right of (3), where the patent holders are forced to go to court
against infringers, and between (1) and (iii), where competitors weed out a
share of the bad patents through challenges.
Overall, the profits of patent holders – both valid and invalid– are weakly
decreasing in the share of invalid patents in general.17 In the following, we
will focus on the case ∂pi
−
A
∂pB
≥ 0, in order to avoid having to deal with multiple
equilibria later on. All of the following results can also be derived without this
assumption, as long as the profits of both kinds of patentees are weakly decreas-
ing beyond some pB and reach their minimum beyond this point, which is always
the case due to our assumptions regarding the specification of industry profits:
As the prior probability of patent validity pB → 0, (pi−A , pi+A) → (υDA , υ − κ),
which is the minimum level the respective expected profits can reach. Therefore
focussing on monotonously decreasing expected profits greatly simplifies proofs
in the following, without affecting the generality of the argument.
Figure 2.5 displays the effects of an increase in the private value υ of a given
patent on the profits of the various players. We observe two things: First, profits
increase within each outcome for all players. Second, the boundaries of the
outcomes shift, most notably, (1) is relaxed so that the threshold for challenging
a patent decreases. The other clear effect is that (3) shifts downwards, so
that fewer cases reach settlement given infringement and it is more likely that
infringers will be sued. The effect on the boundary between challenging and
infringing patents is unclear given the assumptions made and depends on the
signs and relative magnitudes of the changes in υDB − υCB and υ − υDA − υCB .
We can note as a result, that as the value of a patent increases, patentees are
less likely to enjoy the full monopoly benefits therefrom. Further, if patentees
suffer losses from an increase in υ, this is either due to the fact that while less
17The only exception is if the sum of competitive and duopoly profits more than exceeds the monopoly
profits, to be precise, whenever υ < υDA + υ
D
B + υ
C
B
υDB−υCB+κ
υ−υDA−υCB+κ
. Then, the holder of invalid patents
receive a higher expected profits under the pooling and infringement case than under challenges from
competitors.
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Figure 2.5.: Changes in the payoff structure of the litigation game given an
increase in the private value of the patent υ.
profitable patents were not challenged more profitable patents are, or because
while less valuable patents were challenged, more valuable ones suffer from
infringement. Most importantly, though, as noted above, the expected profits
of the holders of valid patents are bounded from below at υ − κ (or υDA , if (2)
is violated) and the expected profits of holders of invalid patents are bounded
from below at υDA . These bounds are strictly increasing in υ.
Incentives for Patenting and Idea Generation
Let piA(pB, ι, υ) denote the expected outcome from the litigation subgame for A
for a given idea and given prior beliefs regarding the patent quality if granted.
Obviously, A will patent this idea only if the following condition holds:
(2.4) φ(ι)piA(pB, ι, υ) + δ(Φ)υ ≥ τ1
A benefits twofold from a patent application. First, there are the expected
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profits from obtaining the patent, taking the probability of doing so φ(ι) into
account if the idea is not objectively patentable. Second, A receives the patent
pending status to his idea in any case, which is potentially valuable. If the sum
of these two factors exceeds the costs of the patent application τ1, A will decide
to patent. At this stage, there are two potential sources of difference between
the expected gains from patenting objectively patentable and non-patentable
ideas:
1) φ(ι < µ) ≤ 1, i.e. non patentable ideas are (weakly) less likely to obtain
a patent
2) and pi−A ≤ pi+A , i.e. given that a patent was awarded, the benefits derived
from the patent are weakly smaller for holder of latently invalid than for
holders of valid patents. We described above in detail when this second
inequality is strict, as only in this case private litigation is complementary
to the inspection efforts of the PTO.
Up until now, we have not discussed where the prior probability of patent
validity pB originates. We impose that this prior is correct in the sense that it
resembles the actual share of invalid patents in the patent population. Based
on this, we are able to state the following Lemma:
Lemma 3: For a given structure of market payoffs and level of υ, either no
idea is patented, every idea is patented, or a cutoff level ιˆ(υ) exists with the
following property: For each idea, if ι ≥ ιˆ, A applies for a patent and refrains
from doing so otherwise.
Proof: Rearrange (4) to φ(ι)piA(pB, ι, υ) ≥ τ1 − δ(Φ)υ. Note that the right
hand side of the inequality is a scalar for given values of υ. Denote the share
of valid ideas among all ideas for a given υ as pmin. Consider the lefthand
side of the inequality. As pi+A ≥ pi−A and it is non-decreasing in pB, obviously
if pi+A(pB = 1, υ) < τ1 − δ(Φ)υ, no idea will be patented. Analogously, if
φ(ι = 0)pi−A(pmin, υ) ≥ τ1 − δ(Φ)υ, every idea will be patented. Our require-
ment with regard to the priors pB being correct means that the original prior
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probability of facing a valid patent pB(Φ, υ) is determined by the actual shares
in the patenting decision, i.e. the following condition must hold in equilib-
rium: pB(Φ, υ) =
∫ 1
µ
f(ι)dι∫ 1
ιˆ
φ(ι)f(ι)dι
∀υ. It is simple to show that if B applies for
a patent for an idea with ι1, and there is a second idea with equal value υ
and greater quality ι2 > ι1, then B will also apply for a patent for the second
idea – the expected value from obtaining a patent is strictly increasing in ι.
Analogously, if B derives a negative expected value from patenting an idea
with a objective quality ι1 and there is a second idea with the same value and
objective quality ι2 < ι1, i.e. φ(ι1)piA(pB, ι1, υ) < τ1 − δ(Φ)υ and ι2 < ι1, then
φ(ι2)piA(pB, ι1, υ) < τ1−δ(Φ)υ and B will also decide not to apply for a patent
for the second idea. Combining these statements completes the proof of the
Lemma.
Logically the following four cases may arise: (i) it is not even profitable to
patent valid ideas, (ii) it is even profitable to patent the least patentable ideas,
(iii) it is profitable to patent invalid ideas, as long as their quality is above a
certain threshold as well as valid ideas and (iv) it is only profitable to patent
objectively patentable ideas.
Figure 2.6.: Illustration of Lemma 3 depicting an example in which all 4 cases
occur.
Figure 2.6 illustrates Lemma 3 and depicts an example for how patenting
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decisions are made in (ι, υ) space. It is worth while to consider which of the
depicted cases are generic and which only arise under certain circumstances.
First note that for every patent application fee τ1 > 0, case (i) will arise for
low enough values υ of valid ideas, i.e. no idea that yields relatively low private
benefits will ever be patented. Next let us focus on case (iv), in which only
valid ideas are conferred to the patent office. This case will arise if lim
ι→µφ(ι) < 1,
for then there is a wedge between the value of patentable and non-patentable
ideas. Note that if the share of invalid patents is “small enough” pi+A = pi
−
A = υ,
only as the share exceeds the threshold given by (1) a difference between the
two values arises. Case (ii) occurs if φ(ι = 0)pi−A(pB = 0, υ) ≥ τ1 − δ(Φ)υ,
therefore it disappears if τ1 is large enough. This case is problematic from a
policy perspective, as this means that the patent office is unable to deter any
bad applications. It is more likely to occur for higher private values and larger
returns from pending patents. Intuitively, if obtaining a patent for an idea will
enable a firm to make an absolute killing in the market, the firm is going to
take the comparatively cheap gamble – it only incurs the fixed patent fee – of
applying for a patent, no matter how small the chance is of obtaining it. The
higher the gains from the patent-pending status, the more relevant this case
becomes. (iii) arises in the remainder of constellations. The frontier in (iii) is
generally not linear as depicted.18 Due to the shifts in the boundaries of the
litigation outcomes as υ increases as discussed above, the frontier can even be
increasing, but only locally.
Finally to close the model, A generates the (n + 1)th idea as long as the
expected profit is larger than its costs, i.e. the following condition holds:
(2.5)
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
ιˆ(υ)
[φ(ι)piA(υ, ι) + δ(Φ)υ − τ1]f(ι)g(υ) dι dυ ≥ C(n+ 1)− C(n)
Therefore also patents that should formally and legally not have been granted
18Instead this resembles a case in which F (ι) is independent of υ and the expected profits from receiving
a patent are either constant or a linear function of υ. This occurs for example if the same litigation-
equilibrium arises independent of υ.
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give inventors an incentive to exert innovation efforts as long as they generate
positive expected payoffs. For example, a laxer inspection policy will result
in the generation of more ideas. This is an obvious simplification, as it does
not take second order effects such as patent-thickets etc. into account. Never-
theless, we have created a relatively complex system. For this general setting
with general distribution functions, a closed-form solution does not exist. But
despite this complexity, in the following section we will be able to generate a
number of important insights concerning the proposed piecemeal reforms and
adaptations of existing patent regimes, focussing on pointing out trade-offs and
problems that have been mainly overlooked so far.
2.4.2. Comparative Statics - Potential Approaches to
Reform
Application Fees
One obvious difference between the European and the US patent regime is
the significant difference in fees that are imposed for patent application and
maintenance. Various authors, most recently Bessen and Meurer (2008a) and
Chiou (2008) have suggested to increase patenting fees in order to deter lower
quality inventors and raise the average quality of patent applications.
Our setup allows us to dissect the results of such a reform in an extremely
straightforward and simple manner. Let us consider a change from τ1 to τ ′1. This
affects the patenting decision at two margins. As shown above, the lefthand
side of the condition that implicitly defines ιˆ, i.e. φ(ι)piA(pB, ι, υ)+δ(Φ)υ ≥ τ1,
is strictly increasing in ι given that ι < µ for each value of υ. Therefore if one
adds a constant to the righthand side, the cutoff value ιˆ(υ) must increase as
well, which resembles a shift of the frontier in Figure 6 to the right. We will
denote the new cutoff value as ιˆ(υ)′. Intuitively, this is the desired effect, as
fewer invalid ideas are submitted to the PTO office for scrutiny, and captures
the intention of those proposing this kind of reform.
There is a very simple second effect though, one that directly affects
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patentable ideas only. Consider the case in which only valid ideas are patented,
therefore pB = 1 and pi+A = υ. Here the patenting decision is defined by
(1 + δ(φ))υ ≥ τ1, which directly implies the minimal private value of an idea
that is patented is υ = τ11+δ(Φ) . An increase in the application fee τ1 moves this
frontier upward, which is the effect at the second margin. This second effect is
extremely undesirable, as it precludes additional objectively patentable ideas
from being patented, because the costs outweigh the private benefits.
Further, both effects lead to a strict decrease in the expected profits to be
derived from generating new ideas and should therefore lead to less generated
ideas (and patent applications) in general. As a short sidenote: Due to the
static character of our model, we are overlooking a further potential effect:
The smaller number of applications may lead to a decrease in the delay be-
tween application and patenting and thereby reduce the benefits from pending
patents, which would be a further positive effect. Arguably, this should not
happen in the short run, though, due to the “stockpile” of applications that has
accumulated over the years and still has to be dealt with. We summarize these
considerations in the following proposition:
Proposition 3: An increase in the patent application fee from τ1 to τ ′1 leads
to an increase in the relative share of valid applications only if the following
holds:
(2.6)
∫ 1
υ′
∫ 1
µ f(ι)g(υ) dι dυ∫ 1
υ′
∫ 1
ιˆ′ f(ι)g(υ) dι dυ
−
∫ 1
υ
∫ 1
µ f(ι)g(υ) dι dυ∫ 1
υ
∫ 1
ιˆ f(ι)g(υ) dι dυ
> 0
Proof: The proposition follows directly from lemma 3 and the definition of
υ.
When the condition in the proposition does not hold, the share of valid
patents actually decreases with a change of the application fee! As the condition
is not necessarily intuitive in this form, we may benefit from considering the
marginal effects only. From our previous discussion it is clear that a change in
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τ1 will affect the mass of valid as well as the total mass of applications. Let us
denote the original share of valid patent application as γ(τ1) and the total mass
of applications as α(τ1). Then simple calculus allows us to derive the following
much more interpretable corollary to proposition 3:
Corollary to Proposition 3: The marginal effect of a change of the ap-
plication fee τ1 to τ ′1 on the relative share of valid applications will be positive
only if the following holds:
(2.7) |α′| > (1− F (µ))g(υ)
1 + δ(Φ)
(γ(τ1))
−1
From this one can easily determine that the average quality of patent ap-
plications is more likely to decrease for increases in the application fee, if the
density of patents with the marginal private value υ is relatively high. This
stems from the fact that on the lower margin only valid ideas are patented.
This effect mechanically becomes stronger, the lower the original patent qual-
ity is, as the decrease in valid patents then has a stronger weight, as well as for
laxer patent regimes (lower levels of µ). As a direct result of this, in regimes
with a relatively high average quality of patent applications such as the Euro-
pean patent office, a decrease of the patenting fee could increase the average
quality of applications. On the other hand, for the US, in which the complaints
about the quality of applications are widespread, an increase in the patenting
fee should be less problematic.
Intuitively, there is a kind of “positive selection” at work here. As the pri-
vate value of patents decreases, the quality cutoff level for which patents are
profitable increases, until at the margin only the best patents survive - if an
inventor expects a patent to be of relatively low private value to him, he must
be relatively (or completely) sure of its patentability to be willing to incur the
costs of patenting. Raising patent fees therefore generically kills off high-quality
patent application over-proportionally.
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Litigation Costs
Various developments in the US and Europe have affected (or will affect) the
way patent litigation functions. In the US, the evolution of a specialized ap-
pellate court has reduced legal uncertainty (which can be interpreted as a form
of cost in our simplified model) and possibly led to or at least encouraged an
increase in patent litigation.19 Concurrently, in Europe the European Patent
Litigation Agreement has been seeking to establish a unified European Patent
Court with the expressed goal of reducing patent litigation costs.20 Our model
setup allows us to dissect the effects of such a decrease in some detail.
Let us first consider the changes in the litigation subgame. We collect our
qualitative results in Figure 2.7. Again we observe two related kinds of shifts:
The first affects the the payoffs of the individual players directly, and the sec-
ond, as a result, moves the boundaries between the different litigation scenarios.
In the infringement game, we get the (well established) result, that the like-
lihood of settlements will decrease if the litigation cost are reduced. From a
competition policy and welfare standpoint, this is a highly desirable result, as
it reduces the scope for collusion. In our figure, this is represented by a shift of
boundary (3) to the left.
Next, the reduction makes challenging existing patents more attractive to
the competitor. This effect is unambiguous at both margins. For relative high
priors of patent quality, challenges occur where they did not before. This is
represented by a shift of the boundary at (1) to the left. But also at the
margin between challenging and infringement/settlement, the effect is clear,
with challenging becoming relatively more attractive compared to infringement.
Therefore the boundary at (iii) moves to the right. Each of these effects is
arguably desirable from a social welfare point of view.
The payoffs of the various player-types develop in an interesting pattern. The
competitor is weakly better of as court fees decrease – the threat of litigation
19See Cook (2007) for more details. Further see Bessen and Meurer (2008a) for a very critical assessment
of the recent developments of the patent judiciary in the US.
20See for example http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legislative-initiatives/epla.html for details.
42
2.4. Analysis
Figure 2.7.: Changes in the payoff structure of the litigation game given a de-
crease in the costs of going to court κ
bears slightly less weight in the infringement case (which also makes settlement
less likely) and the payoff of a challenge, whether successful or unsuccessful is
strictly higher. The change to the expected payoff of a holder of a valid patent
is somewhat ambiguous. Given that his patent is challenged, the lower court
fees make him better off, yet he will be challenged in more cases. It is this effect
that Bessen and Meurer (2008a) worry about in the face of litigation reform in
the US. Patent litigation becomes more likely also in the infringement subcase,
as argued above - as settlement is not necessarily desirable from an antitrust
perspective, as has been brought to attention by Shapiro (2003), this could be a
beneficial effect, but it decreases the expected payoff of patent holders. Finally,
in the cases in which the holders of valid patents have to sue to protect their
investment, i.e. to the right of (3), the decrease in costs strictly increases their
profits.
The effects on the profits of holders of invalid patents are less ambiguous. The
fact that more patents will be challenged strictly decreases the area in which
pooling equilibria arise: The shift to the left of (1) implies that more patents
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will be subject to challenges, from which bad patents suffer more strongly than
good ones. Further, the shift of (iii) to the right implies that patents that
would otherwise have been infringed and settled are now subject to challenges
as well. While the effect on the profits of holders of bad patents in this area
might even be positive, as discussed above, nevertheless this increases the area
in which a wedge exists between good and bad patents and thereby increases
the likelihood that the courts may be able to aid the work of the PTO. Finally,
the shift of the boundary (3) to the left implies that holders of good patents
must defend more claims in court that they would otherwise have settled. As
the holders of bad patents never go to court, this reduces their income from
settlements and again increases the wedge between the payoffs to the two types.
To summarize, this analysis shows that streamlining court-proceedings can
be poison or medicine, depending on what you believe ails the patent system.
If, like Bessen and Meurer (2008a) one believes that the main problem of the
system is the erosion of payoffs to patenting from too much litigation, then the
effect of lowering costs is unclear – not strictly negative, as one might have
expected. On the one hand, it should lead to more litigation, but on the other
hand the costs to patentees decrease, so the net effect is unclear. At the same
time, the reform steps in this direction unambiguously strengthen the role that
litigation and courts can play in sifting out bad patents from the system and
might therefore reduce the burden on the PTO.
Extension: Diligence of the Patent Offices
The effects of an increase in the diligence of the PTO appear obvious at first
sight. An increase in the inspection intensity should lead to more bad appli-
cations being rejected, so that it becomes less attractive to try to pass of bad
ideas as patentable. Consider an adjustment of the patent office’s policy such
that Φ changes to Φ′ and thereby φ(ι)′ < φ(ι) ∀ι < µ. By itself, this effect
would be purely beneficial. But as assumed above, this improvement comes at
a cost, as the returns from pending patents increase to δ(Φ′) > δ(Φ). Note
that an increase of the required diligence in the PTO’s assessments would in
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reality not only affect new patent applications but also the existing backlog of
past applications that has accumulated.
Revisiting condition 2.4, we had established the following regarding the de-
cision whether or not to apply for a patent with a given idea:
(2.8) φ(ι)′piA(pB(Φ′), ι, υ) + δ(Φ′)υ ≥ τ1
The effects of this reform then are far less clear cut than we would have
expected. Note first that in any case the cutoff level υ decreases, as the return
from valid patents is increasing in δ, which may be considered a positive side-
effect. The overall outcome on the other margin depend on the relative sizes
in the changes in patenting probability and profits received during the pending
phase. Instead of over-stretching our model at this point with regards to the
assumptions we have made (for example the linearity of pending-revenues in
the private value of an idea), we would like to point out that the profits during
the pending phase have a fundamental effect on the current patenting system,
yet there are next to no empirical findings with regard to this topic, while they
are clearly sorely needed.
2.5. Discussion and Outlook
The current regime of issuing and enforcing patents and the resulting rights of
patent owners has faced increasingly harsh criticism in the recent past. There
have been calls for completely abolishing the system or at least carrying out a
fundamental reform thereof. Due to the enormous investments of the holders of
existing patents, it appears relatively unlikely that such a fundamental reform
is going to happen soon.
What appears far more likely, instead, is a continuation of the current praxis
of minor piecemeal improvements (or rather changes, to phrase it more neu-
trally). We add to the understanding of the effects of three of the most consid-
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ered – or currently being implemented – steps: An adjustment of the application
fees, simplified and cheaper adjudication of patent conflicts and finally a policy
of stricter scrutiny by the PTOs. Our approach is new in two central regards
- first, we take three major aspects of the current system into account in our
theoretical model, i.e. policy setting, the role of the PTO, and the interplay of
patentees and potential challengers/infringers in the market and in the courts.
Second, we take into account that ideas come in a plethora of form and shape
and that they may vary continuously in their private value to the patentee
and in their patentability (which to a certain extent reflects their value to the
community).
From our approach, we gained both new insights and new questions. Allow-
ing the competitor to both challenge or infringe upon an existing patent, we
found that below a certain threshold of patent quality, the competitor loses her
interest in policing patent quality through challenges but will prefer to infringe
upon the rights of the patentee instead. This effect is strongly exacerbated in
industries in which there are relatively few barriers to entry - a patent does not
only protect its holder. In this context, there is clearly a thin line between tol-
erating an infringer and anticompetitive settlements of weak patents - focusing
on explicit agreements from an antitrust perspective does not do justice to this
issue.
Allowing for continuous types allowed us to derive a surprising result with
regard to an often contemplated reform step: Raising application fees may ac-
tually decrease the average quality of patent applications. This will especially
be the case if the distribution of private patent values is skewed towards lower
values - which appears to reflect reality very well - and if the standards for
patenting are relatively lax. Further, we showed that a decrease in litigation
costs through specialized courts (or a centralized court in the case of the EU)
may actually make the work of the patent office easier, by forcing a wedge be-
tween the payoffs from good and bad patents (or increasing an existing wedge).
Further it can destabilize the infringement “agreements” discussed above.
Finally, we introduced a problem into our setting, which is so far very little
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understood - patents yield benefits to their owners before they are approved by
the PTO. Prior to the decision, even applications that are later rejected may
be of considerable monetary or strategic value to their owners. We strongly
appeal to empirical economists working in this field to help better understand
the issues connected to the “patent pending” stamp. The second empirical
issue raised is the interplay between market structure (e.g. barriers to entry)
and the outcomes of patent disputes. Our model predicts that the openness of
an industry should be negatively related to the probability of a patent being
challenged.
The approach of this article was to make relatively few assumptions and see
which general results could be derived therefrom - clearly, one logical next step
would be to breathe more life into the market setting by imposing tested forms
of competition that are well understood in the spirit of Farrell and Shapiro
(2008) together with specific distributions in order to be able to work with
closed form solutions. We believe that this more flexible setting is a valuable
complement to the existing literature, as it enabled us to point out a number
of tradeoffs that are worth studying in more detail.
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3.1. Introduction
3.1.1. Motivation
Actions and interactions in social networks involve highly complex decisions.
The resulting payoffs can be immense, such as acquiring a job offer that one
would otherwise not have received or founding long-lasting mutually beneficial
partnerships. Regarding the timing, these benefits or detriments can be im-
mediate or gradual, lasting or short-lived. Their source may be linked to an
individual directly or through any number of intermediaries. While the im-
portance of networks in highly relevant areas, such as the spread of medical
knowledge (see Coleman et al. (1957)) or the likelihood of obtaining a desirable
occupation (see Granovetter (1974)), has attracted the attention of social scien-
tists many decades ago, researchers for a long time grappled with the empirical
and theoretical problems raised by their complexity.1
The last decade has seen major breakthroughs in the way economic theorists
think about and approach the subject of networks. Works such as Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996), Bala and Goyal (2000) and Jackson and Watts (2002) have
made many of these concepts tractable in a graph-theoretic setup. In these
articles, rational agents maximize the payoffs generated from links to others,
which in turn allows predictions concerning the structure of the underlying
networks. Yet in many social networks one encounters potentially emotionally
1See Granovetter (1976) for an early discussion on the empirical issues raised by the dimensionality of data.
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charged terms, such as “friendships” in social online-networks or “partnerships”
in business relations. Consequentially, a more recent strand of the literature
has realized that concepts such as inequality aversion or trust may play an
important role in interactions between agents in social networks. Experimental
economists have therefore introduced these concepts into simple network mod-
els and tested their behavioral predictions under highly controlled settings,
providing evidence that often strongly contradicts the “rational” predictions for
equilibrium network structure.2
The contrast to these controlled settings highlights some of the challenges
that non-experimental empirical work on individual behavior in social networks
faces: e.g., it is impossible to disentangle the motives of individual persons or
entities entering into relationships, costs and utilities of decisions are mostly
unobservable and may differ substantially between individuals, etc. Most im-
portantly, though: There is next to no data that combines micro- (individual
decisions and characteristics) and macro-level (structure of the network overall,
locations of links inside a network) observations.
Our study aims exactly at this gap, using a completely unique data-set. We
were able to obtain data from an emerging online-social network: on the one
hand on user behavior of more than 30,000 registered users, for example with
regard to provision of a public good type effort, number of private messages
sent, number of public comments posted, entry into new and severance of ex-
isting “friendships”, and on the other hand on the structure of the underlying
network itself, i.e. number and location of friendships between users and overall
network size.3 We use this data first of all to perform what can be considered
“basic” research: Addressing the challenges by experimental studies, we demon-
strate clearly that users behave in ways that are compatible with the rational
paradigm. Based on these findings, we address two further issues that could
2See Kosfeld (2003) for a survey of the early literature in this vein.
3As part of the agreement concerning the data, the name of the company and its service is not used in this
study. All user-related information was provided to us in a way to completely assure users’ confidentiality
and protection of their personal data. We were only provided with randomized user-IDs that cannot be
linked to individuals in any way and we have no access whatsoever to individuals’ personal characteristics.
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barely be studied empirically so far:
The first is the provision of local public goods by users. Users in the net-
work can provide and organize information – as described below in detail –
two kinds of activity from which both they themselves and their direct friends
derive utility. Standard theory, such as Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) in the
specific context of a network with information provision, would lead us to ex-
pect to find evidence of free riding in the sense that users should provide less
effort themselves if they have friends who provide more effort, all else given.
Interestingly, we find only weak evidence for this type of free riding. Instead –
and far more pronouncedly – users seem to react in a positively reciprocal way
to their friends’ effort provision - that is they react to their friends’ provision of
effort by exerting more of their own, a phenomenon that has been noted before
in the context of peer-to-peer networks among others by Gu et al. (2009).4
This leads us to the second issue of our study: Direct, negatively reciprocal
behavior as an enforcement device. Studying the formation and stability of
individual links, we find strong evidence that users are willing to incur costs
to actively punish free riding by their friends by severing (otherwise purely
beneficial) relationships.
Our findings are highly relevant, as the provision of public goods in Web 2.0
services is creating tremendous, constantly increasing values. Microsoft’s par-
tial acquisition of Facebook priced the latter company as a whole at multiple
billion dollars5 - which is somewhat surprising, because apart from the infras-
tructure, the entire content of the social-networking site as well as most applets
are created and provided by users. The same holds true for 3 other purely social
networks that together with Facebook form 4 of the 20 most frequented sites
on the internet.6 If one further considers massively popular sites with a strong
social-network character such as Youtube.com or flickr, it becomes obvious that
social online-networks are encroaching on many people’s daily lives and that
a major building block of this development is free user-provided content. In
4For an introduction to the economics of reciprocity, we refer to Fehr and Gächter (2000).
5See, for example http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1675658,00.html
6The sites are MySpace, FaceBook, Orkut and Hi5.com, according to alexa.com as of April 2010.
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the course of this article, we seek to provide new economic insights into the
behavior - and potential motivation and payoffs - of individuals in these kinds
of networks.
We proceed as follows: In the following subsection we present the most closely
related literature. First the theoretical foundations of the theory of social
networks, then the “experimental attack” and finally we briefly cover existing
empirical studies. In Section 2 we introduce and describe the online-network
we wish to study as well as the features that make it especially interesting
from an economic standpoint. Section 3 relates these features to some simple
theoretical concepts that will form the basis for our further inquiry. Section 4
contains the data description and our empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes
and proposes resulting new venues for future research.
3.1.2. Related Literature and Contribution
The literature relevant to our questions can be separated into theoretical, ex-
perimental and empirical studies.
From the theoretical perspective, a set of by now canonical articles has
enabled economists to come to term with the complexity of the subject, allowing
them to make predictions about the structure of networks and to judge their
efficiency. Perhaps the initiators of this development are Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996). Their graph theoretic framework, depicting individuals in a network
as the nodes in a graph and the connections or links between these individuals
as the arcs, has become the de-facto standard approach. Individuals derive
utility from the links they are involved in (and indirectly also from the links
of those they are connected to), while it is costly to maintain direct links. A
network is “stable” if the utility of agents cannot be increased by creating a new
or severing an existing link. The predictions concerning stable networks from
this model range from complete interconnection (high benefits to costs ratio)
over a “star network”, in which one node is connected to everyone else, while
the peripheral nodes maintain only a single connection each, to a completely
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disconnected network (lowest benefits to costs ratio). Bala and Goyal (2000)
enrich the setup by explicitly modeling the linking-strategies of players in a
non-cooperative game and distinguishing between cases in which information
(and thereby benefits) flow in only one or both directions. In addition to the
stable network structures mentioned above, they find that a symmetric circle
or wheel network in which each agent is linked to exactly two other players.
Of further importance in their setup is the concept of decay of benefits - the
more intermediate links separate two indirectly connected players, the lower
the benefits they derive from each others’ information.7
There are a number of important extensions to these basic models. Goyal
(2005) notes that depicting the existence of a link between research affiliates,
for example, as a purely binary variable may often be too much of a simplifi-
cation. Instead, partners can invest specifically into the stability of individual
links, so that heterogenous link strengths may arise in equilibrium. Bloch and
Dutta (2009) adopt this concept and model it explicitly. They find that under
relatively broad conditions, the stable and efficient network again will have a
star structure.
Three papers of which we are aware of try to model the provision of public
goods in social networks. In Cho (2006) ex-ante symmetric agents agree to a
binding contract that covers both the amount of a local public good each agent
provides as well as the form of the network through which the benefits of the
public good are transmitted. In this setup, equilibria exist, in which agents
almost surely provide efficient levels of effort if they are patient enough. In
Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) agents only specify their effort levels, taking
the structure of the network as given. Effort provided by an agent’s neighbors
is a substitute for her own efforts. They show that under these assumptions free
riding exists in every social network in equilibrium and adding links between
players reduces individual incentives to contribute. In the model of O’Dea
(2008), depending on the outcome, one can find both equilibria in which agents
7For an excellent survey of the theoretical literature on network development and stability, see Jackson
(2004).
52
3.1. Introduction
voluntarily provide public goods and equilibria which resemble cost sharing for
an excludable club good.
These clear and distinct predictions concerning network formation and struc-
ture have piqued the interest of a number of experimental economists, who
find significant deviations from the rational depictions. Falk and Kosfeld (2003)
directly test the hypotheses developed in the Bala and Goyal (2000) model and
show that in settings in which the Nash-equilibrium provides for symmetric
payoffs and little coordination efforts, the predictions are relatively accurate.
Yet in settings that should lead to star networks, with relatively high costs per
link and high information benefits, the rational equilibrium predictions have
almost no explanatory power. They show that this is only to a small extent
explained by the higher requirements with respect to coordination. Instead
they argue that star networks provide users with extremely unequal payoffs
and therefore the deviation from the rational equilibrium may be explained by
subjects’ inequality aversion. Cagno and Sciubba (2007) attempt to dissect
the various drivers of individual decision in network formation. They identify
two conflicting driving forces: Optimizing best-response behavior only explains
the observed behavior to a certain degree. Instead they find that reciprocity
and inertia play important explanatory roles. In a highly surprising study,
Cagno and Sciubba (2008) combine a network formation experiment with a
trust experiment. They find that the levels of trust in a trust game played
after an endogenous network formation game are significantly lower than in
the simple trust game. Subjects hereby tend to trust players less on average
with whom they have interacted previously than they trust complete strangers.
The authors deduce from this that potentially existing reciprocal behavior in
the network formation game does not foster trust. This indicates that there
are psychological mechanisms at play in network interaction that still have to
be explored.
Not all experimental studies have been purely detrimental to the rational
behavior paradigm. Corbae and Duffy (2008) test the rational behavior hy-
pothesis in rather specific experimental setting, in which individuals can form
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risk-sharing partnerships through a non-cooperative proposal game with id-
iosyncratic risk. They find that individual behavior is generally well predicted
by rational theory, which agent achieving near-efficient outcomes. Goeree et al.
(2008) analyze a setting in which agents with heterogeneous linking costs can
form links under different informational settings. While for homogenous agents
equilibrium predictions cannot be validated, the heterogeneous agent predic-
tions are well suited to explain individual linking behavior. Interestingly, star
networks do develop in this experimental setting as frequently as expected.
There is a large number of empirical studies regarding networks in general
that mainly focus on locating and quantifying network effects, such as promi-
nently Saloner and Shepard (1995) or Gowrisankaran and Stavins (2004). For
a survey of this strain of the literature, we refer the reader to Birke (2008).
There is only a limited amount of empirical economic research on social net-
works, though. Prompted by Newman (2001) who looks at the properties of
research collaborations from a physicist’s perspective, Goyal et al. (2006) and
Rosenblat and Mobius (2004) both analyze the structure of research networks
in economics. Goyal et al. (2006) find a collaboration structure composed of
a number of stars (authors that write a relatively large number of papers to-
gether with coauthors) and a large periphery (composed of authors who only
published papers together with one of the star-authors), which suits the struc-
tural predictions of theoretical models. Based on a model that they develop,
Rosenblat and Mobius (2004) look at the rise of the internet and electronic
communications as a kind of natural experiment which lowered the costs of
communication between potential collaborators. They found that the degrees
of separation between individuals on average decrease and each author is more
likely to coauthor a paper with a distant author from a similar field. On the
other hand, the likelihood of coauthoring a paper with a coauthor from a dis-
similar field significantly decreases. Further, Kossinets and Watts (2006) use
the email-communications inside a large US college to draw up a social network
structure and discover various characteristics that determine the likelihood that
two individuals within the college will be linked directly.
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A small wave of more recent yet to be published papers proceeds in a direction
that is almost a hybrid between economic and information systems research -
in their subject, these are most closely related to our paper, even though they
strongly differ in methodology and focus.
Kumar et al. (2006) try to characterize user types in two huge social online-
networks, Flickr and Yahoo!360. They characterize 3 kinds of users: passive
members, inviters who entice others to join, and “linkers” who make full use
of the social networking capabilities of the services. Gu et al. (2007) look at
at peer-to-peer IRC music sharing service and show that it resembles a two-
sided market in many ways, in which contribution and consumption are highly
complementary.
Three studies specifically scrutinize public good problems and free riding:
Asvanund et al. (2004) try to quantify the extent of free riding in a peer-to-
peer file sharing network (Gnutella) on a macroscopic level. They find that
a substantial share of users (42%) behave as free riders, i.e. access others’
files without providing any of their own. Xia et al. (2007) discover that users
are more likely to share files in online sharing communities if he has himself
benefited from the community or has a recognized social status. Finally Gu
et al. (2009) consider the effects of indirect reciprocity on the public good
provision behavior of members of a peer-to-peer file sharing network. They find
that the propensity of an individual user to free-ride depends on the prevalent
behavior of other users in the community, which they construe as evidence
for an indirect reciprocal behavior. Further they find evidence for reciprocity
as a social norm, as free riders are discriminated against through voluntarily
enforced settings on communal servers. These studies are not comparable to
ours, as they do not have the individual characteristics of users at their disposal.
This allows us to apply individual utility maximization behavior and analyze
user behavior in a microeconomic context. Apart from this fact, pathological
incentives may arise through the fact that file sharing is illegal behavior, while
the service that we study operates well within the realms of copyright law.
Against this extensive background, our contribution is the following: We
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make use of a unique data-set in which we observe both individual characteris-
tics and behavior as well as the link structure among all individuals within an
actually existing social online-network. In contrast to the findings of a series of
experimental studies, we provide evidence that network formation and linking
decisions are motivated by strategic behavior that can be explained within the
utility maximizing rational agent framework.
Then we focus on public (or more precisely club-) good provision within
the network. Looking at the entire behavior with respect to the forming and
continuation of friendships among users over approximately four months, we
show that negative reciprocity, i.e. unilaterally severing existing friendships,
even though they are purely beneficial, is used to punish free-riding behavior.
Finally, we look at the overall effects of this. Using a user-fixed effects panel
estimation procedure, we show that there is only very weak evidence for the ex-
istence of free riding behavior, despite an almost textbook public good problem.
On the contrary, we are able to identify signs of positively reciprocal behavior.
The effect of the latter more than compensates the effect of free-riding that we
observe.
3.2. The Social Online-Network under Scrutiny
3.2.1. Function and Features of the Network
In this article, we study an emerging European social online-network, which we
will refer to from now on as the Network. Various features make the Network
especially interesting for economic analysis. The basic infrastructure is very
similar to well-known sites such as Facebook. Each user has an individual
profile page which is accessible to others and which allows him to provide others
with information about himself, such as age, gender, hobbies etc. As a further
feature familiar from other networks, individuals can become “friends” with
other users - for this to occur, one of the users has to propose the formation of
a bilateral link to another and the second user has to accept this proposal. For
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legal reasons, the number of friendships a user is allowed to enter into is capped
at 150, but this limit is non-binding for all users for the duration of our study.
While it takes the consent of both users to become friends (link-formation is
bilateral), either of the two can end the friendship at any later point of time
(unilateral link severance).
The main differentiating feature or unique selling proposition of the Network
is that users can upload digital copies of music that they legally own to an online
music library. We call this uploading activity provision of information. Via
a player embedded in their web-browser, users then can listen to (but not
download) music in their library. Further, and this is the main motivation for
our study, users can also listen to music in the library of their direct, i.e. first-
degree, friends, as long as the friendship lasts. A user therefore has access to
all the music that either he or one of his direct friends has uploaded while he
is online.
A feature of the Network that is something of a nuisance to users is a blessing
to our study: The access to individual music files is somewhat complicated.
For one, the music available to a given user is distributed into different music
libraries (e.g. music uploaded by himself is one library, but music uploaded
by each friend is stored in an individual separate library). The music files
in each of these libraries are sorted alphabetically, which makes it potentially
time-consuming to find specific songs in large libraries or to find something
interesting while browsing through them. Tests with medium sized libraries
of around 1,000 songs size showed that it took more than 6 minutes to locate
a song beginning with the letter “m”. While the service does provide users
with a search function, searches due to the programming of the website always
cover the library of the entire Network, i.e. both files that a user can access
and files that he cannot. From the search results (itself a list of hundreds of
songs, depending on the popularity), a user can only establish whether she
has access to a given file by adding it to her player and waiting for an error
message to appear upon hitting the play-button and waiting for the song to
load. Due to the extreme usability issues with this procedure, the site was
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recently completely refurbished, but this took place outside the time-window
that we observe.
It is exactly this nuisance that introduces the second kind of effort provision
into the equation. There is a mechanism that reduces the inconvenience for
users. They can create “play-lists” by adding multiple songs to the embedded
music player. Any number of songs can be added from the libraries that a user
has full access to. These play-lists are temporary in principle, i.e. they are
deleted whenever the browser cache is cleared. But a user can also save and
give a name to a play-list that he has compiled. This has two effects: It stores
the list with the Network and makes it available to the user whenever he logs in
again in the future, as well as to anyone visiting his website. Clearly, this will
be most useful to the user’s friends, who can access many of the same songs as
her due to the greater overlap of their first-degree libraries. For this reason, we
call the creation and storing of play-lists organization of information. The
second effect is that other users, who are not friends yet, cannot view a given
user’s songs, but they can view his playlists. A user’s playlists therefore are
the main indication of his value as a source of songs to others in the network.
A user can prevent one of his friends from accessing music-files (only) by end-
ing their friendship. As this also significantly decreases the value of his playlists,
provision and (indirectly) organization of information have the characteristics
of classical club goods.
3.2.2. Network Size and Development
The web-site came online in December 2007 with 2,000 registered users. This
number grew to 9,000 in March 2008, more than 20,000 in September 2008 and
exceeded 30,000 in November 2008, when the data for this study were mainly
collected. For many - maybe even most - questions of interest concerning online
networks, the number of registered users is not a very good indicator, as it may
include individuals who only registered at some point of time but never actually
used the service or have ceased to do so at some point in the past; therefore we
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will briefly discuss the most widely used alternative measures.
According to the common practice of sites such as facebook, myspace or
similar sites such as the German studi-vz, a user is considered active if she has
logged into her account in the course of the past 30 days. At first glance, it
is not obvious whether and how this measure is meaningful. Table 3.1 below
sheds some light on this question. In it, we have gathered descriptive statistics
for various such cutoff levels of user activity as of October 15th 2008.8
All Users Act30 Act20 Act10
Friends 0.92 2.16 2.50 3.91
Songs Listened 35.57 100.82 121.50 208.63
Songs uploaded 28.62 50.23 56.93 96.88
Play-lists created 1.63 2.55 2.80 3.80
Messages sent 0.38 1.30 1.67 3.02
Comments left 0.03 0.12 0.16 0.28
Days logged in 2.92 6.03 7.01 10.57
#Observations: 31,455 6,013 4,466 2,291
Table 3.1.: Descriptive statistics for various activity measures
Some important observations can be gleaned from these numbers, both about
the activity measures in general and about the Network in particular. First of
all, each more restrictive sub-sample includes users that are on average highly
significantly more active than the users in the more inclusive sample. For
example, users that have been active in the last 30 days (Act30) upload almost
twice as many songs on average as the general population, i.e. those users that
are left out of the sample are significantly less active. One loses a large number
of observations in the process, from all registered users to Act30, the drop is
precipitous, from 31,455 to 6,013. These findings indicate that the frequently
employed measure does have some merit. Figure 3.1 depicts the development
8Act30 designates user who have logged into their accounts in the last 30 days, the other columns have
analogous interpretations. By line, the sample means of the following are reported: number of friends
per user, number of songs listened to per user, number of songs uploaded per user, number of play-lists
created per user, number of messages sent per user, number of public comments left per user, number of
days on which the user has logged into her account at least once per user. All respective sample means
differ at 1% significance level (t-tests).
59
3. Individual (ir)rationality? Behavior in an emerging social online-network
Figure 3.1.: Development of Act30 Users over time.
of registered vs. active users in the period from December 2007 to November
2008. While the number of registered users increases more than 17-fold, the
number of active users increases only by a factor of 2.5 in the course of this
period.
Two further findings from Table 3.1 concerning the Network are particularly
important for our study. On the one hand, note that “social” activities, such
as posting comments or sending messages to other users appear to play a very
minor role in the network, with even the most active group of users having
sent no more than a total of 3.02 messages and posting no more than 0.28
comments on average. On the other hand, listening to and uploading songs
take up a much larger share of users’ activities, which points in the direction
that these music-consumption related activities are the main source of utility
for those involved in the Network.
3.3. Analytical Framework
One of the aims of this article is to provide evidence for strategic and utility
maximizing behavior among users in the Network. In order to facilitate the
understanding of readers and help us formulate our hypotheses more precisely,
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we will sketch a simple formal model of link formation and individual behavior
within the Network. This will form the basic framework for our empirical
analysis. We hereby draw on the notation and concepts introduced by Bala and
Goyal (2000), Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Bramoullé and Kranton (2007).
As we do not intend to explain or analyze the equilibrium network structure,
but instead individuals’ decision behavior given the contemporaneous structure,
we will keep the complexity of the exposition to the absolute minimum.
Following the established graph-theoretic approach, we think of the Network
as a set of nodes N = {1, ..., n}. In our context, each individual agent (user)
is represented by one node. Further, for each agent i, there is a vector gi =
{gi,1, ..., gi,i−1, gi,i+1, ..., gi,n}, such that each gi,j ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether or
not a direct link exists between nodes i and j. These links can be interpreted
as friendships between users in our context. A network g therefore is defined
by the set of vectors gi, i ∈ N . All friendships have the same “strength” in this
framework, as they are depicted as purely binary relationships.
3.3.1. Creation and Severance of Individual Links
Assume that each link gi, j between two users or players i and j is undirected,
i.e. both can benefit. To form a new link, both players have to consent to
the formation. One player (the “sender”) initiates the link formation process
through an invitation while the other (the “receiver”) decides whether to accept,
ignore or decline the invitation. If the receiver accepts the invitation, a new link
is formed and gi,j becomes 1. We denote this change in the network structure
by g′ = g + gi,j. If the receiver declines or ignores the invitation, the structure
of the network does not change.
Conversely, each user inside a friendship can sever an existing link unilater-
ally. If user i or user j cancels their friendship, then gi,j becomes zero. Analo-
gously to above, we denote this change in the network structure as g′ = g−gi,j.
The utility that a user obtains from the network depends on its structure,
therefore ui = ui(g). It appears sensible to assume that the formation of a new
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friendship is associated with costs, which may vary with the characteristics of
the individuals involved: The sender must first locate the receiver, then click
on a button and compose a message to send out a friendship invitation, and
finally he loses one free slot among his friendships if the receiver accepts the
invitation. Once a friendship offer has been extended, the search costs are sunk
and only the costs of the free slot remain. In our context, all these costs are
most likely negligible; ignoring them would not change the following analysis.
There is a certain asymmetry here: The receiver only has to click on one button,
whether he accepts or rejects a friendship (she has to take no action to ignore
the invitation) and she looses one free friendship slot if she accepts.
As the formation of new friendships requires mutual consent, the following
two conditions have to hold at the same time for a new friendship to be created,
assuming that i is the sender and j is the receiver, and denoting their respective
costs of inviting/accepting as κi/j:
(3.1) ui(g + gi,j)− κi > ui(g)⇔ ∆ui > κi
(3.2) uj(g + gi,j)− κj > uj(g)⇔ ∆uj > κj
The way the Network is set up, additional links are close to purely beneficial.
They allow users to access more music and to make better use of additional
play-lists. As indicated above, users in the Network are mainly interested in
music consumption, therefore these considerations should be their main priority.
On the other hand, each additional friendship costs next to nothing as long as
users are not close to the upper limit of friends, which is given for the period
of time that we study.
Analogously, for user i to be willing to sever an existing link, denoting the
costs of severance as λi the following condition must hold:
(3.3) ui(g − gi,j)− λi > ui(g)⇔ ∆ui > λi
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For the same reasons as stated above, we would expect ∆ui to be negative
in the case of link separation, unless the number of friends is 150 (or close to
the upper limit and users anticipate reaching it with certainty). As the costs
of link separation λi are non-negative, in this simple setting users are expected
not to separate links.
3.3.2. Provision of Club Goods in Network
One of the main features of the Network is that users provide different kinds of
effort, uploading music or compiling play-lists, that are potentially useful both
to themselves and to their friends. We treat this in the simplest imaginable
form: Consider that user i can exert effort ei at cost c(ei). We denote the set
of user i’s first degree friends as Ji, each of whom also exerts effort. Expanding
the utility function of user i above to incorporate these considerations, it now
becomes ui(g, ei) = ui(ei, {ej}j∈Ji) − c(ei). Clearly, the optimal level of effort
of i is determined by
(3.4)
∂ui(ei, {ej}j∈Ji)
∂ei
= c′(ei)
Therefore, if the effort of user i and his friend user j are substitutes (i.e. the
cross-partials are negative) and the costs of effort provision are non-negative,
the optimal effort of i should decrease with the effort that his first degree friends
provide. If in addition the utility of user i increases in the effort of his friend
user j, i.e. ∂ui(ei,{ej}j∈Ji)∂ej > 0, we can talk of a local public good.
9 But how
likely is it that these assumptions are satisfied in the setting we encounter?
1) Utility increase in effort provision of friends: More songs provided by his
friends gives a user more songs to choose from and likewise more playlists
give him a combination of more choice and better choices. Standard
9Note that in the Network, we can distinguish two dimensions of effort, provision and organization of
information, which are complements.
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theory usually states that more choice is a good thing, recent advances
in behavioral economics non-withstanding. As the users of the Network
display many characteristics of collectors and music connoisseurs we find
arguments to the opposite unconvincing.
2) Negative cross partials: This point is less clear-cut. If someone uses the
service to listen to a given set of songs that he has decided upon ex ante,
then there is no substitute for these songs. On the other hand, if users
want to create a mix of music to entertain them, then they will value vari-
ation above all else and a song uploaded by a friend is an almost perfect
substitute to a song uploaded myself. We do observe users listening to
their friends’ music frequently, as one can glean from the analysis below,
therefore we find this assumption to be equally justified.
It is straight-forward to derive the expectation of free-riding by users from
these considerations. In fact, in a similar setup, Bramoullé and Kranton (2007)
find a unique stable equilibrium with complete specialization, i.e. the agents
can be cleanly separated into two groups, one of which provides effort, the other
of which free-rides entirely.
There are two straightforward reasons why this is not necessarily so clear
cut in the Network we are considering. For one, users may not take the link-
structure as given, but can instead strategically form friendships and sever
existing links. Therefore social norms may be formed and upheld that free-
riding can and is to be punished by severing links with free riders, which we
refer to as negative reciprocity. In addition, users may only enter into new
friendships with others who have already demonstrated that they are good
citizens (strategic link formation), i.e. who have provided measurable effort up
front.
The second reason why free-riding does not necessarily have to occur is the
fact that many of the peer-groups within the network are relatively small. Even
the most active group of users distinguished above, those who have logged into
the network in the course of the past 7 days, only has around 4 friends on
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average. In such a close (if still potentially anonymous) setting, one may ex-
pect that social forces such as shame or guilt, combined with the relative ease
of monitoring a small number of connections, may prevent users from engag-
ing in free-riding behavior. Experimental evidence shows, though, that even
in small groups the play in repeated public-good games converges neither to
a pure free-riding equilibrium (the rational equilibrium), nor to purely coop-
erative behavior (the efficient outcome), but instead behavior is mixed, with
play converging towards a situation in between the two extremes. See for ex-
ample the seminal contribution of Andreoni (1988). We will simply take these
competing hypotheses to the data.
From all of the considerations above, we derive the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a - Strategic Linking Behavior regarding Invitations: Users that
are invited to join a friendship have provided higher efforts on average than the
peer-group of active users.
Hypothesis 1b - Strategic Linking Behavior regarding Acceptance: For friend-
ship invitations that are accepted, the inviter has provided higher efforts on
average than her peer-group. Especially, users whose friendship invitations
have been accepted have provided significantly more effort than users whose
friendship invitations have been denied or ignored.
Note that for the formation of new friendships, both users have to agree,
therefore the behavior and characteristics of both parties are relevant for the
formation. As opposed to this, for the severance of friendships it is sufficient
for one of the users to make the decision. This is reflected in the following
hypothesis, which will be more closely specified further below:
Hypothesis 2 - Negative Reciprocity: Friendships from which one of the users
derives little utility are more likely to be severed. Especially users who dis-
play behavior that resembles free riding are more likely to be excluded from
friendships.
The hypotheses concerning free riding behavior are very straightforward:
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Hypothesis 3a - Free Riding for Information Provision: Users upload fewer
songs themselves, the more songs are available to them through their friends.
Hypothesis 3b - Free Riding for Information Organization: Users generate
fewer play-lists themselves, the more play-lists are available to them through
their friends.
While our first three hypotheses focus on free-riding and negatively reciprocal
punishment behavior, conversely one could also expect a social norm to exist
that rewards desirable behavior or effort provision in some form. The design of
many websites takes exactly this form of reward into account: For example, in
many popular specialized internet-forums, users are awarded ascending titles
based on the number of contributions they have written. Similarly, Wikipedia-
contributors can access statistics regarding the number and extent of their
contributions.
Figure 3.2.: Greeting screen with information of friends’ activity.
Also the design of the Network we study has a built in perquisite of this form.
Whenever a user logs onto the service, he is greeted by a welcoming-screen.
Placed centrally on this screen is a message box that informs the user when-
ever one of their friends has supplied additional play-lists or music, as depicted
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in Figure 3.2. Confronted with this information regarding the beneficial activ-
ities, users might want to positively reciprocate by providing additional effort of
their own, as for example suggested by Fehr and Gächter (2000). The potential
reasons for this kind of behavior are manifold: They range from competitive
instincts (who has the most songs in his library), over imitation to gratitude
and reciprocation. Irrespective of the true motivation, we can subsume each of
these under the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4a - Positive Reciprocity for Information Provision: Users re-
spond in kind whenever their friends provide additional information/upload
new songs, i.e. users are more likely to upload new songs if their friends have
recently uploaded new songs.
Hypothesis 4b - Positive Reciprocity for Information Organization: Users
respond in kind whenever their friends provide additional organization of infor-
mation information/create new play-lists, i.e. users are more likely to compile
new play-lists if their friends have recently generated new play-lists.
3.4. Empirical Analysis
3.4.1. Data Description
We use two different data sources to approach the questions that we wish to
study. For the questions related to link formation and severance, we mainly
use data covering every change of user friendship status between July 10th and
November 11th 2008. From this we create two different data-sets. To test
Hypotheses 1a and 1b, we look at all friendship invitations that were issued
during this time, as well as what happened to them (acceptance, declination,
revocation, nothing). We observe 3,657 friendship invitations in this time-span.
Importantly for our topic of interest, we also observe certain user characteristics
for those involved in these exchanges. In order to estimate the probability for
a friendship being severed for Hypothesis 2, we limit our analysis to those
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invitations that were accepted in this time-span and which we observe for at
least 50 days. This limits our number of observations to 1,52. We call this data
set A.
For the remaining hypotheses on free riding and positive reciprocity, we make
use of a panel data set. We have 10 weekly cross-sections of user data in which
we observe various characteristics and behavior variables as described below.
The data cover the period from September 14th until November 18th 2008.
Due to attrition and new arrivals, this results in an unbalanced panel with ca.
25,000 users and an average of 8.1 observations per user. We will refer to these
as data set B.
In the following, we briefly describe the variables used in our study and
indicate in which of the data sets they are available to us:
Days Online (A,B) - This count variable logs each day that a user logged
into her account or used one of the functions on the Network. The value
of this variable is the aggregated number of days that a user has visited
the site. Note that this variable does not measure how many actions a
user has performed on a given day or how much time he has spent using
the service.
Days since Registration (A,B) - This variable describes how many days
ago a user registered with the service.
Last Login (A,B) - Measured in days, this variable denotes the time since
the last activity of the user. An activity is a login or any other action
within the user interface.
Friends (A,B) - The number of currently active friendships a user is in-
volved in. There is a limit of 150 friendships that a user can enter into,
but this limit was binding for only one user at the time of our analysis.10
Music Uploaded (A,B) - This variable states the number of uploaded
10Due to a technical glitch in the system, this user was actually able to enter into more than 150 friendships.
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songs by a specific user. These songs are collected in the users own music
library, which is accessible for the user’s friends.
Songs Listened (A,B) - This is the total number of songs the user has
listened to on the Network. A limitation to this variable is that it includes
both songs that were skipped as well as songs that were listened to in full
length. Nevertheless, assuming that users derive utility from listening to
music through the server, this is one of the better proxies for user utility
available to us.
Own Play-lists (A,B) - The number of play-lists that a user has created
and that exist at the current point of time, i.e. if a user deletes a play-list,
this variable declines by one.
Play-lists Friends (B) - The total number of current play-lists of all of a
user’s friends.
Common Friends (A) - All users that are friends of both the sender
and the receiver of a friendship invitation at the given point of time are
counted in this variable, illustrating the overlap of senders’ and receivers’
friends.
Common Music (A) - This variable counts songs that are owned by both
sender and receiver. Important to note is that this variable is not able
to completely capture the overlap of the both music libraries, since some
songs may vary in quality or length and are thus tagged with different
internal IDs by the system.
Songs from Friend’s library (A) - This counts the number of songs from
the other users library that a user has actually listened to.
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3.4.2. Strategic Linking Behavior and Negative
Reciprocity
One criticism that one could easily point at our project is that users do not
act out of rational objectives, i.e. that they interact with people they con-
sider friends totally irrespective of their effort provision. The aim of the first
hypothesis is to if not repudiate this argument then at least to put it into per-
spective. Table 3.2 below shows the average characteristics of four different
groups: First, those who received friendship invitations throughout the period
we observe. We partition the senders of these invitations into two subgroups,
those whose friendship was accepted and those whose friendship was declined
or left pending for more than 30 days.11 We compare the characteristics of
these groups to the group of those that have logged in within the past 10 days,
the most restrictive “conventional” activity measure.
The results are quite striking. People who have received an invitation are on
average by far the most active group. They have uploaded far more music (3
times the average of the second most active group), provided more play-lists
and are also more active concerning the social network functions. Both mean-
and median-equality tests are rejected at the 1% significance level for each of
these variables. Therefore we cannot reject Hypothesis 1a and consider the
evidence in support of the hypothesis to be strong. The users in the network
appear to be guided by rational considerations in deciding whom to invite to
form a friendship.
Similar arguments hold with respect to Hypothesis 1b. Those users whose
invitation was accepted have provided twice as much music as their rejected
(or ignored) counterparts, almost three times as many play-lists and have sent
twice as many messages or comments on average. Again, both mean- and
median-tests show that the differences are significant at the 1% level. So the
evidence is strongly in favor of the hypothesis. For the more general point,
we also conclude that users do behave in a way that appears to be driven by
11The date was chosen as more than 95% of acceptances were issued within 28 days, but the results are
highly robust to moving the cutoff date.
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Inviters Inviters
Invitees Accepted Not Accepteda Act10 usersb
Own music 1936.02 667.30 316.28 368.71
(5416.59) (1879.08) (1326.79) (1299.06)
Own play-lists 40.65 20.95 7.79 11.12
(126.97) (90.41) (37.37) (47.00)
Friends 38.07 21.5 20.61 14.48
(39.76) (27.50) (26.69) (27.93)
Messages sent 36.41 10.40 5.61 11.47
(150.83) (62.61) (33.44) (88.03)
Comments left 2.82 1.17 .59 1.06
(7.82) (4.16) (2.88) (4.78)
obs. 3657 2,076 930 602
aAn invitation was considered non-accepted if it was outright declined or if it was left pending for more
than 30 days.
bHere, we exclude those users that have registered less than 10 days ago, which explains the differences to
table 1.
Table 3.2.: The average characteristics of various groups of users:
invitees, accepted and non-accepted inviters and the most active group of the
Network’s users according to the most widely used definition, (means reported,
std. deviations in parentheses)
rational (utility maximizing) motives.
Next, we focus on the unilateral decision to sever existing friendships. We
distinguish between two parties, the person who severed a friendship (“Severer”),
and the person who passively had to endure the severance (“Severed”). Even a
cursory glance at the descriptives displays a very clear pattern. In Table 3.3,
we present the average characteristics of a Severer, a Severed and an “average”
user in the sub-sample. Comparing the latter to the other measures of user
characteristics presented above shows us that the new friendships we observe
were formed between relatively active and involved users.
The comparison between Severer and Severed is very stark: From a static
viewpoint, the Severer had provided 22-times the music (4472.15 vs. 206.14)
and 48-times the number of play-lists (358.62 vs. 8.47) at the time that the
friendship was formed. Looking at their individual behavior during the time
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that the friendship lasted, the Severer uploaded 110-times as many songs per
day (33.71 vs. 0.28) and 12-times as many play-lists (0.65 vs. 0.051) as the
Severed. Finally, the Severer was far less likely to listen to a song of the
Severed than vice-versa (0.02 vs. 1.29 songs of the other listened to per day).
The small, yet positive, number of songs that the Severer listens to from the
Severed’s music library is a reminder that the decision to end the friendship is
costly: You lose access to those songs that the other person has provided. In
a static world, which takes the utility derived from a friendship as given, this
appears not to be rational, unless a user derives an immediate satisfaction from
link severance (“revenge” for example). On the other hand, it is relatively easy
to imagine a dynamic game in which an equilibrium exists, in which punishment
counteracts free riding. Both concepts have in common that free riding is the
cause of dis-utility to the other party. To restate our second hypothesis in
accordance with this argument:
Hypothesis 2 - Negative Reciprocity: Friendships in which one of the users
displays behavior resembling free-riding are more likely to be severed.
Importantly for our analysis, no user reached the maximum number of friends
(150) during the time that we observe, the maximum number of friends that
was reached in the severed friendships was 125.
From the descriptive statistics alone, it is hard to disentangle whether it is
the sheer amount of effort provided by a user or the additional provision of
effort over time that the other party values. In order to shed more light on
this question, we consider the following discrete decision model. Let us call the
probability that a given friendship is severed p(x) ≡ P (y = 1|x), where x is
a vector that captures both parties’ characteristics. Using the latent variable
approach, we estimate logit-models, see Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix
for the exact results.
In model 1a, we only include the “static” characteristics, i.e. the effort pro-
vided by both users at the beginning of their friendship (here again, we talk of
a severer and a severed user - if the friendship was not severed, then these two
roles were assigned to the users in a friendship randomly). We would expect
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Severer Severed Average User a
Own music beginning 4472.15 206.14 885.84
(3111.36) (987.39) (1335.54)
Average songs added per day 33.71 0.28 4.08
(34.44) (1.03) (11.05)
Own play-lists beginning 358.62 8.47 31.52
(317.54) (36.25) (71.19)
Average play-lists added per day 0.65 0.051 0.29
(1.80) (0.11) (0.84)
Friends beginning 12.82 15.61 28.96
(29.15) (22.90) (22.68)
Friends endb 22.27 17.63 34.48
(35.36) (23.24) (24.34)
Number of friend’s songs listened per day .020536 1.29 0.15
(0.13) (3.65) (0.74)
obs. 114 114 3,042
aAverage of users in the entire sample of new friendships being formed.
bThe maximum number of friends observed among severed friendships was 125, well below the limit of 150.
For non-severed friendships, we report the number after 50 days.
Table 3.3.: Mean characteristics of users involved in severed friendships:
The severers of friendships compared to those who were severed and the average
of all users involved in “new” friendships.)
that the effort provided by the Severed should lower the probability that the
friendship will be ended, as it raises the costs of the Severer (more information
that he can no longer access), and the effect does have the expected sign and
is (though weakly) significant for the provision of music, while the provision of
play-lists is not significant. Interestingly, the effort provision of the Severer is
significant and increases the probability of severance along both effort dimen-
sions - this means that users that have contributed a lot of effort themselves
are more likely to end a friendship (while they are also more likely to encounter
free riders, according to the analytical framework presented above).
In model 2a, we only include the “dynamic” characteristics, i.e. the number of
songs and play-lists that the individual users have added over time on average.
We encounter the same pattern: The more music the Severer adds, the more
likely he is to end a friendship, while adding more music makes it less likely that
a user will have his friendship ended by the other party. The effect of play-lists
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added by the Severer is more interesting. Adding more play-lists makes it much
less likely that a user will end a friendship. On second glance, this is rather
intuitive: When adding a play-list a user organizes the information available to
herself for easier access. This may (or may not) include information provided
by the other user. In any case, this makes the information more valuable (as it
is more accessible) and therefore raises the costs of ending a friendship.
In model 3a, we include both the static and dynamic characteristics. En-
couragingly, the effects retain their signs and significance levels.
In models 1b and 2b, we add those variables that capture free riding in the
potentially most intuitively appealing way, by including the number of songs of
the other person that the respective users have listened to per day. Model 1b
only includes these two variables and, as one would expect, songs listened by
the severer decrease the probability that a friendship is severed. Further, the
number of songs listened per day by the severed highly significantly increase the
probability that a friendship will be severed. This resembles the most intuitive
description of free-riding, but it is noteworthy that the severer does not know
that his music library was accessed by the other party. In model 2b we add
all explanatory variables used in the previous models and the effect that this
intuitive form of free-riding strongly increases the probability of a friendship
being severed persists.
To conclude the section, let us briefly summarize our findings. There are
strong indications that users make their link-formation decision contingent on
the utility they expect to derive from a given friendship. Invitations are sent
out to very active individuals, and invitations by users who have provided little
effort themselves are far more likely to be rejected. Regarding the severance
of links, we find that users are willing to incur severance costs (not being able
to access the other’s information) in ca. 7.5% of friendships in the interval of
time that we observe. Patterns and regularities, as well as our logit regression
results, suggest that this behavior is caused by the desire to punish the other
users’ free riding. This corresponds with experimental findings especially in
the literature on the ultimatum game. Interestingly, this punishment behavior
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can itself be interpreted as a form of public-good provision, e.g., enforcement
of social norms.
What remains now is to show how prevalent free-riding is in this community,
given the existence of the described control- and punishment mechanisms on
an individual friendship level.
3.4.3. Free Riding and Positive Reciprocity
As discussed above, we consider a user to be free-riding if she provides less effort
ceteris paribus given that her friends have exerted themselves more. A naive
approach to this problem therefore would be to simply regress all users’ levels
of uploaded songs and generated play-lists onto the levels of their friends in a
cross-sectional approach. At second glance, though, this approach is clearly not
conductive to answering the question due to a reverse causality issue. Assume
that one finds that people whose friends provide a lot of effort provide a lot of
effort themselves. One can clearly imagine a story in which people who have
provided a lot of effort in the past attract more friends, especially considering
our findings on strategic linking behavior.
To circumvent this issue, we therefore don’t consider the total levels of effort
that users provide as a dependent variable. Instead, we look at their weekly
efforts, i.e. how many songs/play-lists they add in a given week, given the
explanatory variables and different sets of controls from which we obtain the
following regression equations:
(3.5) eit = β1Xit + β2Zit + uit
where eit is the effort an individual exerts, Xit describes the explanatory
variables and Zit designates the controls. Clearly, there may be unobserved
individual effects that are correlated with the individual error terms, e.g. some
individuals may be compulsive collectors of music, while others are casual listen-
ers only. In order to capture these differences, we estimate a user fixed-effects
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model, and adjust the standard errors for potential user-cluster effects.
We estimate three different models (with two different samples) for infor-
mation provision and organization respectively, in order to shed some light on
hypotheses 3 and 4. In each specification, X is composed of three variables:
The determinants for the effort that a user provides for information pro-
vision in a given week should be determined by a) the total amount of music
that his friends have made available to him, b) the total amount of music that
he himself has uploaded in the past and c) the amount of music that his friends
have added in the recent past. For c), we use the additional music friends have
uploaded in the course of the past week - if anything, this should under-estimate
the effect we are trying to find. Relating these variables to our hypotheses we
would expect the following: a) should have a negative influence on effort pro-
vision (free riding, hypothesis 3a), b) should have a negative effect on effort
provision due to decreasing marginal utility from effort and c) should have a
positive influence on effort provision (positive reciprocity, hypothesis 4a).
The three models differ by the controls that we add. Model 1 is bare, i.e.
without additional controls. In model 2 we add a control for the user’s time
since registration by adding a dummy that takes the value 1 if the user has
been registered for longer than 60 days (experienced dummy). Further we add
a control for time. In order to control for users whose main motivation to join
the network is mainly social, we add controls for the amount of public comments
that users have left and private messages they have written. In model 3 we give
credit to the consideration that the two kinds of efforts are complementary. One
would expect users to add more music if their existing music is well organized
and vice versa. Therefore in model 3 we add controls for the number of own
play-lists and number of friends’ play-lists available to a user. We estimate
each of the models once for the entire population of registered users and once
for the sub-sample of active users only.
Analogously, for information organization efforts in a given week, the
explanatory variables in X are a) the total number of play-lists that a user’s
friends have provided, b) the total number of play-lists that he himself has
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compiled and c) the number of play-lists that his friends have added in the
past week. From our hypotheses, we would expect the same signs as above.
Again, model 1 is bare, model 2 adds controls for time and social interactions
and model 3 takes into account the amount of music that the user and her
friends have respectively uploaded.
For the detailed regression results, please refer to Tables A.3 through A.6
in the Appendix. We find very weak evidence for hypothesis 3a, free riding with
regard to information provision. Users upload weakly significantly less music
only for the sub-sample of active users in model 3, i.e. taking the effects of the
complementary effort provision into account. On the other hand, the evidence
for positive reciprocity with regard to information provision (Hypothesis 4a) is
comparatively robust. In each specification of the model there is a small but
significant and positive reaction to other users’ providing more music. Some
other observations for the regressions regarding music files added are highly
interesting. For one, the level effect of the own music uploaded is never sig-
nificant - this could either be due to the fact that the marginal utility from
additional music is non-decreasing, i.e. now matter how much music is already
available, more music is yet better. Or there is so much music available freely
in any case, that additional own music files from the beginning on have little
value to users.
The regressions for the additional provision of play-lists (Tables A.5 and
A.6) resemble our assumptions rather closely. There is a significant negative
level effect for the amount of own play-lists already compiled, which resembles
initially positive and decreasing marginal utility of organization of information.
Model 3 shows that the more music a user himself provides, the more likely
he or she is to exert more effort in organization. The effect of friends’ mu-
sic on the other hand is surprisingly significant and negative (if economically
not very meaningful). Again, this might resemble the fact that more music in
questionably accessible libraries may actually reduce the utility a user derives
from the service because it makes things harder to find. Regarding our cen-
tral hypotheses, we find robust evidence for hypothesis 4b, users react to their
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friends’ organization of information in a positively reciprocal manner. Again,
the evidence for free riding is limited to one of the sub-samples and only ap-
pears when controlling for the complementary level of information provision in
model 3. Finally note that the absolute value of the coefficient of the positively
reciprocal effect is twice the size of the free-riding effect - therefore the net
effect of a friend providing more music is positive in the short run.
3.5. Conclusion and Outlook
In this article, we attempted to empirically assess the rationality of user be-
havior, analyzing unique data from a real social online-network. The major
advantage of this data is that we observe both individual user characteristics
as well as the structure of the entire network which allows us to study issues
that were not easily approachable up until now empirically.
We find that despite mixed experimental evidence, the existing theory on
link-formation allows straightforward and useful predictions: Users systemati-
cally pursue more valuable “friends” in the process of link formation. On the
other hand, individuals are willing to sever at first glance purely beneficial links
in 7.5% of the friendships that we observe. There is substantial evidence that
this is linked to punishment-behavior when users encounter free riding, i.e. a
direct form of negative reciprocity that in the past has been most prominently
encountered in ultimatum games. Viewed statically, this kind of behavior would
not be predicted by network theory (or economic theory in general). Interest-
ingly, this can in itself be construed as a form of public good provision, as it may
help to enforce social norms, from which users in general benefit. Finally, we
focused on whether free-riding is detectable, or whether on the contrary we ob-
serve a form of positively reciprocal behavior in which individual users respond
to their friend’s additional effort provision in kind. There is clear evidence for
the latter, with the positive effects of reciprocal behavior overcompensating the
free-riding effects in the short run.
We believe that our research raises some interesting theoretical questions.
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Evidently, there are interactive effects between the formation of links, the pro-
vision of club goods within a network and unilateral link-severance, which may
influence the prevalence of free-riding within a social network. These effects
have, to our knowledge, not been captured in theoretical network models up
until now, even though they may yield predictions that are far closer to the
empirically observed facts. In addition to the individual behavior, it would be
interesting to generate predictions concerning network formation and equilib-
rium network structure in an in this sense richer context.
For the specific network, there are a number of issues that we want to address
in future work with additional data. The questions include, but are not limited
to: Is the punishment mechanism that we observe effective, i.e. do individual
users, who have been “kicked out” of friendships change their behavior? What
are the effects of the size of neighborhoods (or the number of friends of an
individual user) on his free-riding behavior - e.g. are members of larger neigh-
borhoods more likely to exhibit this kind of behavior, as potentially monitoring
costs increase and punishment is less likely? Finally, it would be wonderful to
see whether our findings hold true for comparable social networks, if similar
data becomes available in the future.
In closing, we would like to restate that we are well aware of the drawbacks
that empirical work in this field suffers from in general. We do not observe
and cannot perfectly control for individual users’ actual motivation in their
actions. There may be substantial and unpredictable differences in their utility
functions, “network savvy” and computer literacy, which may systematically
bias our results. While experimental studies are not nearly as prone to these
problems, they are subject to certain shortcomings of their own. We hope that
our study is viewed as a strongly complementary building block that enriches
our understanding of the behavior of individuals in complex social network
settings.
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4. Trust and Investment - A Theoretical
and Empirical Assessment
4.1. Introduction
4.1.1. Motivation
In the last couple of years, the automotive sector, one of the most innovative
and important industries in developed countries, has witnessed unprecedented
turbulence. In June 2009 General Motors, the second biggest carmaker in the
world, filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. It appears that more than
just being strangled by mounting pension obligations and being undermined by
rising fuel-costs, the former industry juggernaut has been out-manouvered by
more innovative and design-savvy competitors. Since then, the financial crisis
has made consumers even more loth to make extensive investments into their
mobility.1 Increasingly harsh competition for a slowing demand has eroded
industry margins, placing an ever greater premium on companies that produce
efficiently and are able to differentiate themselves from others through their
high level of quality and innovative products; but to an ever greater degree, it
is upstream suppliers’ know-how and efforts that are responsible for successful
differentiation.
As a result of increased outsourcing efforts, carmakers contribute only a mi-
nor share of innovation efforts and the total value added of their product -
1Despite the fact that governments throughout the world have responded decisively and expensively, prop-
ping up ailing carmakers by guaranteeing loans and providing liquidity on the one hand, and giving
consumers additional incentives to replace their old cars through variations of the “cash for clunkers”
program.
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in some cases they are almost reduced to pure assemblers. Upstream suppli-
ers are responsible for much of the ground-breaking basic research, which is
then adapted to the specific needs of individual car models. Nevertheless, the
structure of the market places the car manufacturers in the superior bargaining
position vis-à-vis their suppliers. This leads to an inherent dilemma between
attaining the desired quality levels and short-term rent-extraction/profit gen-
eration. We demonstrate that trust can play a central role in such a hold-up
situation in a theoretical model, whose predictions we then test using a unique
data-set.
To be able to do this, we contribute to the understanding of trust: While
there have been significant advances in economic research on this topic in the
past decade, many of them share what can be considered a drawback: Both
experiments as well as empirical approaches focus on trust as a characteris-
tic of subjects, either investigating their general attitudes towards others (“Do
you think in general others can be trusted?”) or analyzing their willingness to
contribute funds to more or less anonymous players in lab settings. In con-
trast to this, we define an upstream supplier’s trust in the downstream firm
as his expectation (the subjective probability) of whether the latter is going
to exploit a holdup scenario to extract rents. This is closer to the sociological
and colloquial reading of the term, in which in a specific setting A trusts B
to do something (or refrain from doing something), which is in B’s realm of
influence. With this understanding, trust can alleviate the under-investment
problem. We further show that, as opposed to many results in the literature
on relational contracting, trust and competition between upstream suppliers
induced by the downstream firm are not mutually exclusive. In fact, compe-
tition can be a substitute for other forms of rent extraction and in this case
stronger competition induced by the manufacturer would be associated with
higher levels of suppliers’ trust.
We are able to approach the subject of trust empirically using a unique
data-set, collected from an online-survey of suppliers and manufacturers in the
German automotive industry in 2007-2008. The measures of trust that we
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generate are relationship-specific – instead of subject specific – and we analyze
the determinants of suppliers’ trust in the manufacturer by linking them to
reported past behavior. We show that higher levels of suppliers’ trust lead
to higher relationship-specific investment proxied by failure-rates of supplied
parts. Finally we show that more intense supplier competition is not mutually
exclusive with trust in the downstream firm.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. After briefly outlining
the related literature, we develop a very simple model in Section 2, from which
we derive hypotheses on the effects of trust on vertical relationships. In Section
3, we first introduce the study that provided the data on which we base our
empirical analysis, an in-depth survey investigation into the structure of the
German automotive industry. We present potential measures of trust and try
to carefully evaluate what they capture. At the center of our empirical anal-
ysis, we analyze how trust between manufacturers and suppliers is related to
two important questions: Sourcing decisions and supplier (under-)investment.
Finally, Section 4 concludes and raises some new research questions resulting
from our findings.
4.1.2. Related Literature and Contribution
Interactions between suppliers and OEMs2 in the automobile industry are no-
toriously complex, fraught with moral hazard and hold-up problems. Neverthe-
less, both parties regularly invest substantial amounts of time, know-how and
money into specific relationships. Apparent puzzles like this have piqued the
interest of economists for quite some time—perhaps the most prominent expla-
nation approaches can be subsumed under the headings of property rights the-
ory (applied mainly to hold-up problems) and contract theory (applied mainly
to asymmetric information and moral hazard).3 Beyond that, it has been well
2We use the term OEM, i.e. original equipment manufacturer, for the downstream automobile producer.
We will refer to the upstream firms simply as suppliers.
3Due to the more applied focus of our study, we refrain from delving deeply into the intricacies of the
literature on the holdup-problem. Instead, we refer to the seminal Hart and Moore (1988), Grossman
and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), as well as the more recent Hart and Moore (2007) and
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established that in settings like these, relational (or informal) contracts can play
an important role in governing relationships. As opposed to formal contracts,
which are linked to outcomes verifiable by third parties and courts, the term re-
lational contract refers to self-enforcing, often implicit agreements “sealed with
a handshake”.
Theoretical Approaches
There is a rich theory on relational contracting in different contexts,4 beginning
with Bull (1987) who provides the original repeated games-framework for em-
ployment relationships. Also for employment, Baker et al. (1994) demonstrate
how the combination of formal and relational contracts can lead to better re-
sults than either instrument could achieve alone. Interestingly, there can be a
substitutive (if either works almost perfectly) or complementary relationship
between the two. Baker et al. (1999) analyze the informal delegation of decision
rights within hierarchies under different informational settings.
More recently, research has focused on more generic settings, searching for
optimal contract design. Levin (2003) finds that while under moral hazard
optimal relational contracts exist and are relatively simple, under hidden infor-
mation cases arise in which agents do not respond to the incentives provided
therein at all. Calzolari and Spagnolo (2009) further extend this scenario: The
relationship between a principal and an agent interacting repeatedly can suf-
fer from both moral hazard and hidden information - but the principal has a
further tool available to him by being able to select from various competing
agents (screening) who are able to collude. They find the intuitively appealing
result that in cases in which non-contractible factors contribute more to the
principal’s payoff, the best package of instruments will rely more heavily on re-
lational contracts with a smaller set of agents. Vice versa, in “simpler” settings
in which the most important issues are contractible, the principal will rely on
Hart (2008), the latter two with many further references.
4We refer to MacLeod (2007) for a careful survey of the literature on relational contracting, with a special
focus on the effects of the quality of legals systems.
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a more competitive setting amongst agents. Brown et al. (2004) carry out an
experimental study in order to be able to control for the level of enforceability
of contracts. They find that as enforcement becomes more effective, the original
long-term rent-sharing relationships are replaced with short-term arms-length
agreements, very much in line with the theoretical results described above.
This can be taken as evidence of a substitutive relationship between formal
and relational contracts in their specific setting.
Entering into a business relationship without being able to resort to legal
means of enforcement would probably be called a form of “trust” colloquially.
The models described above have in common that relational contracts and com-
petition are in a certain sense polar concepts—you either rely on handshakes
or you prefer arms-length market interactions. We will demonstrate in our
analytical model (as well as the empirical part of our study) that trust and
competition can actually be associated with each other in a hold-up setting,
if competition is used as a “legitimate” mechanism of extracting rent from the
individual, instead of “illegitimately” extracting rents through superior ex-post
bargaining power. As the concept of trust that we propose is not congruent with
relational contracts, this result can be seen as complementary to the existing
literature.
Empirical Studies
Trust has for some time drawn considerable attention and scrutiny from experi-
mental economists.5 Yet researchers in applied micro-economics and industrial
organization have been rather cautious about using this term, even actively
trying to avoid it (see, e.g. the discussion in MacLeod (2007)).6 On the other
hand, empirical researchers in the areas of macroeconomics and growth have
been less reticent in this regard, so that some empirical strategies do already
exist.
5See Fehr (2009) for a sweeping overview of the experimental and neuro-economic literature.
6For a careful survey of the development of the term “culture” in economics and the effects of culture on
economic outcomes, see Guiso et al. (2006).
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As a basis for many studies, the answers to the following question from the
World Values Survey has been used: “Generally speaking, would you say that
most people can be trusted or that you have to be very careful in dealing with
people?” While one may doubt the power of this construct at first glance,7 it
has been used frequently to obtain results. The basic hypothesis of La Porta
et al. (1997) is that trust is an integral requirement for the functioning of larger
organizations in which the likelihood of repeated interactions is relatively small
and thereby the established mechanisms for ensuring cooperative behavior are
less effective. In a cross-country study they try to establish that populations in
which higher levels of trust are prevalent should foster more effective governance
as well as relatively larger firms. Aghion et al. (2008) perform an international
comparative study in which they scrutinize the connection between levels of
social capital (or trust/distrust) in populations with the amount of existing
state regulation as well as the demand for it. The basic intuition is that a lack
of civic mindedness in one’s fellow citizens may lead to a stronger desire for the
state to regulate interactions. They find very strong evidence for this, even for
societies in which the government itself is plagued by corruption. Therefore it
appears that trust and regulations are to some extent substitutes. In contrast
to most other articles cited so far, Butler et al. (2009) study the effects of trust
on individual’s economic outcomes instead of aggregate economic performance.
They use the European Social Survey as well as experimental evidence to argue
that a medium amount of trust may be optimal for individuals: With too little
trust, too many opportunities for beneficial interactions are missed, with too
much trust the danger of being taken advantage of becomes too great.
Guiso et al. (2009) use a slightly more concrete measure, the trust that
citizens of a given country in Europe have for citizens of another. They find
that the levels of trust are explained in part by characteristics such as the
distance between countries, but also by factors such as sociological and genetic
closeness and common history. They find that less trust in the citizens of a
7See Sapienza et al. (2007) for an experimental study on the merits of this measure and a discussion of the
previous literature.
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country is associated to significantly lower aggregate trade and investment. In
a second study, Guiso et al. (2004) suggest that the different characteristics of
Italian regions lead their citizens to develop different levels of social capital.
They then show that in high social capital/trust areas people are more prone
to invest in stocks instead of holding cash reserves and have easier access to
bank credit. The effect is mitigated by levels of education. Along similar lines,
Guiso et al. (2005) find that individuals who display higher levels of trust buy
more risky assets relative to their wealth. They counter a common criticism by
controlling for risk- and ambiguity-aversion, which does not make their original
result disappear.
Finally, Bottazzi et al. (2009) study the willingness of venture capitalists to
perform non-contractible services in a micro-economic environment. In partic-
ular, they analyze the influence of more effective legal systems in this context.
Both in their theoretical model and their empirical analysis of a data-set with
European venture-capital deals they find that a more efficient legal system has
two effects. On the one hand it is complementary to trust, in the sense that it
makes venture capitalists more willing to grant non-contractible support; but
on the other hand, they require more protection for the case of failure of the
venture.8
We believe that the empirical part of our study adds a new angle to the way
economists think about trust. We define trust not as a characteristic specific to
individuals. Instead, we interpret trust as the expectations of one party towards
future behavior of the other, based on relationship-specific observable and un-
observable characteristics, including the joint history. Based on this approach,
we attempt to analyze how higher or lower levels of trust in a downstream firm
by an upstream firm affect upstream investment levels as well as the choice of
contractual setting in the German automobile industry.
8In the working paper on the same data, Bottazzi et al. (2007) also show that higher scores on the Euro-
barometer measure of trust between nations are associated with higher investments.
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4.2. Analytical Framework
We introduce a simple model as an analytical framework for our study with
two main goals in mind: On the one hand to clearly define the concept of trust
that we wish to work with and on the other hand to integrate some industry
specific observations that we encountered in the course of the qualitative part
of our research project into the canonical model. In particular, we want to
analyze how competition between suppliers—induced by the OEM—relates to
issues of underinvestment due to hold-up problems.
What we observe in reality when a new part is to be developed and procured
is that in most cases multiple suppliers are invited to develop a blueprint to
match the OEM’s specifications. Depending on the development stage, these
can range from extremely vague (pre-development up to 3 years in advance of
series production) to rather specific (detailed development about 6-9 months
prior to series production). A large part of the compensation of the supplier
is comprised of the OEM’s subsequent business regarding series production
or more detailed development—but in these later phases only a subset (often
only one firm) of the previously employed suppliers will be awarded the second
contract.
4.2.1. Structure and Timing of the Procurement Game
We model this in the following way: Assume that a monopolistic OEM needs
the input of a supplier in order to produce output with a value of v(θi, Ii),
where the arguments of v designate the intrinsic quality and effort choice of the
supplier to be defined exactly below.
First, in t = 0, the OEM irreversibly9 chooses n ex-ante identical suppliers,
inviting them to develop and submit a blueprint for the part it wants to pro-
cure. For each supplier, it incurs costs k, e.g. administration and coordination
efforts, so that the total costs are nk. The suppliers then each independently
9Imagine that the interfaces between the part in question and the other parts have been designed by the
time the OEM could reconsider, making this option economically impossible.
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draw an intrinsic quality parameter θi from the known distribution Q(θ), which
is continuously increasing within the domain [0, 1]. There are many ways to
interpret this parameter - for example it could measure how well the supplier’s
employees involved in the project are compatible with the OEM’s engineers,
or how well the research capacities of the two firms complement each other
with regard to the period of time in question. Clearly there is a certain level
of randomness involved here, even if the firms have cooperated already in the
past, and we would argue that in an established industry like the automotive
industry, this randomness should be of similar or the same degree over compa-
rable suppliers. After each supplier privately observes the value of its draw, it
choses an effort level Ii, given the revelation of θi and the n chosen by the OEM.
Exerting effort induces the costs c(Ii), with both c′ and c′′ strictly positive.
Then, in t = 1, the suppliers’ qualities and investment choices become com-
mon knowledge. We limit the subset of suppliers that receive a second contract
to a singleton, which is selected in the following fashion. If n = 1, then this
supplier is awarded the contract, otherwise, the suppliers engage in a second-
price auction (or equivalently Bertrand competition) under perfectly symmetric
information. Intuitively, this ensures that the supplier contributing the highest
net value is awarded the contract.
Finally, in t = 2, the supplier with the winning bid and the OEM bargain
about how to share the joint surplus from production v(θi, Ii), which is strictly
increasing both in θi and in Ii. In this bargaining process, we denote the OEM’s
outside option as g, which is exogenously given. The supplier’s outside option
is endogenously determined by its effort choice and will be denoted f(θi, Ii).10
We make the following simplifying assumptions with regard to the relationship
of the joint surplus and outside option f(θ, I) of the suppliers:
A1: f(θ, I) < v(θ, I) and ∂f(θ,I)∂I <
∂v(θ,I)
∂I for any given (θ, I).
This assumption implies that the surplus generated from the supplier’s in-
10In an excursion below, we will propose an alternative setting inspired by discussions with industry rep-
resentatives, in which the outside option is replaced by the OEM covering a share of the suppliers’
costs.
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vestment within the relationship is always greater than the surplus obtained
from that investment outside the relationship. Further, an increase in invest-
ment by the supplier leads to a greater creation of value within than outside
the relationship.
A2: v(θ, I)− f(θ, I) > v(θ′, I)− f(θ′, I) if θ > θ′.
Higher quality suppliers generate a larger surplus above their outside option
than lower quality suppliers for a given level of investment.
A3: v(θ, I) > v(θ′, I ′) ⇔ v(θ, I)− f(θ, I)) > v(θ′, I ′)− f(θ′, I ′)
The higher the total surplus within a relationship, the higher is the efficiency
loss suffered if bargaining breaks down. This implies that a supplier with a lower
intrinsic quality θ can overcome this disadvantage to become more efficient
through higher initial investment I. A1 through A3 would be satisfied for an
exogenous outside option fˆ of the supplier. Given these assumptions, clearly
the first best investment level is determined by the first order condition v2 = c′.
We will call any level of investment below the first best underinvestment.
We distinguish two polar subcases with respect to the bargaining situation
at t = 2. In subcase a), which we will refer to as the de facto scenario, the
OEM has the entire bargaining power and is in the position to make a take
it or leave it offer to the supplier. In subcase b), which we call the de jure
scenario, it is the supplier who is endowed with the superior bargaining position
and who makes the take it or leave it offer. One possible interpretation is that
the supplier obtains the property rights of the blueprints it has developed at
t = 1. In the de jure scenario the OEM honors these property rights, while in
the de facto scenario he is able to extract rents from the supplier beyond his
formal legal rights without having to fear repercussions.
4.2.2. Results
We solve for a subgame-perfect equilibrium by backward induction for each of
the two bargaining settings.
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Case a) de facto - OEM makes take it or leave it-offer in period t = 2
At the bargaining stage in t = 2, the OEM offers the supplier a fixed pay-
ment T2, maximizing v(θi, Ii)− T2. He has to take the supplier’s participation
constraint into account, therefore he must offer at least the outside option such
that T2 ≥ f(θi, Ii). This is the only constraint of the problem at this stage,
therefore the OEM will choose exactly T2 = f(θi, Ii).
Now consider the competitive situation among suppliers in t = 1. If a supplier
is awarded the subsequent contract, we have just seen that he will obtain an
offer from the OEM that is equivalent to his outside option, i.e. the OEM
extracts the entire rent from cooperation and the supplier is indifferent between
winning or losing the bid.11 Nevertheless, there is a substantial effect of n
from the point of view of the OEM. As suppliers are indifferent and there is
symmetric information at this point, he is able to select the highest-quality
supplier out of n. Mathematically, this is a simple order statistic problem.
We know that the maximum order statistic with n draws follows a distribution
Qn1 = [Q(θ)]
n. For non-degenerate Q, this stochastically dominates the original
distribution, therefore ∂Eθ(n)/∂n ≥ 0 and increasing the number of suppliers
n leads to a higher expected quality θ1 of the highest quality supplier among
the competitors, without affecting their investment incentives.
As a result, each supplier faces the following maximization problem in t = 0:
maxIf(θi, Ii) − c(Ii), leading to the first order condition f2 = c′. By A1 the
suppliers’ investments are more valuable within the relationship than outside it.
In this setting therefore the suppliers underinvest. If we denote the supplier’s
optimal investment level in this case as Ia(θi), the ex ante expected profit of
the OEM is:
(4.1) EΠOEMa = E[v(θ1, Ia(θ1))− f(θ1, Ia(θ1))|n]− nk
where the subscript 1 indicates that it is the expected quality and investment
11The winning bidder receives his outside option as the outcome of t = 2 bargaining, the losing suppliers
receive it because they have to fall back on it.
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of the highest quality supplier that is relevant. The OEM benefits from larger n
only through the higher expected quality of the best supplier and extracts the
entire value added through cooperation. Therefore the optimal n∗a is chosen at
the point where the difference between marginal benefits from expected profit
gains due to higher expected quality and administrative costs becomes negative
for n∗a + 1.
Case b) de jure, supplier makes take it or leave it-offer in period
t = 2
To clearly demonstrate the effects we are interested in, we first consider the
case n = 1, in which a single supplier has been chosen originally. Then, in t = 2,
the supplier offers the OEM his outside option, which we denote by g, according
to the same rationale as in the previous case. We make the assumption that the
OEM’s outside option does not depend upon the effort provided by the chosen
supplier, which can easily be justified.12 Then in period t = 0, the supplier’s
maximization problem is maxI v(θi, Ii) − g − c(Ii), leading to the first order
condition v2 = c′. Obviously, this contract induces first best effort choice by
the supplier, who in this case owns the entire project.
The case in which more than one supplier compete amongst each other in t =
1 differs substantially from this. Again, first consider the supplier’s bargaining
problem in t = 2 who prevailed in the previous competition with the winning
bid, which we call b1. As the supplier owns the property rights to the blueprints,
this bid can be interpreted as the rent granted to the OEM by the winning
supplier. How high will the suppliers be willing to bid? The winner’s payoff
– ignoring the investment costs that are sunk at this stage – will be the total
surplus of the project minus his bid, i.e. v(θi, Ii(θi)) − bi, while the losing
bidders still obtain their outside option worth fj(θj, Ij(θj)). By A1, therefore,
the suppliers derive higher rents from winning the competition, as long as the
amount they have to pay is smaller than bˆi = v(θi, Ii(θi))− fi(θi, Ii(θi)).
12The results from contacting another supplier do not directly depend on the effort the first supplier has
provided, for example.
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At t = 2, the suppliers compete à la Bertrand or in a second price auc-
tion. For simplicity, we assumed that at this stage, the individual qualities
and investment levels are common knowledge.13 We obtain the well known re-
sult for this competition that in equilibrium the most efficient supplier i, with
i = argmaxi∈Nv(θi, Ii(θi)) − fi(θi, Ii(θi)), submits an offer to the OEM, at
which the second most efficient supplier is indifferent between matching the
bid and her outside option.14
To understand the economic mechanisms at play here, it is helpful to consider
the OEM’s payoffs at given levels of investment and given the choice of suppliers
n. If we denote the most efficient supplier as supplier 1 and the second most
efficient as supplier 2, the OEM’s payoff at given investment levels is simply:
v(θ2, I2(θ2))− f2(θ2, I2(θ2))−nk, which is equivalent to the surplus the second
most efficient supplier would receive if running the project, minus the costs
of soliciting the n offers. Ignoring the investment incentives for the moment,
two effects are at play: as in case a) with increasing n the expected quality
of the second best supplier improves – though it follows the second instead
of the maximum order statistic distribution. We consider this a level effect –
the OEM profits from the overall expected quality increasing. For the second
effect in question, it is useful to first derive the surplus of the most efficient
supplier net of his outside option and ignoring the sunk effort costs incurred in
the previous period:
(4.2) [v(θ1, I1(θ1))− f(θ1, I1(θ1))]− [v(θ2, I2(θ2))− f2(θ2, I2(θ2))]
While in case a) the OEM by construction absorbs the entire surplus from
cooperation no matter how many suppliers compete, now the most efficient
supplier also receives a share, which is determined by the difference in surplus
13This assumption is not necessary in this setting, as bidding their real valuations is a weakly dominant
strategy in the second price auction.
14We obtain the same outcome with a second price auction – here each supplier bids her valuation and the
most efficient one pays the second most efficient supplier’s bid.
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between his and the second best design. As n becomes larger this difference
shrinks, so that the OEM receives a greater share of the surplus, which is the
second effect we alluded to above.
Up until now, we have taken the investment level of suppliers as given to
examine the effects of competition on the bargaining outcome. Now we turn our
attention to the investment decision of suppliers in t = 0. First let us consider
the expected payoffs given that the supplier is awarded the production contract
later on, conditional on the number of suppliers involved in the competition and
the realization of his own quality θi. Again denoting the most efficient supplier
as supplier 1 and the second most efficient supplier as supplier 2, these are :
E[(v(θ1, I1(θ1))− v(θ2, I2(θ2)) + f2(θ2, I2(θ2))|n, θ1 = θi]− ci(Ii))
For notational simplicity, we abbreviate this expression to E(Si|n, θi)−ci(Ii).
We can take the surplus generated by supplier 1 out of the expectation oper-
ator, which means that his profits given that he receives the contract are the
value he generates, reduced by his investment costs and the expected surplus
generated by the second best supplier. As noted above, the latter increases
in the number of suppliers involved for given levels of investment. But sup-
plier i does not receive this payoff with certainty, but instead he anticipates
that he will be awarded the subsequent contract only if he is the most ef-
ficient supplier. As at this point the intrinsic quality of the other suppliers
is unknown, the supplier expects this event to take place with probability
p[v(θi, Ii) − f(θi, Ii) ≥ supj v(θj, Ij) − f(θj, Ij)] with i 6= j. Applying A3,
this can be reduced to the shorter expression p[v(θi, Ii) ≥ supj v(θj, Ij)].
Now, spelling out the maximization problem of supplier i in t = 0, we get:
(4.3) max
I
p(θi, Ii, n)E(Si|n, θi) + [1− p(θi, Ii, n)]fi(θi, Ii)− c(Ii)
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This leads to the first order condition with respect to optimal investment:
(4.4)
c′(Ii) =
∂p(θi, Ii, n)
∂Ii
[
v(θi, Ii(θi))−max
j 6=i
v(θj, Ij(θj), n)− fi(θi, Ii)
]
+ p(θi, Ii, n)
∂(v(θi, Ii)− fi(θi, Ii))
∂Ii
+
∂fi(θi, Ii)
∂Ii
We observe a number of countervailing effects. On the one hand, investment
incentives are somewhat diluted, as the supplier only profits from the added
value with some probability. On the other hand, he can increase the probability
that the contract will be awarded to him by choosing higher levels of investment.
Note that irrespective of the number of suppliers n, the investment incentives
are strictly higher in this case than in case a) – intuitively, in the de facto
scenario, the suppliers never participate in the surplus they generate within
the relationship, therefore even the incentives diluted by competition induce a
higher effort level. Only as n gets very large, the two effort levels converge at
f2 = c
′.
Again denoting a supplier’s investment choice in this subcase analogously to
above as Ib(θi) and the most and second most efficient suppliers as supplier 1
and supplier 2, respectively, the expected profit of the OEM in this case is:
(4.5) EΠOEMb = E[v(θ2, Ib(θ2, n))− f2(θ2, Ib(θ2, n))|n]− nk
Comparing equations (1) and (5) may lead to the impression that the OEM’s
profits are necessarily higher in the de facto case, as one is comparing the max-
imum and the second order statistic. But unlike case a), in which the supplier’s
investment level was not affected by the choice of n, here the supplier’s invest-
ment choice does depend on the level of competition and is, at the same time,
strictly larger than above. As a result, we cannot in general rank the two profit
levels.
We are able to say a bit more about the optimal number of suppliers in
the two scenarios. In a), increasing the number only has the effect that the
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expected quality of the best supplier increases. In b), we have three effects: 1)
The OEM expects a higher quality, 2) he receives a greater share of the surplus
as n increases, and 3) the suppliers invest less into quality. It is extremely
simple to show that effects 1) and 2) dominate the quality effect in scenario
a), i.e. would lead to a higher choice of n, were it not for the investment
effect. Then, we really are only comparing the maximum with the second order
statistic – we know that as n → ∞, the second order statistic approaches the
maximum order statistic from below. As both are monotone increasing, the
slope of the second order statistic must be strictly greater. As a result, the
OEM will choose a higher n in case b) than in case a) unless the investment-
deterring effect 3) is “too large” in relation to 1) and 2). To enhance the
intuition for this result, consider the following simple example: Let supplier
quality be uniformly distributed so that Q(θ) = θ. The suppliers’ investment
cost function is determined by c(I) = I
2
2 . The surplus derived from cooperation
is v(θ, I) = θI and each supplier’s outside option is worth f(θ, I) = av(θ, I)
with a ∈ (0, 1). Finally, the OEM’s outside option is g = 0. Here we are able
to derive closed-form solutions which we summarize in the following table:
I(θ) E(v) EΠOEM
a) n = 1 aθ a3
a(1−a)
3 − k
a) n > 1 aθ ann+2
a(1−a)n
n+2 − nk
b) n = 1 θ 13 −k
b) n > 1 (1− a)θn + aθ (1−a)n2n+1 + ann+2 a(1−a)n(n−1)(n+1)(n+2) + (n−1)(1−a)
2
2(2n+1) − nk
Table 4.1.: Investment decisions, expected surplus and expected profits of the
OEM in t = 0
(for Q(θ) = θ, c(I) = I2
2
, v(θ, I) = θI, f(θ, I) = av(θ, I)).
In the de jure case, the suppliers’ investment is higher by (1− a)θn than in
the case in which the OEM extracts all surplus ex post. With increasing n,
these investment incentives decrease, but due to the functional form, for θ → 1,
the pace of this process goes towards zero. As a result, a “ ‘wedge” between the
expected value v of the two strategies remains even as the number of suppliers
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grows very large.
Π
n
Figure 4.1.: OEM’s expected profits depending on n
(Blue: Πa (low k); red: Πa (high k); green: Πb (low k); brown: Πb (high k)).
What we care about at this point, though, is the optimal choice of n. For
this, we can compare the expected profits in the third column. First, compare
only the first terms of EΠa and EΠb. The term in the de jure case starts
out at 0 and approaches the level of the first term in the de facto case as
n → ∞. For the given functional form, this isolates the effect of the second
order statistic approaching the maximum order statistic at given investment
levels alluded to above. The second term of EΠb is also strictly increasing in n,
which reflects the higher share of the (larger) total surplus being absorbed by
the OEM. Therefore ∂EΠb∂n >
∂EΠa
∂n and the OEM’s optimal choice of n is larger
in scenario b) than in scenario a). Figure 4.1 depicts the OEM’s profits in
these two scenarios and gives an example for which they are larger in each of the
two settings, respectively, depending only on the relative size of administrative
costs k. Note that while it is not clear which strategy is more profitable in
general, n∗a < n∗b holds.
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4.2.3. A Simple Notion of Trust
Trust and Underinvestment
Up until this point, trust does not explicitly play a role in our model. We
attempt to integrate the concept in the following way. Assume that prior to
their investment choice, it is not certain which subcase, a) or b), will be played
later on in the game. Instead, with probability λ it is the supplier who makes
the take it or leave it offer in period 2, while with probability 1 − λ it is the
OEM who makes the offer. Correspondingly, the supplier is able to generate a
rent above his outside option with probability λ.
How does this relate to the reality in the industry? In our in-depth inter-
views, the clear picture emerged that OEMs are at great liberty in designing
and enforcing contractual details in relationships with suppliers, almost irre-
spective of the size or market power of their counterparts.15 Ben-Shahar and
White (2006) report equivalent or even more pronounced findings for the North
American automobile industry. At first glance therefore it would appear as if
only the a)-subcase (allotting the entire bargaining power to the OEM) de-
scribed above are relevant with respect to reality. This confrontational setting,
in which the relationship is defined mainly through the pure holdup-problem,
is often subsumed under the term of an “American” procurement strategy. Yet
the global success of Japanese carmakers beginning in the 80s has prompted
much interest in alternative ways of supply-chain management, perhaps most
famously incarnated in the MIT’s International Motor Vehicle Program. As a
result, researchers started to stress the importance of cooperative and mutually
beneficial relationships between OEMs and suppliers in the industry in achiev-
ing the goals of lean production. In this context, Taylor and Wiggins (1997)
show that granting the suppliers positive economic rents can be a substitute
for control (i.e. monitoring quality levels and eventual punishment).16 Tra-
ditionally, cooperative relationships are prevalent in the Japanese automotive
15See Müller et al. (2008) for details.
16See also Aghion et al. (2002) for qualitatively similar results in a more general setting.
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industry and were common practice in Germany at least up until the mid-90s.
For a “traditional” micro-economic perspective, consider the entire game from
the previous sub-sections to be only the stage game of an infinitely repeated
Markov-game. λ then is a state variable that depends on the (in our reduced-
form unobserved) previous history of the game. At the point in time in which
the stage game that we observe is played, λ is given and resembles the subjec-
tive probability with which subcase b) will be played in this period, i.e. the
probability with which the OEM respects the supplier’s property rights. This
is precisely our definition of trust in the following: Higher values of λ denote a
higher subjective probability with which the OEM will grant the supplier the
extraction of a share of the rent generated within the relationship – in other
words, the higher λ, the more the supplier trusts in the OEM’s willingness not
to exploit his superior market power.
We refrain from spelling out the repeated game for the following reasons:
First, the data on which we base our accompanying empirical analysis are cross-
sectional without a panel-dimension. Therefore, what we observe can be con-
sidered exactly one period of the stage game, in which the current relationship-
specific levels of trust are exogenously given, and this allows us to apply the
model more directly. Second, in this setup of the model, what matters is the
supplier’s level of trust toward the OEM. We believe that the main driving
force in these relationships is the hold-up problem and therefore our objective
is to see whether and how this can be mitigated by the belief of suppliers that
abuse is less (or more) likely. Finally, looking at this reduced form allows us
to remain agnostic about the reasons for the OEM wanting to grant the sup-
plier this rent.17 To state just two examples, as in Taylor and Wiggins (1997)
there could be a tradeoff between rent extraction and control costs, or relat-
edly, it may be worth while to make the supplier fear the consequences of the
relationship being terminated as in Akerlof and Yellen (1990).
Our model allows us to state our central prediction very straightforwardly:
17For the game to be on the equilibrium path, the subjective and the objective probability of subcase b)
being played would have to be the same.
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Hypothesis 1: Higher levels of supplier trust in the OEM are associated
with higher relationship specific investments by suppliers.
As shown above, this holds for any given procurement strategy chosen by the
OEM – but even this reduced form model conveys some of the complexity of the
procurement decision, which also depends on the level of quality uncertainty re-
garding the product. Clearly, all else given, higher levels of quality uncertainty
will induce procurers to induce competition between more suppliers.
Trust and the Optimal Induced Level of Competition
While we get a clear cut and very intuitive result with respect to the relation-
ship between trust and upstream investment, the analysis with regard to the
level of competition induced by the OEM is somewhat more complicated – and
surprising. As described above, a large part of the relational contracting liter-
ature, see e.g. recently Calzolari and Spagnolo (2009), argues that competitive
arms-length agreements on the one hand and relational contracts on the other
will be used in mutually exclusive settings, depending, for example, on the en-
forceability of complex clauses. Supported by these findings one might expect
in a naïve first approach that supplier-OEM relationships governed by trust,
i.e. with relatively high λ in our model, should be associated with less induced
competition, i.e. lower n. Our analysis above has shown that generically the
opposite is going to be the case, as λ simply generates a convex combination
between scenarios a) and b) and in the latter, a higher level of competition is
optimally induced. Figure 4.2 displays how the optimal n increases for the
simple example stated above as λ increases from 0 to 1.
The intuition behind this result is as simple as it is striking. In the de
facto setting, the OEM extracts the supplier’s entire rent through his superior
bargaining position, exploiting the existing hold-up situation. In the de jure
setting, he forgoes this possibility – inducing competition, i.e. a choice of a
higher n is his alternative mechanism to extract rent from the cooperation. In
this sense, trust and competition are complementary in this setting. We can
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Π
n
Figure 4.2.: OEM’s expected profits depending on n for different values of λ
(Blue: 0.0; red: 0.2; green: 0.4; brown: 0.6; orange: 0.8, cyan: 1.0).
directly derive the second hypothesis from the formal model:
Hypothesis 2: Higher levels of supplier trust in the OEM are associated
with more intense supplier competition in the procurement process.
While this results rather directly and clear cut from the formal model, it
will prove to be very difficult to distinguish our concept of trust from, e.g.,
the concept of relational contracting or a “naïve” understanding of the term.
In each of these cases, the predictions would be the opposite of our second
hypothesis, and therefore we approach the task at hand as one of competing
hypotheses and will let our data decide.
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4.3. Empirical Analysis
4.3.1. Source of Data
Our data results from an online questionnaire study that was carried out for the
German automotive industry association18 (VDA) from Fall 2007 until Spring
2008. The questionnaire was designed on the basis of the results of a case
study performed in Spring 2007, in the course of which interviews with high
ranking executives in the automobile industry were conducted.19 We obtained
a unique view of the relationships between original equipment manufacturers
and their tier 1-suppliers, with a twofold approach: First, each of 13 partic-
ipating suppliers was asked to evaluate their relationship with each of up to
11 OEMs active in the German market for different representative products in
their portfolio in clinical detail – more than 300 questions were asked covering
all central functions within the firms. In addition, the participating OEMs were
asked to evaluate their sourcing relationships in general – i.e. not specifically
for individual suppliers – for each of the four different product classes according
to the established industry classification:
• Commodities: physically small and technologically unsophisticated
(e.g. shock absorbers)
• High-tech components: physically small but technologically sophis-
ticated (e.g. electronic brake component), in the following referred to
simply as component.
• Modules: physically large but technologically unsophisticated (e.g front
end)
• Systems: physically large and technologically sophisticated (e.g. break
system)
18Verband Deutscher Automobilunternehmen e.V.
19For the qualitative results of this case study, see Müller et al. (2008).
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As OEMs answered a set of questions almost identical to the supplier ques-
tionnaire, we are thereby able to compare their view of their general policies
with the suppliers’ view. In total, more than 1,500 questionnaires were filled
in by competent engineers, procurement- and sales officers with the following
methodology. A participant first would have to indicate his function within the
company out of the following20:
• Pre-development: “Basic” technological research, not model-specific.
• Vehicle Development: Car-model specific (technology adaptation).
• Series Production
• Quality Control
• Sales
• Logistics
• Aftermarket
Then she would choose a product for which she had the necessary know-how
as well as the customers she worked with, the latter from a list. For each
product and customer, she would then answer a set of questions suited to her
function within the company.
One observation in our data is composed of the answers of the entire supplier
questionnaire for a given product and a given customer. This exceeds the
extent of any given function-questionnaire listed above – therefore, in order
to obtain as complete observations as possible, we merge the answers from a
given supplier, product and customer over all functions to cover all aspects
of the relationship. What each observation therefore describes, is one view
(potentially of many people) of the relationship between the supplier and a
20For a detailed description of the individual functions and the automobile development and production
process, we refer to Müller et al. (2008)
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given OEM for one product. We merge this with the results from the OEM-
questionnaire in order to be able to control for the non supplier-specific behavior
of OEMs.
On paper, we have 792 observations, but for two reasons these are not neces-
sarily complete: First, not each function within a company filled out a question-
naire for each product studied. In this case, whole sections of the questionnaire
are missing for the observation covering the given product. Second, participants
could skip individual questions and made ample use of this option. Therefore
the numbers of observations over the individual questions differ substantially,
as seen in the descriptive data below.
4.3.2. Descriptive Statistics
The underlying questionnaire sought to depict complex relationships in hith-
erto unmatched detail. In the following subsections, therefore we will exert
effort – perhaps more than usual – to introduce the variables of the study
and shine some light on the basic forces and tensions that are at play between
manufacturers and suppliers.
Participating Companies and Characteristics of Parts
On the OEM side, 10 of the largest players in the German market participated
actively in the survey, 7 producers of passenger cars and 3 truck makers. On the
other hand, 13 suppliers active in the German market provided their input on
11 manufacturers - i.e. the 10 participating plus one further car manufacturer.
The supplier sample is very strongly biased towards large participants, with
average 2007 revenues of 9.4 billion Euro (standard deviation (std) 12.4) and
even the smallest participant posting revenues above 700 million Euro. This is
emphasized by the self-reported European market shares for the product in our
sample: For 161 observations this was provided on a five point scale with an
average of 3.76 (std .90), which translates into a share of more than 25%. Not
surprisingly, the correlation of market share with intensity of supplier compe-
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tition – also on a 5-point scale – is negative with a value of -0.20 (significant at
5%-level). Further, we observe a negative correlation of supplier size (measured
by the 2007-revenues in billion Euros) and the intensity of supplier competi-
tion (-.144, p-Value: .072) and a positive correlation of supplier size and market
share in the observed part (.124, p-Value: .083).
This could raise the worry that the larger suppliers may be able to exert
monopoly power over OEMs for some of the parts we study – to counter this,
we made sure that there are at least two suppliers active in Germany for each
part in our sample. Nevertheless, we will have to try to control for relative
market power in our regressions, as it may clearly affect bargaining strength
and the OEM’s outside option.
Apart from their type, products are further specified by the R&D-share of
total costs as well as the assessment by the supplier how important the degree
of innovation is for the particular part. Both were measured on a 5-point
scale – the importance ranging from 1 – very little – to 5 – very high, while
the cost-shares were provided in 2% increments, therefore ranging from < 2%
to > 8%. As one would expect, the answers to the questions are strongly
correlated (0.27, significant at 0.1%-level). More interestingly, though, they
allow us to revisit the merits of the underlying type-classification. The following
Table 4.2 displays the descriptive statistics for these questions by underlying
product type:
Performing pairwise t-tests shows that the means for both variables are sig-
nificantly lower for commodities and modules than for systems and components,
while among these two groups the hypothesis of equal means cannot be rejected,
which is exactly in line with the industry specification discussed above. This
allows us to introduce an additional dummy measure of the innovativeness of
a part (dummy_soph) which takes the value 1 if the type is a system or com-
ponent. Further, to account for potential price differences due to the sheer size
of a part, we introduce dummy_big which takes the value 1 for systems and
modules.
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Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min Max Obs
Systems
Cost Share R&D 4.19 (1.43) 1 5 37
Importance R&D 4.16 (.74) 1 5 50
Modules
Cost Share R&D 2.06 (1.76) 1 5 18
Importance R&D 2.89 (.76) 1 4 18
Components
Cost Share R&D 3.48 (1.40) 1 5 21
Importance R&D 3.42 (.87) 2 5 45
Commodities
Cost Share R&D 2.35 (1.35) 1 5 91
Importance R&D 2.91 (.69) 2 4 93
Table 4.2.: Importance of Innovation and Cost share R&D by product type.
Characteristics of the Relationship
In this section, we pursue two different goals. While introducing the variables
describing the relationships we also attempt to shed additional light on the dif-
ferences pertaining to product-type. There is a further dimension, in which we
can exploit existing variation: As noted above, we gather information on the
relationship between OEMs and suppliers over the entire car-model life-cycle.
In the following, the distinction between three of these phases is especially
important: pre-development, development and series production. The last of
these phases, series production, is the least complicated case – suppliers work
with existing blueprints and completely designed (or existing) tools to produce
given quantities of the part in question. The product and services can clearly be
specified through contracts without much room for misunderstanding, for ex-
ample specifying acceptable failure rates and delivery conditions in detail. The
(model-specific) development phase is in many ways less clear cut. While the
general requirements that a part has to meet are defined by its function within
the automobile (a brake has a relatively specific function and place, given the
projected weight and top-speed of the model in planning), a plethora of other
parts with which it has interfaces are being designed in parallel. Blue-prints
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for the part do not yet exist at the beginning of the design phase. Clearly, the
objectives cannot be drawn up precisely ex ante in contracts, but are subject
to a continuous cooperative process. Finally, these uncertainties become over-
whelming when considering the (not model-specific) pre-development phase:
Here for example, the supplier is researching brake-technologies without know-
ing how fast or heavy the model in which it will be used is going to be. In
general, more fundamental research is involved here – and, as should be clear
from the nature of the endeavor, it is even harder to write specific and pre-
cise enforceable contracts regarding the outcomes. As our respondents were
involved in the different stages of the product life-cycle, in a way like Brown
et al. (2004) this allows us to exogenously change the level of external enforce-
ability while keeping product and relationship characteristics constant for a
number of questions.
As a case in point, we requested suppliers to evaluate the OEM’s supplier
choice criteria on a six-point scale from 1–no relevance to 6–very important,
for each of the phases in the product life-cycle. From the discussion in the
literature we would expect “relational” choice criteria to grow relatively less
important as opposed to “hard” criteria – such as price – as one progresses
from pre-development onward. Our empirical results strongly support this hy-
pothesis. The importance of price strictly increases from an average of 5.10
(see Table B.1), to 5.37 (see Table B.2) to 5.70 (see Table B.3) (t-tests for
difference of mean are each significant at the 0.1% level). On the other hand,
the importance of trust is respectively 4.89 (see Table B.1), 4.90 (see Table
B.2) and 4.73 (see Table B.3) for pre-development, development and series pro-
duction. Therefore trust is only significantly less important when choosing a
series supplier (p<0.1%), while there is no difference between pre-development
and development. But with this kind of question, it is easier to interpret rel-
ative magnitude of answers: When we look at the differences in differences
between the importance of the choice criteria, there is a monotone relation-
ship, with price becoming relatively more important for each step (p<5% for
pre-development to development and p<0.1% from development to series pro-
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duction).
[Table B.1, B.2 and B.3 about here]
Next, we suggest two proxies for the value of the OEM’s outside option (de-
noted g in the theoretical framework). The first is the share in the volume of
the part provided by the supplier to the OEM (measured on a 5-point scale
where each point resembles a 20% difference, with 1–<20 and 5–>80%). Pre-
sumably, it is more difficult to shift a larger share of production away from one
supplier to another than a smaller one, therefore g should be negatively related
to this measure. Looking at how this measure behaves for the different prod-
uct types shows that the share provided has statistically non-distinguishable
means for modules, components and commodities (the sub-sample means are,
respectively, 3.08, 3.26 and 3.23, i.e. at the upper end of the range 40-60%),
while for the systems, this value is significantly higher at 4.07 (or at the upper
end of the range 60-80%). The reliance on an individual supplier therefore is
significantly stronger in the case of systems than for the other types of part.
As the second potential proxy, the respondents were asked to assess how
often the OEM chooses to produce a given part himself on a 6-point scale
from 1–never to 6–very frequently, with 4–about 50% of cases as a further
anchor. This also allows us to create a dummy variable which takes the value
1 whenever the answer is different from never. The ability to produce a part
himself is perhaps the most intuitive outside option – and it is one of which
OEMs are making ample use, as the recent wave of “in-sourcing” demonstrates.
In day-to-day business, there can be different reasons for this, most commonly
capacity utilization smoothing21 or worries about suppliers’ ability to provide a
part as agreed. The comparison of sub-sample means shows that systems and
components, i.e. the technologically sophisticated parts, are significantly less
likely to be also produced by the OEM himself than commodities and modules,
with the latter being the most likely to be in-sourced. This may be due to
the fact that physically larger parts are more costly to stockpile and utilize
21Labor laws make short-term adjustments to the workforce all but impossible.
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more capacity. Clearly, higher levels of this variable should be associated with
a higher outside option of manufacturers, i.e. a higher g.
Finally, we asked the respondents to evaluate the level of specificity of the
contractual requirements at different development stages, as well as the “degree
of freedom” in relationship in order to be able to generate some insights into
the interactions between trust and contract specificity.
Procurement Decisions by the OEM
We have two sets of variables that measure the OEM’s procurement decisions at
different points in the product life-cycle, one qualitative and one quantitative.
For the qualitative measure, we asked the respondents to evaluate how often
different procurement strategies have been employed by the OEM for each
of the different stages. This may appear slightly paradox, as for each part
a manufacturer should apply one strategy, but parts are procured anew for
each new series of a given model, i.e. there is a new procurement process
every 1.5 to 2 years and clearly different strategies could be used at different
points of time in the past. For pre-development, the options were preselection
of a specific supplier and procurement among a limited number of suppliers,
each on a 6-point scale from 1–never to 6–very frequently. For development
and series production, a further option was added, open procurement, which
plays no role in pre-development. Even the purely descriptive results offer
some interesting insights. For pre-development, OEMs are actually significantly
more likely to contract with specific suppliers (mean 4.43), than to go through
a limited competitive procurement process (mean 3.95, t-test for difference
of means significant at 1% level; see Table B.4). In contrast to this, pre-
selection of suppliers is significantly less likely both for development (mean
3.06) and series production (2.98), see Tables B.5 and B.6, respectively. On
the other hand, for development OEMs are significantly more likely to procure
among a limited number of suppliers (mean 5.18, see Table B.5), therefore
there is a clear shift to more market-based interactions from pre-development
to development. The same kind of shift takes place again from development
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to series production, where procurement among a limited number of suppliers
grows less important (mean 4.55, see Table B.6), but there is a significant
increase in the use of open procurement (2.44 instead of 1.97, see Tables B.5
and B.6). Clearly, the picture that has begun to emerge above, i.e. a shift
to more arms-length interactions as the product reaches the development and
series production phase is supported by these data. We believe this to be driven
mainly by increasing contractibility, when viewed together with the results of
the quantitative measure.
[Table B.4, B.5 and B.6 about here]
For this, we asked how many suppliers provided the given service or pro-
duce the part in parallel, differentiated for additional phases within each of
the (by now) familiar stages. The development stage was subdivided into the
phases product planning, product specification, concept development and de-
tailed development (starting from the earliest). For series production, we asked
for the number of suppliers at series start, after 1-2 years and after more than
2 years. The results from this appear to be somewhat counter-intuitive. For
pre-development there are on average more than two (2.16, Table B.4) suppliers
competing in parallel. This number stays about constant in the first stages of
development, before it significantly decreases for the last development phase
down to 1.51 (see Table B.5). It reaches its nadir at the beginning of series
production with 1.20, before it increases again to 1.59 two years into production
(see Table B.6). How does this mesh with our prior results? The previous ques-
tions only aimed at the choice procedure, instead of at how many suppliers are
selected. For pre-development, due to the lack of specificity concerning the ob-
jectives, open procurement is not feasible – precisely for this reason, there is the
greatest uncertainty regarding the outcome of the process. The way that OEMs
deal with this – also suggested by our model – is to have multiple suppliers work
on the designs. As seen above, these are frequently hand-picked. On the basis
of the most promising approach the OEM then enters into the development
process. There is a strong incentive for suppliers for their preliminary design
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to be chosen, as the contractual reimbursement for pre-development work is on
average below 60% of the actual costs, whether or not the company is awarded
a subsequent development contract. An analogous process is repeated again
for the development process, which results in a specific blueprint. With this
blueprint, the quality uncertainty is practically eliminated, given that suppliers
are generally certified through stringent quality assurance processes, therefore
this component is eliminated from the decision problem. In production, fewer
suppliers with higher volumes promise the highest economies of scales and the
steepest learning curves, therefore the number of suppliers drops significantly
at production start. Once these effects have been realized, the OEM can start
to bring additional suppliers in.
We believe that this background is extremely valuable and should be born
in mind for the following analysis of which role trust plays in the interactions
set out above.
4.3.3. Measures of Trust: Who Trusts Whom - and Why?
Trust is a sensitive concept which has proved to some degree elusive to at-
tempts at explanation by economists. While existing studies have employed
either experimental/behavioral evidence or subjects’ answers to variations on
the question “To which degree can other people be trusted?”, our data has the
huge advantage that it is relationship-specific: We ask representatives of com-
pany A about their stance and misgivings toward company B with regard to
the interactions concerning a specific product. Clearly, there are drawbacks to
this approach as well that need to be addressed. We devote the following three
subsections to determine how robust the individual measures are and whether
and how they can be applied. First we introduce the questions that we believe
to be related to the concept “trust”. Then we use a method well-established
in sociology, exploratory factor analysis, to try to shed additional light on the
dimensionality of the construct we are observing – i.e., is there only one kind
of “trust”, or do the questions we observe really depict a construct composed of
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various different “factors”. Finally, we try to pry the black box from Section
4.2.3 open (if only a slit), by taking a glance at which past outcomes and
behavior affect the suppliers’ evaluation of trust in the relationship.
How Do We Measure Trust?
We attempt to capture trust in the various supplier-manufacturer relationships
in two, not necessarily mutually exclusive ways. One approach is relatively
direct, asking to evaluate mutual trust or inquiring which role trust has played
for important decisions. The second approach, which we call indirect, is to look
at reported behavior for which trust can be considered a prerequisite.
An important context for trust in these relationships is the area of intellectual
property. Especially basic, non model-specific research resembles an important
share of suppliers’ capital and embodies their ability to differentiate themselves
– this ability all but disappears, for example, if an OEM were to take a supplier’s
blueprints for a part and make them accessible to competitors. Much of this
know-how is involved in the earliest stages, the pre-development of products,
where suppliers showcase their advanced know-how. In our interviews in the
preparation of the study, there was a mention of the practice to deny the most
advanced technology to OEMs who were expected not to treat it with the
necessary care, i.e. who were not trusted.
Therefore as a first direct measure of trust, we inquired after the impor-
tance of the trust relationship with the OEM in a firm’s decision to initiate
a pre-development project on a six-point scale ranging from 1–no relevance to
6–very high relevance (from now on Trust 1). To be able to relate this to other
criteria, we asked the same questions for the importance of the factors sales
potential, product positioning and long-term cooperation, so that we can use
both the absolute value of the answer as well as the relative rank as measures
of trust.
As the second direct measure, we asked the question: “How do you evaluate
mutual trust between OEM and supplier with respect to honoring each other’s
intellectual property rights (IPR)?” on a five-point scale ranging from 1–very
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little to 5–very high (from now on Trust 2). While the first question only
involves the level of trust of the supplier towards the OEM, the second question
is phrased to cover bi-directional trust. Clearly, a disadvantage to this second
question is that the supplier must also give an estimate of the other party’s
assessment.
We already encountered the third direct measure of trust above. For each
phase of the product life cycle, the suppliers were asked for their view of the
OEM’s choice criteria for choosing his supplier (pre-development: Trust 3,
development: Trust 4, series production: Trust 5). Again, we have both the
absolute value of the importance of trust as well as the relative rank compared
to cost, personal contact, duration of cooperation and certification. This is the
supplier’s assessment of the OEM’s preferences, only, so we clearly need to
evaluate the reliability of this measure. Second, analogous to Sapienza et al.
(2007), we will have to check whether respondents perhaps related their own
level of trust in the OEM in these questions, instead.
Our potential indirect measures of trust are associated with behavior that
is related to IPR protection and to the secrecy of the cost-structure of the
supplier.22 Suppliers state both how often they provide original research data
to the OEM on a five-point scale (1–very rarely to 5–very frequently) as well in
a separate question how often the OEM provides access to his original research
data on the same scale. Clearly, both the levels and the difference between the
two values may be of interest. Further we inquire on the same scale how often
the supplier’s costs are made transparent to the OEM. An interesting issue
with these measures which we will have to attempt to disentangle is whether
suppliers are forced into revealing these data due to the OEM’s superior market
power or whether this is truly a result of trust. In order to determine this,
the relation between the frequencies with which a supplier and the OEM reveal
original research data will be of interest and we introduce the difference between
22The suppliers’ costs are an extremely contentious issue in negotiations. Cost-cutting manufacturers (have
to) accept that a supplier producing below cost will have to go out of business sooner rather than later.
Therefore, they traditionally try to negotiate prices that are as close to the costs as possible and begrudge
the suppliers any positive margin that they obtain. For an excellent and comprehensive discussion, see
the classical Womack et al. (1991).
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the two as an additional variable.
As a first step towards better understanding these measures, Table B.7 dis-
plays pairwise correlations between each of them. As one would have expected,
there is a significant positive correlation between all of the direct measures of
trust. For the indirect measures, the picture is more interesting: The frequency
with which the supplier makes his costs transparent is negatively correlated to
two of the direct measures – the importance of trust (from the OEM’s view)
in choosing his development and series supplier. These measures reflect the
attitude of OEMs in the selection and negotiation process of development and
series suppliers – it appears plausible that it is the insistence of the OEM,
therefore, and not necessarily trust that causes suppliers to bare their costs
more frequently, which makes this measure non-satisfactory.
[Table B.7 about here]
The supplier’s provision of original know-how, on the other hand, is not
correlated with any of the direct trust measures, while there is a relatively
strong significant positive correlation (.443) with the provision of know-how
by the OEM. The latter is also positively correlated with the mutual trust
regarding the treatment of IPR. What would we expect a “trusting” as opposed
to a “forced” relationship to look like? If the OEM forces the supplier to reveal
intellectual property secrets, this should negatively affect the level of mutual
trust with regard to IPR. Further, we would expect that – in these kinds of
relationships – the OEM provides relatively little intellectual property into the
relationship himself. Finally, the relative market and bargaining power may
play a role in this kind of relationship. To determine, whether this effect truly
exists in the data, we regress the difference of IP-secrets provided onto the
level of mutual trust with regard to IPR, a dummy whether the product is
technologically sophisticated and the supplier revenues as a proxy for relative
market power. The results of the OLS-regression are provided in Table 4.3
below.23
23We also performed ordered logit regressions, which are more suited to the structure of the data. The results
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Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Trust 2 -0.233** (0.113)
dummy_soph 0.249 (0.201)
Supplier Revenue -0.015** (0.007)
const. 2.009 (0.413)
Table 4.3.: (OLS): Difference in frequency of revealing original research data
(N = 129, * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%)
The regression results show a significant negative association of the differ-
ence in IP-provision and mutual trust as well as supplier revenue, which, as we
showed above, can be used as a proxy for relative market power.24 Therefore,
the lower the relative market power of a supplier, the more likely it is that he
provides more original research than his opposite, which we take as an indica-
tion that in these asymmetric setting, enforced revelation (which is negatively
associated with trust) does take place. In the simple pairwise correlations the
overall effect of supplier provision of IP on our measures of trust is neutral
(not significantly different from zero). Therefore there must be information in
this measure that countervails the effect of the on average increasing difference
in provision of IP. Intuitively, one could imagine there to be three coexisting
IP-regimes: One symmetric one characterized by distrust – here, both parties
provide little or no research findings to each-other. One asymmetric one char-
acterized by force, the existence of which is suggested by the regressions above.
And finally, one symmetric one characterized by trust – here, both parties pro-
vide research to each other relatively often and in similar amounts. We try to
use the following measure to be able to account for the differences in the three
regimes: First we create a dummy that takes the value 1 if the difference be-
tween the provided IP is not too large, i.e. no larger than 1.25 Next, we interact
are qualitatively identical (signs and p-values), we report the OLS regression for the easier interpretability
of the coefficients.
24The corresponding regression with mutual trust as a dependent and the difference as an independent
variable shows a significant negative effect of the difference on trust.
25Taking this as a not too large difference is somewhat arbitrary. There are two reasons why we find it
sensible. People tend to overestimate their own contribution compared to others. Further, the value of
1 leads to the highest correlation of the final measure with our direct trust measures.
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this dummy with the frequency of IP-provision by the supplier.26 The resulting
measure has a significant, positive correlation with the reported mutual trust
with regard to IPR (.163, p-value .05).
As a result of these considerations, we are left with the 5 “direct” trust
measures. Our knowledge of the relationship between the observed measures
up until this point is based on pairwise correlations alone. Factor analysis is
a method designed to make better use of these “within” correlations between
a set of variables in order to extend what can be learned from them. Using
a latent variable approach, it maximizes and records the share of variation
in the observed variables that can be explained by one unobserved factor (or
more), while reproducing the correlations between variables.27 The method has
been criticized in the past for producing results that are not unique, but we
find it perfectly suited to produce a kind of “upper bound” in our exploratory
setting, i.e. to explain how much of the variation in our measures can at most
be explained through the unobserved underlying factor, which we assume to
be (at least associated with) trust. One remaining difficulty that we face is
that we only have 59 observations in which all 5 variables are included, but
even this low number of observations can be sufficient in a 1-factor, 5-variable
model as MacCallum et al. (1999) argue, and we perform a number of tests for
robustness.
Table 4.4 displays the factor loadings and uniqueness of the individual vari-
ables using the principal-factor method and limiting the admissible number of
factors to 1. The resulting pattern is robust to using the maximum-likelihood
estimation approach, to allowing a second and third underlying factor and to
recursively eliminating individual factors (thereby obtaining significantly more
observations). In all specifications, the uniqueness for the variables that mea-
sure the importance of trust in procurement negotiations at different stages
(trust 3-5) is close to or below the level of .5, which is seen as the relevant
threshold in the literature. Among these, the explanatory power regarding pre-
26This interaction term has the lowest value for the “force” regime (0), low values for symmetric mistrust
regimes and the highest values for symmetric trust regimes.
27For an introduction to Factor Analysis, we refer to Harman (1976).
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variable Factor loading Uniqueness
(1) Trust1 .594 .648
(2) Trust2 .473 .776
(3) Trust3 .679 .539
(4) Trust4 .844 .288
(5) Trust5 .771 .406
Table 4.4.: Factor Analysis Results
Factor loadings and uniqueness reported, principal-factor method (N = 59).
development negotiation (trust 3) seems to be smallest. The general rules of
thumb would suggest to remove all variables except for (trust 3-5) from the
model.
For us, this entails the following result: It appears that the 5 measures
do not capture the exact same thing, i.e. “trust”, or equivalently, it seems
that the common perception of there being one homogenous kind of trust is
inadequate in our context. In the following section we will perform a closer
analysis of the potential determinants of trust to achieve an understanding of
causal relationships, and therefore the individual meanings of our measures.
Determinants of Suppliers’ Trust – IPR Hold-up, Pay and Fairness
Both our model and our industry survey suggest that the inherent hold-up
problem is at the center of trust formation: suppliers “sink” effort into research
and design for parts which result in blueprints. After obtaining these blueprints,
the superior bargaining position of the OEM enables him to extract additional
rents. Therefore our favored interpretation of trust frames it as the belief of
the supplier regarding the probability that the OEM will refrain from such
undesired behavior.
To test this, we turned to the suppliers evaluation of such behavior by the
OEM in our questionnaire, specifically the frequency of conflicts regarding the
treatment of patents and trade-secrets as well as the frequency with which the
OEM passes on technological secrets of the supplier to third parties without
permission.
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Clearly, there are more direct ways to extract rents from a position of
power, especially by exerting pressure in price negotiations. Therefore for pre-
development we looked at the degree to which the OEM shares the (consid-
erable) risk of higher than expected costs. For development, we can use the
evaluation of the adequacy of license fees in the case that the OEM makes
use of protected know-how of the supplier. And for series production, both an
evaluation of the frequency with which the OEM demands lump-sum price re-
ductions in renegotiations as well as the extent to which he attempts to extract
cost information by employing sub-supplier management were available to us.
We performed OLS-regressions with the individual trust-measures as the
dependent and the measures introduced above as explanatory variables, while
controlling for the size and technological sophistication of the part. Table
4.5 below presents the coefficients and p-values, neglecting the effects of the
product-type dummies.
Trust 1 Trust 2 Trust 3 Trust 4 Trust 5
Pre-Development
Frequency IPR conflicts -.637 (.05) -.323 (.01) -.632 (.00) -.149 (.277) -.416 (.02)
How often does OEM -.147 (.05) -.521 (.00) -.291 (.00) -.153 (.00) -.225 (.00)
leak supplier’s IPR
OEM shares risk of .180 (.06) -.156 (.31) .040 (.82) .242 (.00) .301 (.00)
higher development costs
Development
Frequency IPR conflicts -.302 (.08) -.463 (.00) -.450 (.00) -.118 (.11) -.089 (.39)
How often does OEM -.170 (.17) -.392 (.00) -.333 (.00) -.134 (.01) -.116 (.09)
leak supplier’s IPR
Adequacy of license fees -.035 (.74) .100 (.32) .398 (.00) .134 (.04) .256 (.00)
Series Production
Frequency price re- .007 (.91) -.124 (.13) -.079 (.45) -.180 (.00) -.265 (.00)
negotiation (lump sum)
Efforts of OEM to -.026 (.65) -.042 (.41) -.038 (.54) -.151 (.00) -.166 (.00)
extract cost information
Table 4.5.: Determinants of Trust measures.
Coefficients of OLS regressions controlling for product type and (p-values) re-
ported.
The pattern that emerges lends itself to interpretation: The first trust-
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measure (importance of trust for the supplier to initiate pre-development co-
operation with OEM ) is not significantly influenced by any of the answers to
the questions aiming at compensation and pay. Instead, there is a very strong
negative correlation (-.637) with the reported frequency of IPR conflicts during
pre-development, i.e. the more frequent IPR conflicts, the lower this mea-
sure of trust. A much weaker, but still significant effect with the expected
sign (-.147) results from the OEM leaking sensitive IP-related data more often.
IPR-conflicts during the development phase have a relatively strong negative
effect as well (-.302), the p-value of .08 is in part explained by the smaller
number of common observations.
The second trust-measure (mutual trust with respect to IPR) follows the
same general pattern, though with different individual weightings. Again, the
compensation measures show no significant influence on the trust-measure. But
here, the leaking of sensitive information shows a far stronger effect (-.521 in
pre-development, -.392 in development) than in the former case. Further, in
this measure the importance of IPR-conflicts during the development phase (-
.463) is higher than during the pre-development phase (-.323), which probably
reflects the fact that a higher share of respondents to this question were involved
in later development stages.
The picture changes for the remaining trust measures three through five
(Importance of trust for the OEM’s supplier choice for pre-development, de-
velopment and series production, respectively). For measures four and five,
the importance of IPR-related behavior decreases markedly, while the effects of
adequate compensation and price-cutting become significant with the expected
signs across the board. Interestingly, the third trust measure, related to pre-
development presents itself as a hybrid case, in which the IPR-related factors
are still predominant, but nevertheless also the adequacy of license fees plays an
important role (.398), while the other compensation related measures do not.
The results further provide a judgment on the – as of yet unanswered – issue
of whose trust these questions truly measure: As perceived misbehavior by the
OEM affects them in a significantly negative manner, we feel comfortable using
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them as measures for the supplier’s trust in the OEM.
To crudely summarize these findings: Trust 1 and Trust 2 are negatively
associated with attempts at rent extraction by the OEM in the area of IPR
with slightly different focuses, while they are not affected by direct attempts
at price-reductions. This balance shifts toward the latter for Trust 3 and even
more so for the measures Trust 4 and Trust 5. After going to great lengths
to establish these measures, we now try to show that the underlying construct
significantly affects relevant economic behavior and outcomes.
4.3.4. Mistrust and Underinvestment
The main hypothesis derived from our model states that higher levels of trust
should be associated with more relationship specific investment by suppliers.
Due to the cross-sectional structure of our data-set, determining the direction
of causality is an issue. The case for higher investment by suppliers leading to
higher levels of trust of suppliers in the OEM can be made: Less investment
may lead to more conflicts between the parties, which lets trust deteriorate.
While acknowledging this, we find the opposite argument more convincing, but
leave the issue open and prefer to refer to association instead of causality.
Measuring investment of suppliers poses a challenge. As we do not observe a
direct measure, we propose two proxies related to the quality of parts instead.
One standard interpretation of quality related effort in the literature is that
it affects failure rates of parts (see, for example, Taylor and Wiggins (1997)).
Along these lines, we asked respondents two questions: With respect to the
part considered, how often do quality problems occur? and ... how often do
recall actions occur during series production? Both questions are measured on
a 5-point scale with 1 resembling the lowest and 5 the highest frequency. The
correlation between them is (only) 0.41, which can be explained by the fact
that not every quality problem leads to a recall and the latter are extremely in-
frequent. As a consequence, 89% of respondents reported a 1–very infrequently
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for the recall question, which poses serious empirical limitations.28 Specifically,
in 50% of the cases in which the lowest possible value for recalls is reported,
there is some higher level of quality problems. On the other hand, when quality
problems become more frequent/severe (levels of 3 or higher), which in itself
is rather rare (17 cases), in 54% of cases respondents report levels of recall
frequency above 1.
In general, difficulties arise when trying to assess underinvestment-related
quality issues empirically, as a) the observed failure rates of cars cannot nec-
essarily be linked to individual parts, b) the diligence of the manufacturer in
assembly also affects quality and c) if quality problems are diagnosed before
the parts are installed, this is generally not observable. The huge advantage of
our questionnaire is that the responses are part-specific which address issue a).
The phrasing of the question address issue c). By including customer- or OEM-
effects in the regressions, we hope to alleviate issue b). A potential drawback
is the fact that the frequencies are self-reported, so that respondents may be
tempted to under-report problems. To counter this, complete anonymity was
guaranteed at the outset of the study.
For our empirical strategy, we choose the following approach with y denoting
the frequency of problems arising, κ denoting a constant, i denoting the part
in question and j denoting the customer:
(4.6) yij = κ+ αj + β ∗ trustij + γ ∗ dummy_sophi + δ ∗ dummy_bigi + ij
ThisModel 1 spells out the set of OLS-regressions including customer fixed-
effects (α).29 To address the issue of subjective differences in the understanding
of the questions at hand, we also specified dummies which take the value 1
whenever the answer to the question is the lowest possible frequency (i.e. 1) and
28The model quality, as represented by the F-statistic, in general is very low as meaningful variation is
absent.
29We also perform (more suitable to the data at hand) tobit and ordered-logit regressions, which delivered
qualitatively identical results. We do not report the results in this paper, but they can be provided by
the authors upon request.
120
4.3. Empirical Analysis
take the value 0 whenever the reported frequency is larger than this. This allows
us to estimate a probit-model, in which y is simply replaced by the probability
that no problems occur/problems occur as rarely as possible (Model 2). This
specification has the further advantage that the results can be more readily
interpreted. We would expect negative coefficients for β in Model 1 and positive
coefficients for β in Model 2 from our hypothesis.30
We estimate both models with and without customer fixed-effects. We in-
clude these to capture, for example, potential complementary effort exerted
by the customers (OEMs), which also may influence the probability of quality
issues arising. As this effort may affect suppliers’ incentives to provide better
quality, it is not clear how these effects are directed. As a consequence of the
very limited variation in the frequency of recalls, we only present the set of
OLS regressions for this question to show that the trust measures contribute
explanatory power in the cases that recalls are reported. The results of the
three sets of regressions can be found in Tables B.8, B.9 and B.10.
[Table B.8, B.9 and B.10 about here]
First note that the coefficients in all estimations have the expected signs,
though their levels of significance vary. The latter can, to a large degree,
be explained by the fact that different numbers of observations are available
for the individual regressions. In those including Trust 4, which include the
highest number of observations (122), β is significantly different from zero at
the 5% level for all specifications. As one would expect, both technological
sophistication and size (or interfaces within) raise the probability of quality
issues significantly across the board. The size of the coefficients is noteworthy
– more complex parts that are both technologically sophisticated and large are
more than 50% more likely to have quality issues. The other surprising result is
the extent to which our measure Trust 4 influences the quality level as reported
by suppliers. An increase in the measure by 1 (i.e. 1.1 standard deviations)
30As Model 1 makes use of more variation within the outcome variable, it uses the existing information
more efficiently.
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decreases the probability of quality issues arising by 12.9% (excluding costomer
fixed effects) or even 16.7% (including customer fixed effects), see Table B.9.
We take this as evidence in favor of our first central hypothesis.
4.3.5. Trust and Sourcing Decisions
In this context, the underlying causal mechanism is closely related to the hy-
pothesis one would expect: If the level of competition affects trust, in the sense
that the nature of arms-length market agreements is less amenable to fostering
trust relationships, then one should be more inclined to side with the existing
literature in expecting a negative association. On the other hand, we could also
find ourselves in a setup similar to the model we propose. Then, the supplier
faces attempts at rent extraction by the OEM either through exploitation of the
hold-up situation or through competition. In this case more competition may
be a signal of higher levels of compliance with property rights by the party with
the superior bargaining power, and therefore higher levels of trust. Therefore,
at best we can determine correlation with our data.
Our empirical approach is to analyze how three different measures of sup-
plier competition, i.e. the number of parallel suppliers contracted to work on
pre-development, development and series production projects, respectively, is
associated with our measures of trust derived above, while controlling for the
size and technological complexity of the product in question. As a second test,
we also directly check for the relationship between the number of competitors
and the methods of rent extraction that we identified in Section 4.3.2 as af-
fecting the relevant measures of supplier trust most. For pre-development, this
is the frequency of IPR conflicts and the frequency with which the OEM has
discontinued development projects in the past 5 years.31 For development, this
is the frequency of IPR conflicts and the adequacy of license fees, while for
31We observe multi-collinearity between IPR conflicts and the OEM leaking supplier IPR (the same holds
for development), therefore we omit the latter from the regression. If we use the risk of higher develop-
ment costs, we loose all but 50 observations. Therefore we replace this variable with the frequency of
discontinuation of projects, which captures the opposite of the effect of risk-sharing.
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series production, this is the frequency of price re-negotiation and the OEM’s
efforts at extracting cost information.
We again use simple OLS, as we are mainly interested in correlation between
the variables. In the following approach, y is the number of suppliers employed
by the OEM, i is the part in question and j is the customer, κ again denotes
a constant. x resembles either a trust measure or the vector of the two rent-
extraction mechanism described above, depending on the specification.
(4.7) yij = κ+ β ∗ xij + γ ∗ dummy_sophi + δ ∗ dummy_bigi + ij
Regarding our second hypothesis, we would expect a positive sign for β
in the specifications with the trust measures. Higher levels of trust would
be associated with a higher incentive to extract rents through inducing more
competition, i.e. employing more parallel suppliers. For the specifications with
the direct measures of rent-extraction, we would expect the opposite: The more
an OEM, for example, exerts price pressure directly on the supplier, the less
he needs to induce competition through multiple parallel suppliers.
[Table B.11, B.12, B.13 and B.14 about here]
The results of the regression on the trust measures for the number of suppliers
involved in pre-development are interesting in that even the significance of the
model itself is rejected (Table B.11). There appears to be no significant
correlation between our trust measures and the number of suppliers in pre-
development, with the same also holding for the complexity and size of the
product. The “direct” approach on the other hand yields interesting insights
into the posed question (see column 1 in Table B.14): We find a highly
negative correlation between the frequency of conflicts regarding IPR and the
number of suppliers involved in the pre-development project. This points in the
direction of our hypothesis, in that the supplier’s intellectual property plays a
pivotal role in the course of pre-development, and abuse of his rights in this
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realm is a strong indication of attempts at rent extraction. The fact that there
is no significant correlation with the size and the complexity of the part may
be attributable to the fact that pre-development is by definition not model
specific – e.g. research on the application of a new alloy can be connected to
a car-model and part ex post, but at the time the basic research takes place,
this is far from clear.
With respect to the development stage, the models including the trust-
measures directly related to the development process (Trust 2 and Trust 3)
have the strongest explanatory power (Table B.12). While the coefficients
here are not significant, they are positive and in the case of Trust 2 very close
to significance with a p-value of .16, which points in the direction of our hypoth-
esis. For the development phase, we also find overal negative and significant
effects of the size and complexity of the product in question on the number of
suppliers involved in the process. We may capture the effect of less competition
in these more differentiated good markets, here. Finally, the direct methods of
rent extraction in the case of development show neither a significant positive
nor negative sign (see column 2 in Table B.14).
In series production, the evidence is mixed (Table B.13). Interestingly,
the coefficient for Trust 5, the measure directly related to series production,
is insignificant (p=.758). Amongst the others, Trust 3 shows a strong positive
correlation with the number of suppliers involved in the first stage of produc-
tion, while Trust 2 also has a positive (even larger) coefficient but is barely
insignificant at the 10% level (p=.132). Only the coefficient of Trust 1 is out
of line, which resembles the importance of trust for the supplier approaching
the OEM for a pre-development project. The “direct” approach yields a very
clear picture (see column 3 in Table B.14). The frequency of price renegotia-
tions with lump sum reductions demanded by the OEM is highly significantly
and negatively associated with the number of suppliers involved in the begin-
ning of series production. In our view this strongly indicates that these two
instruments of rent extraction are substitutive.
Overall, we find somewhat mixed evidence, with most of it in support of our
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second hypothesis. We actually consider our findings to be relatively straight-
forward, if one allows for the fact that we used interview data, in which each
observations is compiled from multiple participants and the questions included
psychologically loaded terms such as “trust”. The structure of our data does
not allow us to completely disentangle these ideas, but we strongly believe that
more research into this is warranted and important.
4.4. Conclusion and Outlook
Trust is an important ingredient in almost all meaningful social and economic
interactions. While most recent economic research, to a large extent due to
availability of data, has focused on the willingness of individuals to trust others
in general, we were able to shed light on the role of trust that has developed
– i.e. been fostered or squandered – in specific economic relationships. In this
context, we propose an intuitive definition for trust that we demonstrate in
a formal model: In the presence of a hold-up situation, we define trust as the
subjective probability that the party with the superior bargaining situation will
be exploitative.
We then show in the empirical part of our study that behavior that can be
construed as appropriating rents in excess of the formal property rights of the
OEM does lead to lower levels of supplier trust, using various different measures
for this. We further show that “trust” is not a single homogenous construct,
but instead different people in the same firm will focus on different factors
when asserting their level of trust in the other party. Some of our measures are
more closely related to the adherence to and respect for intellectual property
rights, other measures are associated with fair compensation vs. frequent price
renegotiations.
We find that an OEM’s investment in his supplier’s trust by forgoing these
(often short-term) opportunities at appropriating rent can pay off: In relation-
ships signified by higher levels of trust we find indication for significantly higher
investment by the supplier resulting in fewer failures and callbacks.
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Our model makes a second prediction which may appear more surprising at
first glance: We show that inducing upstream competition is a substitute for
the OEM exploiting an existing hold-up situation – our model predicts that
higher levels of trust of the supplier in the OEM should be associated with a
larger number of upstream suppliers competing. In contrast to results from
the literature on relational contracts our empirical findings support this to a
certain degree, though not unequivocally. While employing a larger number
of suppliers is related with significantly lower levels of rent extraction through
other channels, such as price renegotiations ex post, the effects of our trust
measures on the number of suppliers is mixed. In the face of our finding that
there is no one-size-fits-all concept of “trust”, this was to be expected – and
shows that more specific research in this direction could be very useful.
Finally, we believe that our understanding of trust as being connected to
hold-up situations or similar settings is extremely useful, but clearly does not
cover close to all potential applications. In particular, we believe that an ap-
plication to settings of incomplete contracts, potentially also in procurement
environments such as Bajari and Tadelis (2001), could greatly enhance our
understanding in this field.
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A. Appendix to Chapter 3 - Regression
Results
Dep. Variable: Prob(Severance) Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a
Own music of severer at t = 0 .0000139∗∗∗ - .0000169∗∗∗
(2.72e-06) (2.65e-06)
Own music of severed at t = 0 -.0000182∗ - -.0000161∗∗
(7.71e-06) (7.10e-06)
Play-lists of severer at t = 0 0.00017∗∗∗ - .0000592
(0.0000301) (.000043)
Play-lists of severed at t = 0 .0000641 - .000207
(.000183) (.0000197)
Music uploaded by severer per day - .00483∗∗∗ .00136∗∗∗
(.00053) (.000382)
Music uploaded by severed per day - -.0120∗ -.00966∗
(.00634) (.00555)
Play-lists created by severer per day - -.0449∗∗∗ -.0186∗∗∗
(.00652) (.00465)
Play-lists created by severed per day - .0775 .0754
(.055) (.0467)
observations 1,521 1,521 1,521
pseudo R2 .429 .312 .469
Chi2 347.12 252.54 379.64
Table A.1.: Free Riding and Negative Reciprocity a): Logistic regressions on
the probability that a given friendship is severed.
Marginal effects and standard errors at mean reported: * significant at 10%, **
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
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Dep. Variable: Prob(Severance) Model 1b Model 2b
Songs listened per day by severer -.130∗ -.0450
(.009) (.0455)
Songs listened per day by severed .00952∗∗∗ .00519∗∗∗
(.00244) (.00154)
Own music of severer at t = 0 - .0000145∗∗∗
(2.38e-06)
Own music of severed at t = 0 - -.0000215∗
(.0000115)
Play-lists of severer at t = 0 - .0000623
(.0000451)
Play-lists of severed at t = 0 - .0003717
(.000234)
Music uploaded by severer per day - .000746∗∗∗
(.000286)
Music uploaded by severed per day - -.00862∗∗
(.00366)
Play-lists created by severer per day - -.0279∗∗∗
(.00707)
Play-lists created by severed per day - .0901∗∗
(.00707)
observations 1,477 1,477
pseudo R2 .0473 .358
Chi2 26.64 201.58
Table A.2.: Free Riding and Negative Reciprocity b): Logistic regressions on
the probability that a given friendship is severed.
Marginal effects and standard errors at mean reported: * significant at 10%, **
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
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Dep. Variable: music files added Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
music friends -5.44e-06 -.0000134 -.0000292
(9.66e-06) (.0000138) (.0000199)
own music -.0602665 -.0666011 -.0920428
(.0585873) (.0827902) (.0928703)
∆music friends 4.24e-06∗ 5.56e-06∗∗ 6.75e-06∗∗
(2.29e-06) (2.49e-06) (2.91e-06)
experienced dummy - -.0423019 .4954036
(.0632985) (.5668963)
time - .0234988 .0301578
(.0155074) (.016886)
comments - 1.478684 1.352071
(4.517221) (4.346862)
messages - .0867128 -.1812929
(1.362083) (1.33175)
play-lists friends - - .0073593
(.0072321)
own playlists - - .4954036
(.5668963)
constant 3.364962 3.906991 5.863737
(2.266137) (2.804955) (3.610217)
observations 177,828 177,828 177,828
groups 25,031 25,031 25,031
overall R2 .0294 .0241 .0208
F 2.96 5.52 9.15
rho .924 .933 .962
Table A.3.: Free Riding and Positive Reciprocity for Information Provision, FE-
regressions controlling for potential user-cluster heteroskedasticity,
entire sample
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
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Dep. Variable: music files added Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
music friends -.0000124 -.0000293 -.0000572∗
(.0000198) (.0000197) (.0000345)
own music -.0593032 -.0661795 -.1171941
(.0590668) (.0836462) (.1071663)
∆music friends 3.87e-06 9.61e-06∗∗ .0000105∗∗
(2.81e-06) (3.71e-06e-06) (4.06e-06)
experienced dummy - -1.636376 -1.314448
(2.713547) (2.485865)
time - .3370503 .2793232
(.17308) (.1722218)
comments - 1.48062 1.352071
(4.511961) (4.346862)
messages - .0533741 -.1812929
(1.376997) (1.33175)
play-lists friends - - .0126578
(.0123971)
own playlists - - 1.011472
(1.176967)
constant 11.12651 5.51823 14.21924
(7.765481) (9.963463) (13.35873)
observations 24,413 24,413 24,413
groups 9,428 9,428 9,428
overall R2 .0472 .0409 .0317
F 2.27 5.93 6.67
rho .725 .757 .896
Table A.4.: Free Riding and Positive Reciprocity for Information Provision, ac-
tive user sub-sample
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
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Dep. Variable: play-lists added Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
play-lists friends -.0002687 -.0007544 -.0013166∗∗
(.0005835) (.0007107) (.0006179)
own play-lists -.1671713∗∗∗ -.2086505∗∗∗ -.2901718∗∗∗
(.0393094) (.0453584) (.0489084)
∆play-lists friends .0009297∗∗ .0010383∗∗ .0010542∗∗∗
(.000391) (.0004011) (.0003998)
experienced dummy - .0046399 .0072075
(.0084659) (.0085653)
time - -.0046172∗∗∗ .0019167
.0010961 (.002046)
comments - -.0715414 -.0329556
(.4122087) (.3545851)
messages - .1556359 .0831986
(.1184353) (.1029976)
dummy active - -.0000785 .0040834
(.0079719) (.0073418)
music friends - - -5.21e-06∗∗∗
(1.97e-06)
own music - - .0123697∗∗
(.0056172)
constant .3138434 .4337222 .5619726
(.0710501) (.0549475) (.2757704)
observations 177,828 177,828 177,828
groups 25,031 25,031 25,031
overall R2 .0435 .0000 .0005
F 9.43 16.51 22.27
rho .797 .923 .975
Table A.5.: Free Riding and Positive Reciprocity for Information Organization,
entire sample
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
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Dep. Variable: play-lists added Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
play-lists friends -.0003837 -.0006297 -.0012703
(.0007793) (.0009335) (.0009274)
own play-lists -.123411∗∗∗ -.1525017∗∗∗ -.2550607∗∗∗
(.029512) (.0836462) (.0808259)
∆play-lists friends .0012131∗∗ .0012077∗∗ .0012261∗∗
(.0005418) (.0005203) (.0005189)
experienced dummy - .0961424 -.0053575
(.1195154) (.1435919)
time - -.0199061 .0036746
(.0116495) (.011876)
comments - -.0874014 -.0446645
(.3545696) (.3362418)
messages - .0924774 .0663375
(.1224277) (.1116464)
music friends - - -.0000168∗∗∗
(3.25e-06)
own music - - .0108558∗
(.0064666)
constant .5901143 .979095 1.46338
(.1505223) (.353222) (.9223387)
observations 24,413 24,413 24,413
groups 9,428 9,428 9,428
overall R2 .0892 .0026 .0008
F 12.18 11.53 24.35
rho .524 .651 .914
Table A.6.: Free Riding and Positive Reciprocity for Information Organization,
active user sub-sample
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
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B. Appendix to Chapter 4: Descriptive
Statistics and Regression Results
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min Max Obs.
When is supplier asked to participate? 2.77 (1.37) 1 6 144
How often is progress coordinated? 2.98 (.57) 1 5 151
Share of efforts absorbed by supplier 3.50 (1.33) 1 5 142
Cost reimbursement if subsequent contract 2.31 (1.52) 1 5 246
Cost reimbursement if no subsequent contract 2.39 (1.59) 1 5 232
Specificity development objectives wrt...
... content 2.33 (.97) 1 5 350
... time-frame 1.85 (.96) 1 5 350
... financial engagement 2.22 (1.14) 1 5 343
OEM’s supplier choice criteria:
... importance of supplier price 5.10 (1.16) 1 6 158
... importance of duration cooperation 4.70 (.99) 1 6 160
... importance of trust 4.89 (.98) 1 6 159
Table B.1.: Relationship Characteristics: Pre-Development (Suppliers’
view)
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Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min Max Obs.
How specific and detailed are specifications? 2.39 (1.02) 1 5 231
Supplier’s degree of freedom 2.91 (.86) 1 5 231
Desired degree of freedom 3.62 (.77) 1 5 229
OEM’s contribution to development 2.37 (1.10) 1 5 200
Frequency of IPR conflicts 2.24 (.87) 1 5 194
OEM’s supplier choice criteria:
... importance of supplier price 5.37 (.72) 2.5 6 387
... importance of duration cooperation 4.52 (1.00) 1 6 387
... importance of personal contact 4.52 (.98) 1 6 387
... importance of certification 4.39 (1.14) 1 6 377
... importance of trust 4.90 (.93) 1 6 384
Table B.2.: Relationship Characteristics: Development (Suppliers’ view)
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min Max Obs.
How often does OEM produce part himself? 1.69 (1.31) 1 6 210
OEM’s supplier choice criteria:
... importance of supplier price 5.70 (.52) 3 6 253
... importance of duration cooperation 4.38 (1.07) 1 6 253
... importance of personal contact 4.44 (1.10) 1 6 253
... importance of certification 4.28 (1.19) 1 6 250
... importance of trust 4.73 (.98) 1 6 252
Table B.3.: Relationship Characteristics: Series Production (Suppliers’
view)
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min Max Obs.
Number of competing suppliers 2.16 (.84) 1 5 137
Frequency of subsequent development projects 3.23 (1.11) 1 5 322
How often were projects discontinued in last 5 yrs. 2.00 (.88) 1 5 139
How often were the following employed...
... preselection of a specific supplier 4.43 (1.26) 1 6 351
... procurement among a ltd. number of suppliers 3.95 (1.44) 1 6 338
Table B.4.: Procurement Decisions: Pre-Development (Suppliers’ view)
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Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min Max Obs.
Frequency joint procurement dev. and production 3.76 (1.24) 1 5 363
Number of suppliers employed during...
... product planning 2.22 (1.13) 1 5 167
... product specification 2.03 (1.02) 1 5 177
... concept development 2.12 (1.07) 1 5 208
... detailed development 1.51 (0.90) 1 5 210
How often were the following employed...
... preselection of a specific supplier 3.06 (1.52) 1 6 259
... procurement among a ltd. number of suppliers 5.18 (1.10) 1 6 264
... open procurement 1.97 (1.41) 1 6 255
Table B.5.: Procurement Decisions: Development (Suppliers’ view)
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min Max Obs.
Number of suppliers employed...
... at production start 1.20 (.58) 1 5 251
... after 1-2 years 1.47 (.78) 1 5 249
... after more than 2 years 1.59 (.81) 1 5 246
How often were the following employed...
... preselection of a specific supplier 2.98 (1.63) 1 6 248
... procurement among a ltd. number of suppliers 4.55 (1.52) 1 6 248
... open procurement 2.44 (1.66) 1 6 243
Table B.6.: Procurement Decisions: Series Production (Suppliers’ view)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(1) Trust 1 1.00
(2) Trust 2 .250 1.00
(.048)
(3) Provision IPR -.0296 -.037 1.00
by supplier (.764) (.663)
(4) Provision IPR -.036 .202 .443 1.00
by OEM (.718) (.016) (.000)
(5) Difference in -.009 -.185 .756 -.254 1.00
the Provision IPR (.930) (.029) (.000) (.000)
(6) Provision Costs .037 .005 .120 .032 .121 1.00
by supplier (.557) (.968) (.229) (.748) (.225)
(7) Trust 3 .535 .432 -.046 .136 -.147 -.018 1.00
(.000) (.000) (.569) (.092) (.071) (.889)
(8) Trust 4 .339 .385 -.030 .052 -.078 -.193 .509 1.00
(.000) (.000) (.663) (.447) (.260) (.002) (.000)
(9) Trust 5 .320 .382 -.090 -.011 -.104 -.143 .408 .700 1.00
(.000) (.002) (.365) (.912) (.296) (.025) (.001) (.000)
Table B.7.: Pairwise Correlations of Trust Measures
(p-values)
Trust 1: importance of the trust relationship with the OEM in a firm’s decision
to initiate a pre-development project (six-point scale ranging from 1–no relevance
to 6–very high relevance). Trust 2: How do you evaluate mutual trust between
OEM and supplier with respect to honoring each otherÕs intellectual property rights
(IPR)? (five-point scale ranging from 1–very little to 5–very high) Trust 3 to 5: How
important is trust in the OEM’s selection of a supplier in pre-develpoment (Trust
3), development (Trust 4), series production (Trust 5)? (six-point scale ranging from
1–no relevance to 6–very high relevance)
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B. Appendix to Chapter 4: Descriptive Statistics and Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Trust 1 -.006
(.947)
Trust 2 -.132
(.123)
Trust 3 -.098
(.214)
Trust 4 -.084
(.322)
Trust 5 .208
(.157)
d_soph -.006 .059 .099 .062 -.035
(.982) (.695) (.522) (.686) (.891)
d_big -.023 .133 .075 .119 .001
(.934) (.446) (.68) (.504) (.997)
# obs. 62 126 134 127 61
R2 .000 .028 .020 .014 .036
Table B.11.: OLS-regression results for number of suppliers pre-development
coefficients and (p-values) reported: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***
significant at 1%
140
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Trust 1 -.018
(.820)
Trust 2 .125
(.161)
Trust 3 .079
(.333)
Trust 4 .101
(.188)
Trust 5 -.139
(.276)
d_soph -.382* -.239 -.299* -.238* -.380*
(.079) (.126) (.068) (.060) (.079)
d_big -.161 -.458** -.488** -.208 -.162
(.498) (.015) (.014) (.126) (.494)
# obs. 97 113 119 206 96
R2 .052 .116 .117 .036 .066
Table B.12.: OLS-regression results for number of suppliers development
coefficients and (p-values) reported: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***
significant at 1%
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Trust 1 -.061**
(.049)
Trust 2 .200
(.132)
Trust 3 .188**
(.047)
Trust 4 .041
(.260)
Trust 5 -.031
(.758)
d_soph -.187** -.448* -.462* -.196*** -.186**
(.014) (.077) (.057) (.010) (.014)
d_big -.153* -.256 -.229 -.154** -.167**
(.053) (.323 (.364) (.049) (.034)
# obs. 244 59 63 249 248
R2 .066 .170 .195 .057 .053
Table B.13.: OLS-regression results for number of suppliers series production
coefficients and (p-values) reported: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***
significant at 1%
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(1) (2) (3)
Frequency IPR conflicts pre-development -.389***
(.003)
Frequency discont. of projects by OEM .079
(.350)
Frequency IPR conflicts development .035
(.710)
Adequate license fees -.014
(.879)
Frequency price renegotiation -.125***
(.000)
Efforts at extraction of cost info .005
(.801)
d_soph .028 -.265* -.090
(.139) (.091) (.192)
d_big .261 -.079 -.090
(.179) (.643) (.200)
# obs. 111 147 195
R2 .102 .024 .133
Table B.14.: OLS-regression results: Relationship of different rent-extraction
devices and number of suppliers during (1) pre development,
(2) development and (3) series production
coefficients and (p-values) reported: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***
significant at 1%
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